Man in Rapid Social Change

Egbert de Vries

The processes of rapid social change in Asia, Africa, and South America —a social scientist's descriptive analysis.

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PREFACE

THIS volume could not have been written without the co-operation and support of many. First of all, I want to thank very cordially my friends in the ecumenical movement—at the headquarters of the World Council of Churches, and also in the numerous conferences and meetings on 'Rapid Social Change' since early 1955. Even more important is the background of study teams and groups in the churches around the world who are trying to keep the needle of the compass on the Gospel amidst changing and violent 'Winds of Change'.

Perhaps no single volume can do justice to this ongoing effort. This one certainly does not.

Secondly, I am most grateful to the Board of Trustees of the International Institute of Social Studies, who kindly gave permission to undertake the time-consuming task of pulling together documentation from all over the world. In this work, I have been very conscientiously assisted by Miss Mady Thung, research assistant at the Institute.

Without the support of my wife this work could not have been performed.

E. DE VRIES

February 1961

INTRODUCTION

We live in the midst of political and social upheavals, extending over the width and breadth of this world. There have been other times when, for parts of humanity, epochal changes occurred. But never have they, as in our age, affected mankind everywhere. Dramatic pointers in recent years have been the attack by the Chinese on age-old Tibetan beliefs and institutions, the death of one of the oldest nations and civilizations, and simultaneously, the birthpangs of a large number of new African nations.

We are all the people of the earth; *we* also are all the churches and their membership. From its institution, the World Council of Churches has seen this avalanche of events, movements and inner revolutions as a challenge to its witness and service. After the second Assembly, at Evanston in 1954, it authorized a study on 'areas of rapid social change' and called it a study on our common responsibility.

The study was designed to last three years, to be restricted to eight countries and to deal mainly with four topics. The dynamics of our age, the rapidity of movement, has not allowed those who were in charge of the project to confine themselves to a neat piece of applied social science. The responsibilities of men and women in the cross currents of hope and fear, of progress and danger, had to lead to concerted action as well as disciplined thought.

At the end of three years, at an ecumenical conference at Saloniki, Greece, in 1959, we found ourselves in a process of joint study and action, a study not restricted in scope or field of activity, nor by any geographical limitation.

It had been decided that at the end of the three years, the results of the study were to be recorded in a publication. This is the nature of the present volume, to appear side by side with a volume on Christian action in rapid social change, by the Rev. Paul Abrecht, the untiring secretary of the programme.

It did not prove feasible to record all the findings on situations in the thirty countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, where people or groups of people made their contribution to the study. It was only possible to attempt to put together a picture of Man, struggling for freedom, for human dignity, for

responsible solidarity against the odds of poverty, discrimination and ignorance. A picture also of Christian groups and churches groping for the guidance of God in determining their contribution to a worldwide awakening, for responsible citizenship in an everchanging situation.

I

BACKGROUND ANALYSIS OF RAPID SOCIAL CHANGE

NEITHER in the programme of the World Council of Churches nor in the present volume are we concerned merely with anthropological or sociological theories. Nor are we trying to develop a theory of social change. Such theories tend to be either too general for our purpose, or to be too much limited to one sector of change. We find ourselves confronted with an historic process, starting with the discovery of the globe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, accelerating through a variety of forces, and causing profound changes in the life of people all around the world. This historical development, emanating to a high degree from 'areas of European settlement' [1], has affected Asia, Africa and Latin America. It is a clearly distinguishable force, or rather a complex of intimately connected forces.

In this meeting of civilizations, Western scientists were fully aware of the dynamic, changing character of their own society as well as of the differences between their own and various other cultures. The latter appeared as static and lacking in dynamism. These differences asked for analysis and explanation, hence various social science theories based upon comparison in space (ethnography) and time (history). An enormous amount of careful observation has been accumulated and a variety of generalizations has been made. It would be unrealistic to generalize to such an extent that all changes are simply explained in terms of Man, his structure and behaviour. It is in the differences as well as in the similarities that we are interested. It must be said at once that those efforts which explain as well as describe *social structures*, with a perspective both in time and in space, are the more rewarding ones.

As known from history and from anthropological and socio-

[1] A term used in a United Nations publication: *The Determinants and Consequences of Population Trends*, New York, 1953, p. 11.

logical research, there is not only a difference between modern dynamic society and 'traditional society', but there exists also a wide variation between traditional societies depending upon the natural environment, the culture and history of each individual society. Where do these differences originate? Many answers have been put forward. Two extreme views vie for acceptance. According to some theories, human society is controlled by identical forces everywhere, and differences are merely or mainly a matter of phase. According to some other theories, the differences in culture and social structure are persistent.

Historical introduction

Huntington [1] and his collaborators conceive of persistent or 'natural' differences through a strong correlation between economic and social development on the one hand and the 'cyclonic areas' on the climatic map of the earth. These cyclonic areas are located in the temperature zones of the Northern and Southern Hemisphere, but are concentrated on the North Atlantic basin. This theory attributes great importance to the climatic factor, although 'it must not be forgotten that a stimulating climate is *only one* of the conditions that promote civilization'. [2]

An early author of this type is H. T. Buckle [3], who declares that those physical agents by which the human race is most powerfully influenced are climate, food, soil. They have originated the most important consequences in regard to the general organization of society,' he writes, 'and from them . . . there have followed many of those large and conspicuous differences between nations, which are often ascribed to some fundamental difference in the various races into which mankind is divided.' He adds that 'the agency of climate, which gives man wealth by stimulating his labour, is more favourable to his ultimate progress than the agency of soil.' [4]

A review and critique of these theorics has been given by Sorokin. [5] This sociologist does not deny certain relationships

[1] E. Huntington, *Civilization and Climate*, New Haven, 1915; E. Huntington and E. B. Shaw, *Principles of Human Geography*, sixth edition, 1951, New York and London.

[2] *Loc. cit.*, sixth edition, p. 416.

[3] *History of Civilization in England*, London—reprint from second London edition, New York, 1871, Vol. I, p. 29.

[4] *Loc. cit.*, p. 37.

[5] P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, 1928, New York and London, Chapter III, The Geographical School.

between climate and development, but considers that the sweeping conclusions of many authors—among which Huntington—have not been proved by the available material. It is indeed stretching the imagination too far, if Huntington finds the most important coal and iron ore deposits in this same cyclonic zone. Can one accept a divine Providence, which put raw materials and a suitable climate right in the path of the Caucasians?

There is indeed another school of thought, postulating even more persistent differences in development. This is based upon assumed racial differences in ability or in preference for economic and cultural achievement.

An extreme example of this is the Nazi doctrine of the superiority of the 'Nordic race' as against all other races. The more widespread hypothesis of the superiority of Aryans, or of people with light skin [1] limits the range of inferior races somewhat, but is in principle not far apart from the Nazi racism.

The theology of those who believe in pervasive and persistent differences in genetic stock between races and nations on the basis of a belief in differences given in creation, does not necessarily require a belief in superiority and inferiority. A social theory, however, based upon this theology and developed by a leading group, must almost inevitably lead to the belief in the superiority of this group on the basis of inherited rather than cultural differences. The caste system in India and the *apartheid* ideology in South Africa show clearly how difficult it is to avoid this notion of inferiority and superiority in actual practice. If one acknowledged equal ability, the basis for permanent differences would have disappeared.

One must—as in the environmental theories—stretch interpretation and evaluation a very long way to find any superiority of North Western Europe during the Roman Empire or even the Renaissance, or any superiority of the Caucasians in the time of the Pharaohs or even the first Khalifs. If the Bible calls the Hebrews the chosen people, it is not because of superiority of genetic stock, and if the New Testament transfers this to the Church, there is the contrary of racial discrimination.

To those who believe in persistent differences, static traditional society is diametrically opposed to dynamic (western) society. They see a completely different attitude of man towards the

[1] H. S. Chamberlain, *Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, 1898 (*Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, New York, 1910).

cosmos, towards nature, life and death, welfare and disaster. Even if they recognize changes, they will interpret these as occurring within the given framework of values and attitudes or as a result of racial mixture, but would never attribute them to any capacity for fundamental change. These views may be summarized in the slogan 'Because societies were different for so long a period, they are bound to remain different always'.

The 'evolutionist' theories choose a quite different way of approach. In an effort to understand our society and to show ways to obtain desirable changes, they start from the reactions of the individual in the very small group, still integrated in nature. To this individual and this group they attribute basic human attitudes and build up more complex structures from these elementary assumptions.

Thus the story of Robinson Crusoe could serve as an introduction to economics. John Locke saw political life growing out of man's original right of punishing offence. Man is entitled, 'in the state of nature', to help to preserve himself as he sees fit. This is a right given at creation, to every man. Also owing to his creation as a reasonable being, every man is always capable of exercising it in the right way. By conceding this right to the community, a political society is originated, entitled now to exercise certain rights over its subjects. But this does not alter essentially the freedom with which man is born. [1]

In the constructions of the late seventeenth and the eighteenth century in Europe social change and development generally was no blessing. Primitive man is considered unspoilt, primitive society a lost paradise. Europe, considering itself above all 'civilized' and proud of it, was at the same time motivated by an urge for the natural, the pastoral.

Thus Europe was rational, as well as idealistic and romantic. To the European mind, however, these were no contradictions. It believed in the capacity of man to arrange society to the benefit of all. 'Voltaire appealed to reason and wished to enlighten kings, Rousseau desired to work with the aroused passions of the human heart, being convinced that nature was good and the manifestation of reason itself'. [2]

[1] John Locke, *Two Treatises of Civil Government*, London-New York-Toronto, 1924 (Ed. Everyman's library No. 751), p. 154 ff.

[2] Hans Kohn, *Making of the Modern French Mind*, New York, London and Toronto, 1953, p. 17.

For Rousseau, the evils of modern society were inequality of possession and of power subsequently derived therefrom. But, if enlightened, man should follow the dictates of his own volition and conscience, rather than obey the orders of others. In *Le Contrat Social* [1] he laid down his ideas of society, the people, the nation, where unity was built upon the willingness of a minority to accept the decisions of a majority out of a feeling of belonging. Human relations in society were based or at least should be based upon mutual advantage. Man, in this theory, would be capable of arranging social life to the benefit of all. People had the capacity to change the existing order according to their will as expressed in laws and regulations. Basic in this view was the autonomy of man.

As is the case with all 'models' built as an aid to understanding, the very assumptions of basic common inclinations ('propensities') and rules of human behaviour led to congruous conclusions: the unity of all mankind and the explanation of all different manifestations as phases rather than essential differences.

To those who even in an age of optimism and idealism wondered whether freedom to choose, even if supported by reason, gives enough certainty that in the end all change is progress, the emergence of biological theories of evolution in the first half of the nineteenth century gave support. For a while this was only questioned by a few who could not believe in the basic assumption that man is good and reasonable. These few maintained that the dogma of original sin—and therefore the Christian faith—contradicted the evolutionist theories. But they remained a small minority. In society, as in nature, such was the general reasoning, change is inevitable and the process of competition and selection will weed out the weak and undesirable. Liberal classical economic theory and Karl Marx agreed on this point with Charles Darwin.

The weak will be crushed and disappear—but are they also the undesirable? Or are there in society value-judgements not based upon competitive strength?

In the early nineteenth century, rationalism brought an optimistic view of change, following logically from the biological parallel. Change is desirable as well as inevitable. For Karl

[1] J. J. Rousseau, *Le Contrat Social*, 1762.

Marx social history everywhere is a clash between an oppressed majority and an oppressive upper class. The Marxist theory proclaims the primacy of the system of production over social structures and cultural patterns. Once change has begun to appear in a capitalist system of production it will inevitably develop further, and therefore it can be concluded that eventually all societies will converge into the classless society.

In the context of this essay, we do not have to deal with the theoretical controversy aroused by Marx's social-political-economic theories. We will only point to one element is his theory. Marx postulates that political awareness and action can profoundly change society, at least accelerate the inevitable social changes. Thus he accepts political forces of a mental, cultural or social nature as a catalyst in social change.

The consequence of these views is that the more rapid the change, the faster will the desirable new solution develop. To the masses—industrial labourers in the West, at a later stage peasants in the East—change promised a paradise around the corner.

Thus, the determinist social theories of Marx resulted in an appeal for forceful political action by the proletariat. This appeal, if successful, would mean a breakthrough in an impasse, a rapid change in the midst of stagnation, brought upon the masses in an inevitable economic and social crushing process. In short, social determinism led to strong action for change. Admittedly, it could perform this 'tour de force' only through its marriage with the contradictory idealistic moral roots of the eighteenth century.

As the history of the twentieth century shows abundantly, the belief in the intrinsic goodness of man and badness of society, the doctrine of autonomous man in a society ruled by unchangeable iron laws, has been able to grasp the imagination of millions and has become one of the great ideologies of our age. It has changed society in many countries directly, in others by inference or contrast. As a theory of social change it believes in a convergence of all societies, of all cultures and all civilizations into only one type—the classless society.

But if it is accepted that political movements can change the system of production and indeed society in all its aspects, why would only Marxism as a philosophy and applied socio-political system have such an influence?

According to Max Weber, [1] there can indeed be discerned a number of types of society, each of them characterized by, and even based upon, a different concept of man, nature and society.

He tries to find 'the spirit of capitalism' and the sources of dynamic society in the West and finds its origin in the religious ideas of the Reformation.

Operating with the concept of 'ideal types' he also studied other societies than his contemporary western, capitalist world. In Asiatic cultures, he maintains [2], it would have been impossible to develop the national and worldly ethic so characteristic of thinkers and prophets of the West. Weber then, however, traces these origins of western civilization to a much earlier date than the Reformation.

When he describes the characteristics of Chinese, Indian and Semitic societies, his studies lead him to the conclusions that Confucianism and Puritanism are mutually exclusive; that Indian metaphysics, combined with the concept of caste, created another internally consistent pattern of society; and that the Messianic beliefs of the Near East stand in strict contrast with Asia, where no Messianic prophecies are of social significance.

Obviously, when one describes such a variety of social and spiritual patterns, it becomes on the one hand increasingly difficult to 'explain' the variety out of environment or genetic stock. But on the other hand, the 'ideal types' become closed systems by the systematizing mind of Weber himself. And in this process he tends to stress mutual incompatibility rather than mutual influence and interpenetration. Also, the reader–perhaps more than the author–sees a coherent, persistent picture where change, if occurring at all, is very slow. In short, the 'ideal type' is not very well suited as a basis for a study of social change.

In the discussion of types of civilizations one must, of course, recognize Arnold Toynbee. This historian distinguishes a large number of different civilizations, growing, flourishing, decaying in a historic process as well as existing and influencing one another a great deal in a geographic diversity. First of all,

[1] M. Weber, 'Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen', in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, Vol. I, Tübingen, 1920; Reinhard Bendix gives an interesting survey of these studies in *Max Weber, an intellectual portrait*, New York, 1960, p. 265 ff.

[2] M. Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, Vol. II, Tübingen, 1920, p. 372.

Toynbee argues [1] that neither race nor environment—be it geographical or social environment—is 'the positive factor' which generates a new civilization: '. . . any kind of climate and topography is capable of serving as an environment for the genesis of a civilization, if the necessary miracle is performed by some positive factor which still eludes our search'. Developing his thesis on the geneses of civilizations to their disintegration, he sees as a general factor challenges from the environments as well as from other civilizations and a response which may be weak or strong, negative or positive, integrative or disintegrative according to circumstances.

If the social scientist at this point asks the historian according to *what* circumstances, the answer seems to be—that depends upon the historical outcome. If the response is undesirable from the point of view of the integrity and continuity of the social system, there was either an over-challenge or an under-challenge.

For an appraisal of contemporary societies and their effect on one another one may choose analogies from the past, but the great diversity in space and time makes the method of analogy hazardous. Toynbee acknowledges both physical and social challenges. The former, in his view, are generally obstacles to be overcome—the luxuriance of the tropical forest is an obstacle like the desert—and only in very few cases, notably western civilization thriving on 'new ground', is it a challenge coming from an extremely favourable environment. The social challenge of a new civilization, in many cases, is seen by Toynbee in the disintegration of the previous one, in a few cases only, the challenge of a neighbouring civilization. There is one notable exception: the source of inspiration of religion very often is alien.

Toynbee is the only one among the authors mentioned so far who specifically deals with social and economic changes in Asia and Africa under the inpact of the West. [2] In his Reith lectures in 1952, Toynbee dealt with the 'significant experience' which the non-Western world underwent as a result of the meeting with the West. After having described the way in which Russia, India and the Far East have been hit by the West, he develops a

[1] A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, London—New York—Toronto, 1951 Vol. I, p. 269.

[2] A. J. Toynbee, *The World and the West*, London - New York - Toronto, 1953.

'psychology of encounters'. In this process, he finds, splinters flaked off from the religious core of western civilization were readily accepted. The technological strand in the radiation of the western civilization has overcome a resistance by which the religious strand has been repelled—'there is an automatic selection of the most trivial elements in a radio active culture for the widest dissemination abroad'. [1]

He also indicated [2] that 'if a splinter is flaked off from one culture and is introduced into a foreign body social . . . it will tend to draw in after it . . . the component elements of the social system in which this splinter is at home'. 'In cultural intercourse one thing insidiously leads to another'. [3] 'No wonder that the victim's normal attitude towards an intrusive alien culture is a self-defeating attitude of opposition and hostility'. [4]

In this discussion, Toynbee presupposes 'the wholeness of culture' both in western and non-western society. Although to a certain extent an anthropological abstraction, there is indeed in society, foremost in the behaviour of closely knit small groups, a very potent interrelation between different fields of human life and social behaviour. Partly this is the natural result of the fact that a human being feels to be and generally acts as an undoubted unity. Where man loses this feeling of the integrity of his innermost self and of a close relation between what he is and what he does, he is in the throes of great confusion.

Socially, these interrelations are strengthened by systematic thought and social institutions. For instance, when certain Asian philosophers equate male and female with heaven and earth, sun and moon, *etcetera ad infinitum*, and unity is found behind a large number of polarities, people cannot avoid classifying new influences and new phenomena along a familiar pattern.

But it seems too much of a generalization if one only speaks of splinters of a core of culture, of a radiation meeting with a different intensity of resistance and a natural process of re-integration of the splinter and the core or the various beams into a single radiation after a period of time.

In the next part of our analysis we will expand the 'model' of interrelated forces of impact from the outside and reactions from within into somewhat more specific terms than the historian Toynbee needed for his purpose.

[1] *Loc. cit.*, pp. 68, 69.
[2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 75.
[3] *Loc. cit.*, p. 79.
[4] *Loc. cit.*, p. 82.

Evaluation of primitive society

The approach of building 'models' of society allows wide scope for a free choice of assumptions, anthropological, moral and theological points of departure, and value judgements. It is abundantly clear even from a cursory treatment of various theories and philosophies of society, that all of those contain or at least easily lead to 'value judgements'.

It is almost unavoidable, if one sees stages of development, to consider oneself nearer to the top. It is likewise almost unavoidable, if one sees persistent and basic differences, to consider oneself privileged. Theologies cannot avoid that position either. To the Moslem as well as to Christians, knowledge and acceptance of God's revelation is a privilege.

In the historic encounter of civilizations and societies, the privilege however often leads to conceit, to condemnation or at the best paternalism. In the early contact between Spain and the Americas the myth of superiority was accepted as a theological truth. The eighteenth century, in line with its romantic approach, distinguished between primitive and highly civilized old Asian societies, e.g. China, India, Japan. At that juncture in history, Europe was prepared to adore ancient non-western culture, even if non-Christian, as equal or superior.

Thus, a differentiation in non-western society was made between primitive and different societies. The former type of society became an object of study of the anthropologist.

Anthropological theories have made their contribution to the understanding of change in traditional society. These studies have generally as their starting-point the desire to know more about the life, the attitudes, the social institutions in primitive society. They found their most interesting subjects in tribal society and have only with difficulty adapted themselves to a study of economic and social life in rapid change or to a study of people with old highly developed civilizations. In other words—the transition from anthropology to sociology is not easy, nor to be taken for granted.

Very careful and detailed studies in cultural anthropology have first of all ascertained that 'primitive society' in nearly all its aspects is far more complicated than the early observers surmised. Individual, group- and social life is an integrated whole, and human relationships are very carefully and often minutely arranged.

If at all, the concept of 'the wholeness of culture' will apply in this kind of society, where all relations are interrelated.

Small wonder that specifically in primitive society wise and far-sighted men, when they met with carriers of western civilization, understood that it was for them a matter of total rejection or total acceptance of the new ideas and structures. One of the symptoms of this insight is the attitude towards Christianity and Islam, the religions of revelation. Acceptance of one God must mean the complete breakdown of animistic society.

The scientists describing primitive society are often taken in by the charm of these societies. They describe the fears and unfulfilled desires of these people, but see no easy way of changing society without losing the attractive human characteristics of its way of life.

These theories therefore often lead to the conclusion that adaptation and transformation are out of the question, that the resistances to change are all-powerful and that in fact the contact with western society must lead to a crumbling of weaker economic structures. The Dutch economist Boeke was one of the most consistent advocates of this view. [1]

These theories at the same time easily lead to the conclusion that western society and western man are superior and that, in order to protect the weaker ones, for a long period to come, leadership must remain in western hands. In this group we find the protective, paternalistic 'colonialist' pattern of thought as expressed in many western European attitudes towards Asian and African society.

The evolutionist theories, emanating from the French rationalists and idealists as well as Jefferson and Marx easily lead to the conclusion that all men are equal, but that western ideologies are superior. In order to bring these western achievements to Asia and Africa, rapid change is necessary. In order to accelerate change, these continents need strong indigenous leadership. We find here a great similarity between the liberal-capitalistic view (the forces and virtues of the 'American way of life') and the Marxist-communist thesis. Let old society and old ideas disappear as soon as possible through the positivist forces of technology, profit and reason.

None of these (two, or if one wants to differentiate, three)

[1] J. H. Boeke, *Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Economies, as exemplified by Indonesia*, Haarlem, 1953.

approaches to change in traditional society is based upon biblical or essentially Christian concepts of man and society. Nevertheless, Christians, churches and missions have often yielded to the temptation of an easy acceptance of one of those theoretical concepts of foreign societies—or worse, have preached one concept and acted according to a conflicting theory—and have failed to scrutinize carefully both western and non-western society, the clash between different structures, the changes in social functions of various institutions, and the impact on man himself. This has resulted in a deplorable shortage of unbiased approaches to non-western societies in relation to the Gospel. But worse, it has impeded spiritual help in situations where the inevitable tensions and changes affect the integrity of man, his ability to judge, and his capacity to change out of choice rather than necessity.

II

HOW TRADITIONAL SOCIETY CHANGES

It seems possible to describe the processes of change in non-western countries during the last century in rather general terms because the impetus largely came from an interconnected range of forces from the outside. The ways these influences were accepted or rejected, the intensity of their impact, the speed of change engendered in the societies affected, differs from country to country and situation to situation. This can be attributed to the variations in the 'package' coming from the outside as well as to the differences in the internal structure and functioning of these non-western societies.

We shall try to sort out the processes of change inside Asian, African and Latin American societies in the light of some social forces operating within as well as in the contact between societies.

As tools in our analysis of the processes of rapid social change we choose a mechanical and a chemical concept in conjunction.

The mechanical concept used is the 'prime mover', the chemical concept—in fact a dual one—the 'catalyst' and the 'inhibitor'. The use of these concepts does not imply that we consider social phenomena to be essentially of a 'mechanical' or 'chemical nature'. Nor does the use of the concept 'prime mover', commonly used in technology, have the pretension of pointing to 'ultimate cause' as used in philosophy (Aristotle) or in theology. It rather is a social agent, affecting from the outside a different society.

These concepts can be defined briefly as follows:

a *prime mover* is a machine, which puts another machine into motion,

a *catalyst* or catalytic agent accelerates a reaction and often transfers energy from one system into another,

an *inhibitor* prevents or slows down a reaction or the transfer of energy.

The use of these concepts—as all conceptualization—has the disadvantage of schematizing and of overlooking certain forces which in particular cases are very powerful. They were chosen for an analysis of 'rapid social change' in our age because of the over-riding effect of dynamic, industrializing, expansionist society, in the West over the last century and a half, on traditional, slowly changing societies in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

We therefore knowingly, in our analysis, lay much weight on the variety of influences from the West. But 'prime movers' may very well also develop in one Asian society or philosophical system and spread from there to other parts of the world. One example is the principle of non-violent resistance, developed by Mahatma Gandhi which has made its impact in much wider circles than the country of its origin.

The use of these concepts implies that the processes take time and that it would be possible, historically, to trace their origin and to analyse those social forces, motivations and attitudes, as well as institutions which affected the degree of change.

In some cases the changes are so sudden that they appear to be instantaneous and can be described as a *shock* rather than a measurable movement or reaction. We will come across such cases and will then have to assume a predisposition for change, where a small force has a trigger effect. It does, in my opinion, not invalidate the use of the main tools of analysis.

The usefulness of the concepts, selected for this analysis, would of course only be established scientifically, if it could be shown in a quantitative way, what similarities and dissimilarities in the processes of change we found to be related to different combinations of 'prime movers', 'catalysts' and 'inhibitors'. This would have to be done in a single society (explaining certain imbalances or cultural lags), but also in a number of societies on a comparative basis. Such an attempt would greatly exceed the possibilities of research and analysis for the present study. It surely cannot be expected that all phenomena will fit the chosen pattern of analysis. In the historic reality of peoples' action, in social structures and changes in society, other factors will have played a role.

Nevertheless, as a first approach to the complex changes in the world since the colonial age and mechanized industry, they appear useful.

I · *The prime movers*

The forces which brought about change can be grouped in a number of categories. There surely is no single cause of the change occurring in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

There is a tendency to lump these forces together as 'western influence' and to describe its impact in two different simplifications. The mere fact that the use of the general concept of 'western influence' leads to such contradictory value judgement should warn us against over-simplification.

The relations between Europe and Asia/Africa in the half century 1880-1930 were characterized by intensified colonial administration. How has this relationship been described and judged?

In most of the literature of that time, and in some even today, the following picture emerges:

Through its superior technical (including military), economic and administrative achievements, Europe was in a position to give the peoples in Asia and Africa access to world markets for their products, the benefits of industrial mass-production, improved productivity, better health and education, internal security and improved administration. The energy, skill and perseverance of merchants, industrialists, planters, engineers, educators, administrators (and missionaries are often included) would overcome the lack of interest in progress found in static societies, and would lead towards a world community based upon technique and reason. This, in short, was the white man's burden.

If one looks back upon this same period, however, with the eyes of people in the newly emerging nations in Asia and Africa, a completely different image arises:

By abusing their military superiority and spurred on by the greed of their industrialists for cheap raw materials and markets for their mass products, European governments have drawn the independent peoples of Asia and Africa into their orbit, exploiting them economically, frustrating their indigenous economic growth and national life, denying them the natural right of self-determination, attacking their culture and exposing them to the evils of so-called western civilization. This, in short, was the coloured man's burden, until the day he awoke and shed his chains.

Different as the evaluations of this period may be they both recognize that the tremendous changes in Asian and African life came from another continent, a different mentality, and different social values. Both descriptions picture the impact of one type of society upon another type as originating in and motivated almost exclusively by the inner dynamics of western society. The outcome is pictured in one statement as the inevitable result of good intentions, in the other of evil design. Both statements assume too much coherence in the action and reaction of the various groups.

A comparative historical study would reveal that neither the black nor the white picture corresponds to reality. In spite of the undeniable links between various forces and action groups within society, the contacts have varied greatly in character, in force, and in sequence. It therefore is inadequate to speak only of 'the impact of the West' as a single prime mover operating upon and in non-western society and culture. Various categories of prime movers can be distinguished and in each category one can further distinguish various forces. An attempt to classify them as economic, technological, spiritual, socio-cultural and political forces is made in the chart, pages 48 and 49. It should be understood that these emanate from 'the western world', but not from a closed religious and philosophical system. Sometimes these forces and their carriers (people, books, products), are divided among themselves (viz. spiritual forces). Moreover 'the West' is not a static concept, and the forces emanating from it and operating on the 'non-West' change considerably over a period of time (viz. political forces).

A short description of these prime movers follows.

1. *Economic forces*

Assisted first of all by improved ocean transport and at a later stage also by railroads and roads, the western merchant was able to offer potential producers in Asia, Africa and Latin America a market for surplusses or new products. This brought about an increase in the money economy and the possibility of buying desirable imported products. At a later stage, the western entrepreneur established his own mines, plantations and processing industries in these countries, thus creating a large group of labourers to whom money wages were paid. These countries and territories became highly

involved in inter-continental trade and dependent upon world markets.

2. *Technological forces*

The economic impact would not have been possible, or would have been much less intense, without the new western techniques. After all, inter-continental trade in spices, gems, gold, silk, furs and similar high valued commodities had gone on for thousands of years without changing to any marked degree the structure of society. The circumnavigation of the globe, however, became possible in the late Middle Ages when men learned to determine a ship's location on the high seas. At a later date, steamships and railroads, the application of mechanical power in industry, western medicine, modern armaments and a host of other technological achievements made western penetration of these cultures possible, and in turn aroused awe, inquisitiveness, envy, frustration, and imitation.

3. *Spiritual forces*

Throughout the period of closer contact, western people have themselves experienced a change in their patterns of religious and philosophical thought. The two main expressions of this process, so far as contact with the nations of the East is concerned, have been a strong missionary movement and the spread of secularism in the sense of the self-sufficiency of Man, of which rationalism and positivism are the philosophical base. One can hardly understand the leaders of the new nations, their state of mind and their policies, without taking into account the effect of these conflicting, but strangely intertwined, western spiritual forces.

4. *Socio-cultural forces*

In this field, it should first of all be noted that, especially in the eighteenth century, the highly developed cultures of India, China, and Japan amazed European visitors and were held in high esteem throughout Europe after they became known through their literature and art. Gradually, however, the flow of socio-cultural influence became more one-way. Largely because of western technology, the western way of life was felt to be superior throughout most of the nineteenth century.

Schools for formal western education and the printing press spread the values of western social and cultural life. At a later date the means of mass communication, especially the films and the radio, introduced western ideologies and ways of life to the masses.

5. *Political forces*

Political influences from the outside generally started with treaties between the ruler of a country and an outside group. More often than not these were followed by recognition of the suzerainty of some European power, a 'treaty of protection', and often a direct or indirect colonial administration. This deeply affected the relation between ruling groups and the people. These political events were generally accompanied by the introduction of public works, government services, bureaucracies, new kinds of taxation and new forms of popular participation in the territories' public affairs, leading to the introduction of western democratic institutions.

Even though the national sovereignty of these countries—Japan, China, Thailand, Iran, Ethiopia, Liberia, and the Latin American republics—was recognized by the international community, it was subject to the operation of forces from abroad throughout most of the last century. To call these countries pseudo or crypto-colonial would go a bit far, but undeniably the large European powers with all their bickerings and strife made themselves felt throughout the world.

As the outline in the chart indicates the political forces operating in and emanating from the western world show a strong and decisive internal dynamic pattern of changes. A completely new pattern of political forces appeared after World War I through the principle of national self-determination, leading to the formation of a large number of new states in central and eastern Europe and the Middle East (split off from the Turkish, Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires). This concept of the national state developed from what had appeared a culminating point in internal development (as in Germany and Italy around 1870) to a desirable goal of international politics. The Bolsheviks had a similar principle up to the time of their victory in 1920, but surrendered it inside Soviet Russia in the interest of the consolidation of power. Nevertheless, they maintained the principle in their external propaganda and policies. The idea of the

nation-state, based upon self-determination, thereby became a powerful new prime mover.

The same cannot (yet?) be said about the new political ideas of co-operation, integration and supra-national power entrusted to regional organizations, such as have developed in Europe since World War II. They may, however, in due course also act as a stimulant to similar political ideas in other continents.

As another example: Since the Fourteen points of Wilson in 1917, and especially the Atlantic Charter in 1941, and the United Nations Charter in 1945, opinion and action in the West against colonial administration have been as strong and concerted as the desire to build up colonial empires had ever been.

Conveyors

In the above list, we have not mentioned specifically the people who conveyed western influences to other continents. They are, nevertheless, highly important. The evaluation of them frequently depends upon one's picture of colonialism, for their energy, devotion, perseverance, greed, and desire for power, were responsible for much in the colonial situation. Ingenuity, inquisitiveness, courage and faith, but also love of adventure, cruelty, perversity, and treason can be detected in the operation of these human 'prime movers' in the history of individuals, groups and nations.

Although we shall have to give close attention to the human situation of people inside societies undergoing rapid social change, we must also look at human tragedy and suffering on the other side of the ledger. Pioneers in thought and action have rarely been accepted by their own society. The conquest of unknown fields of knowledge, the introduction of technical innovations, the discovery of and early contacts with far away continents, the opening up of plantations and mines, the construction of canals and railroads, the preaching of the Gospel, the introduction of schools and of extension services in agriculture, all these fields of human activity have demanded untold sacrifice and have required the risk of property and life. To be sure these pioneers were not asked to come, nor were they sent by the West to transgress frontiers. Whatever they inflicted upon the people who were affected by their actions, they themselves did not come out unscathed. As one result, they developed a deep emotional attachment to their work and to the countries

of their exploits. Many of them identified themselves to a large extent with the destiny of Asian and African people, and formulated indignant judgements on their own nation and their fellow countrymen. Many missionaries, but also a large number of civil servants and private citizens, have thus tried to mitigate the bad effects of some of the western influences, while maintaining what in their eyes was beneficial. The act of identification with Asia or Africa made those people not only 'prime movers' but 'catalytic agents' as well.

Catalysts and Inhibitors

What were the forces, operating inside society in Asia, Africa and Latin America, which led to acceptance or rejection, transformation or assimilation of 'western' influences? Again, it would be a fruitless over-simplification to picture these processes in one single catch-all concept. Although here again one can point to a great deal of interrelation, mutual interference, strengthening and weakening, we shall classify these forces for the sake of presentation and analysis.

As might be expected, those forces are of a more general nature, as they are less tied to historical events than most of the prime movers. In fact, they are not confined to non-western countries and many parallels can be found in inter-cultural relations between western countries.

We shall describe the main catalytic (accelerating) and inhibiting (retarding) forces in pairs, without claiming that in each case these pairs logically counterbalance one another.

These pairs can be described as follows:

Catalytic forces	*Inhibiting forces*
a) reward-awareness	*a*) fear of risk taking
b) generation tension	*b*) generation to generation perpetuity
c) prophetic pronouncement, moral indignation	*c*) the sacral nature of the existing order
d) emotioned mass movement	*d*) rejection of individual deviation
e) (curiosity)	*e*) xenophobia

Before dealing with each of these catalysts and inhibitors, we must make some general remarks.

Curiosity is strongly developed even in static societies. Explorers and anthropologists, as well as missionaries and merchants,

generally found a highly developed curiosity among people who had hitherto little or no contact with the outside world. Indeed, for men living close to dangerous nature, this curiosity is necessary for survival.

Without curiosity, the urge to explore, taste and try the new, there would be no social change. Yet, in itself it is not enough to lead to rapid social change.

Secondly, there is in people, in every situation and in every society, a very strong tendency towards *repetition of a certain pattern of behaviour*. Neither social nor individual life would be possible without a largely predictable continuity—or perhaps rhythm—which is only occasionally interrupted or broken off by something new. This basic fact, as necessary in society as is friction if a car is to proceed on a road, or if a machine is to set tools into motion, will work against the rapid diffusion of new methods and behaviour patterns. It would be shortsighted and unwise to call this resilience against and amidst change in human life and in society mere conservatism.

At the root of the catalysts and inhibitors operating in society, then, we find a polarity in human attitudes—curiosity and repetitiveness. In the process of social change man is drawn by the new and held back by the old.

II · *The catalytic agents*

1. *Reward-awareness*

The broad term, reward-awareness, includes what the economists are used to call the 'profit motive' and the sociologists 'status seeking'.

It is assumed that every individual and group can distinguish between a high and low degree of *dissatisfaction*—to put it negatively [1]—and that everybody wants to minimize his or her feeling of dissatisfaction. This relates to physical needs and the supply of goods and services, but it also relates to social needs—to being cared for, to being held in high esteem or admired, in short all that contributes to one's status. In religion, as distinguished from faith, it even applies to man's relation to the

[1] But indeed, the degree of dissatisfaction, of unsatisfied needs, of lack of status is more conducive to action than the 'objective' status or provision with goods and services.

universe and the gods. Much of western economic life is based upon the assumption, however modified by social considerations, that individuals and groups, as well as enterprises and institutions, have a keen reward-awareness. Profit and related motives—not merely sheer and unadulterated moneymaking—dominate western economic and social life. It has been confidently assumed that everybody, in all types of societies, would have this same keen awareness, that one had only to demonstrate the usefulness of the amenities of life, and of the means of increasing productivity, in order to achieve a rapid change in patterns of consumption and methods of production. There is, of course, some truth in this assumption and the demonstration effect has been described as one of the most powerful agents in economic development.

Nor is reward-awareness foreign to the non-western societies. In no society are people able to enjoy part of the social product without contributing to it. There are frequently in static societies rigid social requirements which must be fulfilled before one can make progress. Often these requirements—for marriage, for instance—are highly demanding; e.g. courage must be shown by killing an enemy or a wild beast before the reward is given.

Likewise, a high status in society—king, tribal chieftainship, priesthood, a witchdoctor's position or monkhood—is very often based upon, and can only be maintained at a high cost in personal effort and sacrifice. It is also true that gadgets from a foreign society are looked upon with interest and that many people are eager to acquire them in order to profit by them physically or socially. This does not mean, however, that there is a keen awareness of the reward to be gained from joining the western economic and social world. In many societies there has never been a possibility of really becoming rich except through extortion or usury. The prospect of a high income through new methods of production may look attractive, but it is spoiled by the idea that the community will consider that greediness or unsocial feelings are at the root of the economic improvement. What then can be the individual's reward for accepting a change, if conformity with local society is one of the most desirable social goals? In practically every society nowadays people need money. Often, however, it is needed most urgently for precise and restricted purposes—for paying taxes or school-fees, or for buying the annual or bi-annual piece of cloth. What then is the

reaction to a sudden rise in wages or rates for piecework? Understandably, it will consist in seeking a reward by taking two days off every week or in working five rather than eight hours per day. Some remedies for this situation—if remedies are desirable—can be found almost everywhere. We have, however, to conclude that there is in general a *weak* reward-awareness in relation to western ways of life and that in any event it is selective.

2. *'Generation'-tension*

In every society there is some desire among the younger generation to be more or less different from the older generation. This desire is on the whole weak in traditional society. Where young people have specific duties, privileges, or opportunities, these are important in the life of the individual, but not of society. In fact, the continued existence of tribal or group life without perceptible changes may be best guaranteed by the pronounced flow of change in individual lives. Youth can be kept 'in its place' best by those who have just gone through an initiation ritual. It can be made clear to the impatient ones that if one survives, opportunity, privilege and status will inevitably come. [1] Nevertheless even so-called static societies have made some provision to take care of tensions and frictions between generations, e.g. by unofficially allowing a couple to elope.

Under the impact of foreign forces, however, generation tension in all its aspects has greatly increased. Old people lose their nimbus of having an answer to every question and their authority with young people is severely undermined. In many cases children learn to read and write before their parents do, if the latter ever succeed in learning. It is stated over and over again that parents consider themselves uneducated and therefore unable to educate and guide their children.

If that were the whole truth, the relaxation of control by parents and traditional authorities would signify an absence of tension and friction between generations, rather than the existence of strong tensions. Never having had their authority tested, the older generation and tribal authorities indeed are not well prepared to assert it.

[1] In the parable in the Bible about the prodigal son, the younger one was the impatient one, but the reaction of the older brother shows a pent-up deep revolt against the parental home.

Nevertheless the younger generation feels the urgent need to denounce old institutions and customs, even if those who embody this tradition refrain from protest, or surrender. Young people generally cannot content themselves with just doing things in a new way; they must always compare it with the old which they are rejecting. Thus the opportunity for change finds its individual and social expression through rejection of the old. Older people may complain bitterly, but this has little effect on the attitude of the new generation.

Psychologically, this tendency to acclaim the new under the guise of rejecting the old has important consequences in social and political life. At this point we want to draw attention to the fact that often in a remarkably short time the 'white man' in government, church and society has become identified with the 'old man'. Many officials and pastors have been trained by European civil servants, missionaries or educators. When a country acquires independence, with few exceptions, the new authorities feel themselves to be the new generation, and they often express this by denouncing the old, i.e. the 'colonial' or 'white' way of doing things. And indeed, a high degree of maturity is necessary if one is to appreciate fully the good elements in the past, while at the same time carrying forward the necessary amendments and improvements. Japan in the Meiji period (1868-1905) and India after independence (1947 onwards) provide examples of the maintenance of social control by a generation of mature statesmen and administrators during times of political and social reconstruction. But few countries are privileged to be ruled by such a group of indigenous leaders.

Summarizing, generation tension in the sense of ostentatious rejection of former situations, is very strong, widespread, and conducive to the eager acceptance of new methods and situations.

3. *Prophetic pronouncement, moral indignation*

The effect of moral protest against existing or threatening conditions is to some extent a factor in most societies, but at times it becomes of overwhelming importance. In history there are many examples of a prophetic or ethical movement, which fostered rapid social change. As in the Old Testament, the protest of the prophet greatly helped to bring about change, a protest against the existing state of affairs made against the back-

ground of the lost virtues of the past. However, the praise of those old values—righteousness, justice, solidarity—does not mean a return to old structures. On the contrary, it leads rapidly to new forms of social and religious life. Prophets look ahead, not backward. In the process of rapid social change in South Africa and India, Mahatma Gandhi is an outstanding example of a catalytic agent hastening profound changes in political, social and economic structures through his protest against the inadvertently accepted or ill-designed consequences of existing political and social situations. In other cases, a revolt or at least widespread sentiment against specific features of a changing society takes the form of a prophecy. However, resistance to such things as the payment of taxes or the preponderant presence of foreigners is generally of a different nature, regressive rather than progressive, built upon indignation, but not moral indignation.

There have been during the last century, both inside and outside the churches, numerous examples of prophetic witness. Characteristically, this witness has found expression in service to suffering fellowmen, as for example by Gandhi, Kagawa and Schweitzer. The influence of such men in the retention of moral values in situations of rapid social change cannot easily be measured. The many case-studies of such individuals and movements reveal that they all have in common the effect of building bridges between the spirit, ethos, and mind of peoples from different civilizations. In so doing, they have helped to mould the younger generation in a significant way.

4. *'Emotioned' mass movements*

Throughout the ages, rapid social change has been effected through mass movements of a revolutionary nature. It is characteristic of those movements that they are carried by emotion rather than reason. It would be too sweeping to call them purely emotional, but because of elements of emotion in them, I have chosen to describe them as 'emotioned'.

In our age, in areas of rapid social change, the incidence of emotioned mass movements is exceptionally high. This seems at first sight strange in a process which is highly influenced by rational and economic forces. These mass movements often by-pass the rational motivations and may be harmful or even

disastrous from an economic and objective point of view. Nevertheless, they occur and have sweeping effects on the whole life of society.

Their number and power may be partly related to the new means of mass communication. It is not only possible, but an actual fact, that illiterate people all around the world listen to radio broadcasts which incite them to mass action. There is no need for a long process of personal realization of, and emancipation from, present bad conditions: there is no need to work out a practical solution individually or in a small group: the man at the microphone knows all the answers.

His words would, of course, go unheeded, were there not in the hearts of the listeners the half-conscious recognition that this analysis of the situation fits their own image of the world. For people faced with tremendous problems of transition between an old world and a new one, the promise of a quick and easy solution comes like a Gospel. To follow the new leader is the logical answer. If many of those movements exist now in developing countries, let us not forget the influence of the printing press on the spreading of the theses of Martin Luther in 1517, or the emergence of the Populist movement and the Ku Klux Klan in a period of rapid economic and political change and slow social adjustment in different parts of the United States. The non-violent resistance and action by large groups of negroes in the USA and of Bantus in South Africa are a new and important form of emotioned mass movement, requiring a great element of self-restraint as much as emotion.

We shall have to discuss these movements in more detail in a later chapter. May it suffice here to state that the emotioned mass-movement has become one of the most powerful catalysts in rapid social change, and that its incidence is constantly increasing because of the progressive introduction of mass media of public opinion formation.

The carriers of catalytic forces

As in the case of the prime movers, we must ask what is the function of specific institutions, small groups, and individuals in the process of absorbing the new influence from abroad into existing social systems.

First, the role of the newly emerging educated class, students and young leaders cannot be overemphasized. In the changing

situation, political leaders and organizers of mass-movements (labour-unions, political parties) play a predominant part. They can combine, through their actions as well as their promises, nearly all the catalyzing effects described above. To the outsider, their influence may seem inordinately great, and some may be called demagogues by their adversaries, but their prominent position fits precisely into the pattern.

Secondly, women, even girls, very often promote the new order in society either through their own courageous action or by stimulating men into action.

Thirdly, the old concept that the possession of knowledge implies magic power is being transferred to the teacher of western science. The desire for knowledge, primarily technical knowledge, is insatiable. Reward-awareness and the desire for renewal (generation tension) make young people very susceptible to the influence of teachers. If it is to be fully effective, however, people must see the school and the teachers as an institution of their own, and no longer as a foreign influence.

Fourthly, there is the group of new industrialists, a developing middle-class, who are more aware than others of the possibilities in economic development for their own progress. The profit motive is strong in the action of these people. Once they become influential, they receive support from a rapidly growing group of technicians of all sorts.

In some countries—as for instance Japan and some Middle East countries—this middle class found its origin in merchants rather than industrialists. Being even more mobile and bent upon relations with the outside world, the merchant and banker has become in these countries an influential carrier of new ideas and attitudes.

Fifthly, there is a small but influential number of prophets, the proclaimers of the new age. India, particularly, is fertile ground for these emerging prophets of social renewal with their moral impact upon people. But the renewal movements in Islam and more recently in Buddhism have become also the carriers of an old gospel in new forms. The Christian churches in areas of rapid social change, particularly through their ecumenical contacts, likewise bring a message of social renewal.[1]

[1] Paul Abrecht shows in the parallel volume, that the churches find great difficulty in accepting the typical catalytic forces for change, with the exception of 'moral indignation'.

III · *The inhibitors*

1. *Fear of risk taking*

Any innovation brings risks, and to a large extent even new and incalculable risks. People have to weigh these risks against the possible profits or rewards which may lead to acceptance of the innovation. Any honest agricultural extension officer can remember cases where peasants surprisingly rejected something new only to be vindicated by further research or experience. It is also part of man's nature to overestimate the unknown risk. Some—the adventurous—may similarly exaggerate the unknown profit or reward, but most people will underestimate the possible gain. Socially, a new departure may mean glory or shame, victory or defeat and one's status in society is rarely so high or indestructible that defeat can be easily overcome. For a witchdoctor as for a surgeon, one failure equals at least five successes. A cautious approach because of the risk involved often counterbalances reward-awareness.

2. *Generation to generation perpetuity*

When we remarked that in traditional society generation tension is generally low, we might also have said that there is a high propensity for cultural transmission from one generation to another. Here again, cultural, religious, or social institutions may reinforce this natural tendency in a society where the need and opportunity for change is low in any case. In some instances these institutions have had a profound effect on social behaviour and national life. The prescription of filial piety by Confucius has moulded Chinese life for over two thousand years. It has fostered amongst other things the imitation of the life of the father by the son. However, as this was based upon a moral principle rather than a rigid institution it left some freedom for the individual. The perpetuation of family life becomes much more strongly entrenched in the Indian caste system, which very often limited job opportunities for the young generation to one or very few. In many tribal societies traditional institutions are often kept alive by the rigid patterns of behaviour, set for certain age groups, and abruptly changing when certain barriers are overcome (initiation, etc., etc.). This social pattern keeps 'vested interests in perpetuity' very close to people who might otherwise want a change. We may conclude that where society

is institutionalized so as to make a break in generation perpetuity a moral, religious or social crime or transgression, change has become very, very difficult.

3. *The sacral nature of the existing order*

A powerful weapon against the prophets of change is the prevalent feeling that the existing order is sanctified by usage and perhaps even by sacral ceremonies. Even in dynamic societies many institutions are perpetuated because they are considered to be of a sacral nature. People without a living faith may have their children baptized, or circumcised, or may call a priest to pronounce absolution when they are dying. In peasant society in Asia and Africa most of economic life is of a more or less sacral nature.

The prophetic challenge or the ethical admonition is very often countered by the fear of upsetting the magic or sacral order of things. No doubt in many cases this fear is a screen behind which vested interests protect themselves. From Amos onwards these have been a most powerful obstacle to the renewal demanded in the name of God.

A process of secularization is needed to discover both the ethical choice and the choice between obedience and disobedience to God. It is also needed to allow medical treatment or improved animal husbandry (the problem of the sacred cow in India!).

4. *Rejection of individual deviation*

It is as difficult to engage in an individual deviation as it is easy to co-operate in an emotioned mass-movement, especially if this deviation has a rational or economic motivation. In many societies, individual deviation is only permitted to special guardians of the gods, e.g. the mentally disturbed people. According to the Old Testament, David used it deliberately to escape from the wrath of his enemies. It may seem far-fetched, but to many traditional groups the deviationist can only be crazy.

Generally a group is needed to secure wide social acceptance of an innovation.[1] Conversely, where a mass movement has once started, most obstacles to change disappear. The forces of conformity may very suddenly and sometimes completely unexpectedly reverse from retarding to accelerating change.

[1] E.E. Hagen, 'How Economic Growth Begins: a general theory applied to Japan', *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Cambridge, Mass., Fall 1958.

5. *Xenophobia*

In some societies a strong propensity has developed to reject anything alien. Often this tendency is equivalent to resistance to anything new. I believe that this attitude is basically foreign to human nature.

However, it is a fact that individuals, groups, and in some cases whole nations, may be conditioned into xenophobia. There are in most countries in the West as well as in the East isolated groups of villages which perpetuate their culture in whole or in essence by a general taboo against anything new or foreign. The Amish in the USA are a widely publicized example. To perpetuate a given social stratification and leadership by inculcating xenophobia in the group or tribe has been described by various anthropologists.

In some cases, the ruling groups may succeed in maintaining their own contact with the outside world, while denying this privilege to their rank and file. Japan in the Tokugawa period is an example, especially between 1750 and 1850. The so-called iron and bamboo curtain policy is a more modern form of a similar attitude. This practice, or effort—in the end—is generally futile.

6. *The protectors of the old order*

The forces in the human mind and in society which retard or prevent change also are carried by individuals and small groups.

In many cases the 'protectors of the old order' are moved to resist change by personal or group interests. This one might call a negative reward-awareness, stronger even than the awareness of risk involved in change. It would, however, be onesided and futile to attribute all resistance to change to ruling class interests.

If innovations are offered and rejected, some proponents of change soon cry with disdain: 'traditionalism', 'conservatism'. But to reduce the counteracting forces to a mental attitude alone, is also an over-simplification.

The protectors of existing social stratification and of prevailing authority cannot use the tools of the innovators. Only occasionally can they mobilize masses against new habits and foreigners. They cannot constitute a group with a demonstra-

tion-effect on others, like the new middle-class. They work behind the scenes as much as possible.

They are generally paternalistic in family life, in government and in the church.

They utter well-meant warnings against risks and dangers of all kinds—in life in town, in investment in new ventures, in the choice of a marriage partner, in upsetting the magic forces of nature. They may well be the elders in the church, or the grandmothers. But they may also be those who have vested interests in government or in the local community.

Small wonder that the proponents of change are aroused against friendly paternalism as much as against oppression and exploitation. They have learned by experience that inhibiting forces are present everywhere at least in a latent form, and that the protectors of the existing order exploit doubt, fear and hesitation.

IV · *The shock*

In the above, an attempt has been made to classify the external and internal forces leading to change, or resisting transformation. The inference has been that in this interplay time plays an important role. Indeed, very often, although we speak of *rapid* social change, the various elements and stages in the process can be distinguished: the old and the new blend, or exist side by side.

But there are other situations where the upheaval may be sudden, almost catastrophic. This is the case particularly where *physical violence* is involved.

Some examples may indicate the effects of such a 'shock' better than an attempt to generalize.

The war in Asia and four years of Japanese occupation, with the complete disappearance of European authority and status, made a profound and lasting impact on the Indonesian people. The peasant-by-day and soldier-by-night life of the villagers engendered by the military and revolutionary movements is almost inextinguishable, even by the Indonesian government.

The emergency in Kikuyu land in Kenya led the government to transfer the people—by force—to large compounds. This destroyed the strong and deep-rooted tribal society to such an extent that it has been possible and even necessary to recon-

struct agriculture and village life along a completely new pattern.

The appearance of Japanese and Allied troops and the strange behaviour of large groups of young men on the beaches of New Guinea shook the Papuan's belief in the magic equilibrium of life to a greater degree than all the educational, missionary and administrative activities in a whole generation.

The Russian revolution of 1917 followed a crushing defeat; the course of events was to a large extent dependent upon specific tragic coincidences.

Similarly, the defeat of the Japanese imperial navy and armies and the occupation by American troops brought about changes in ethical and social values in Japan in eight years which the preceding eighty years had been unable to accomplish.

The independence granted to Ghana in 1957, but perhaps more dramatically the announcement by General de Gaulle of the plebiscites to be held in 'Overseas France' in September 1958, caused a shockwave of nation building in Africa. Its rapidity surprised the Africans themselves more than the —admittedly few—sociologists and political scientists who had closely followed the situation.

An analysis of the few examples given, and of many others, would undoubtedly reveal underlying causes of great importance and the gradual build-up of tensions. The shock has generally had a *trigger effect*, and the dynamics can be more easily seen *a posteriori* than predicted *a priori*.

One may therefore predict that the unexpected will happen in the tense situations in areas of rapid social change—unexpected to the social scientists and to the statesmen, as well as to the inhabitants of these areas themselves. In fact, the latter may be expecting the miraculous, the complete renewal.

V · *Attitudes and Institutions*

It appears from this description of prime movers, catalysts and inhibitors, that some of the forces leading to or retarding change operate through and in the minds of people. In order to achieve social change, the attitudes of individual men and women and of groups must change.

There are, however, also forces operating through changes in old institutions or through new ones. The school established by

a missionary, the new shop opened by a merchant, the road built by a government and the taxes imposed by the same government affect society directly. These institutional changes have very often been imposed upon non-western society rather than elected by it. Areas of rapid social change are characterized by a multitude of changing attitudes because new institutions have provided the individual with a widely increased array of opportunities and choices. At the same time, of course, non-western society has introduced many new institutions because changing attitudes towards life, work, society, and nature required new forms of social expression.

In this study, we want to refrain from a hypothetical or philosophical approach which would 'explain' all behaviour patterns as the result of social organization or methods of production. In many cases the spirit of people prevailed over institutional patterns.

However, we would not deny the profound influence which social institutions have upon the attitudes, the motivations, and behaviour of man. Especially in cases where the new elements are of foreign origin, as is so often the case in areas of rapid social change, we may expect tensions and contradictions, the outcome of which may depend upon mental attitudes as well as institutional forces.

Perhaps we can illustrate this joint effect of institutions and attitudes by a few examples.

Before the International Labour Office was founded in 1921, the emerging industrial labour force in India was badly organized. Two institutional decisions were made, independent of the Indian industrial and labour situation. The first was the admission of India, although not yet an independent state, to the League of Nations and the International Labour Office. The second created tripartite national representation: government, industry and labour. This suddenly gave labour unions in India an official *raison d'être*. Labour leaders were recognized by a colonial government and received political importance. This government, however, did not include in its part of the national delegation the leaders of the nationalistic opposition, the Indian Congress. This combination of factors determined the attitude of the labour union leadership. How could they have remained aloof from the political situation in India? Naturally the Indian labour unions became—first in Geneva,

then in India itself—the spokesmen of the nationalist movement. In short, the labour unions assumed a political anti-colonialist character, quite different from the concept of the ILO itself, which was based upon western class structure. The labour unions in India were nationalist Indian rather than internationalist socialist; government rather than the emerging Indian industrialists was their enemy. Fortunately the government had the wisdom to let the labour movement develop. But in independent India the attitude and structure of labour unions had to be gradually overhauled.

Another example is the impact of technical (agricultural) schools upon the attitude of people towards work, especially manual work. Most of the teachers drenched in western attitudes undoubtedly introduced this institution together with the fundamental basis of an appreciation of skilled manual work. Hopefully, they tried to transplant both skill and attitude to their pupils. The latter, however, entered school in a society where very few educated people—including those arriving from western countries—would ever have to do manual work. When the idea of a technical or agricultural school was transplanted, this institution became detached from the western appreciation of manual work. Very soon complaints began to appear in the reports of school officials and governments—very few of the alumni were operating farms or workshops, the majority were finding a white collar job. I remember that in 1924 the agricultural extension service in the then Netherlands East Indies had to defend expenditures on agricultural schools for prospective farmers by showing how the schools had helped to increase production. Fortunately, one single alumnus, a successful grower of fruits and vegetables, was discovered and extensively photographed with his products for the authorities in order to save the schools.

The impact of new forms of marriage on society and the attitude of people is very striking. In many countries in Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, the mission added to existing patterns of tribal marriage the possibility of a church-wedding. Furthermore for westernized, more secular people, the government often introduced the civil marriage. Thus very often three possibilities were open—with Islam here and there giving a fourth choice.

The authorities rarely imposed *one* type of marriage, but the

freedom of choice often led to embarrassing conflicts of values and attitudes. Who married in church? The 'demonstration effect' of brides in western style white dress and veil was in many societies dramatic.

In Northern Celebes—a fully christianized part of Indonesia —during the copra boom of 1906-1920, the ideal bride wore a bridal gown ordered directly from the Paris mail-order-house 'Le Louvre'. Where economic circumstances were less favourable, only the rich could afford western dress and therefore only the rich married in church. A civil marriage very often indicated a still higher social status, that of government officials and the like.

Thus the various marriage ceremonies were distinguished by the outward status-value which was attached to them, rather than by difference in spiritual or legal meaning resulting from their origin and terms.

A wise judge would undoubtedly recognize as real and valid in court either of these forms of marriage. Churches however have often looked with disgust at 'immoral' tribal marriages and thereby have undermined their continuity and moral values. (The Roman Catholic Church takes the same attitude to civil marriages.) As tribal religions and Islam do not stress monogamy as much as does Christianity, the attitude of the churches towards marriage in areas of rapid social change is very important. We shall deal with these problems later, but I want to point out in this introductory chapter that institutions and attitudes are often confusingly interwoven.

The Impact on traditional society

WHERE DO THE CHANGES OCCUR

What causes change	Hierarchy, Community	Family, Kinship	Work	Concept of Nature
Economic forces				
international trade	merchants gain prevalence over landlords	new horizon opens up for the enterprising members of the group	better opportunities for increased and diversified production	the world opens up
money economy	rise of individualism and loss of social security; increased inequality in income and wealth	kinship groups and small communities lose their function as production and consumption units	direct relation between production and consumption pattern weakens; more diversified consumption becomes possible (demonstration-effect); decreased social security; indebtedness threatens; problems of land tenure develop	ritualism in production loses meaning
western enterprise (plantations, mines, industry)	foreign enclaves develop in community life; race-problems arise; new groups (skilled labourers, entrepreneurs, industrialists) emerge	breakup of close family-ties (migrant labour); young people become more independent	life can be sustained, temporarily or permanently, outside closed society; need for training before job increases heavily	natural obstacles are being overcome
Technological forces				
mechanical power, industrialization	re-evaluation of manual labour; new neighbourhood patterns arise; urbanization	increased freedom through new job-opportunities; functional groups replace kinship groups	productivity per man can multiply, fierce competition sets in with manual craft	natural resources become means instead of magic powers; man becomes independent of nature
western medicine, agriculture, etc.	magic loses importance (witch-doctor)	population increase; need for movement to town and industry	health conditions improve, previously non-used natural resources become available	fertilizers and drugs versus magic
modern armament	opportunities for contact and conflict increase	new role of homecoming soldiers in society	armament becomes heavy permanent burden on economy	natural resources become instruments for gaining power
Spiritual forces				
missions, churches	new groups formed where conver-	monogamous family ideal planted;	new concept of labour develops	mission teaches Christian concept

			stimulated; impersonal work relationships encouraged	
Socio-cultural forces				
chools, western education	loyalties develop outside local community; westernized groups enhance generation-tension	generation conflicts arise forcefully	possibilities for progress for some individuals increase	young people are taught research in natural phenomena
western way of life	new norms set for relations between groups and classes; new prestige symbols	new norms set for choice of partners in marriage, for conjugal life	production becomes means for higher consumption	applied natural science and technology prevail
means of mass-communication	new forms of political power develop	outside world replaces family authority and status	reward awareness is stimulated; advertising increases needs	the faraway and foreign becomes familiar
Political forces				
western domination and paternalism	old hierarchies crumble; dissatisfaction with existing stratification in society arises	old authority questioned, and new one accepted	taxation buys safeguards in economic life	experience of failing magic power against western force
wooing of Asian and African support in European wars	western moral prestige shattered	soldiers meet western women	demand for raw materials in war booms changes economy	confusion as regards superiority of western concepts in the face of death
principle of self-determination acknowledged	new ruling groups appear; strong reaction against remaining paternalism	youth movements develop	national interests affect economic life; labour relations usually politically tinged	large scale rejection of heteronomy in social life; claim to national natural resources
rational principle in government advocated	democratic ideals gain prevalence; from religiously sanctioned to rational leadership	authority based upon example and persuasion rather then status	tendency (temporary) to self-restraint of government in economic life	religious sanctions weakened; moral confusion
social conscience operates in government	equal opportunities demanded	authority again coupled with responsibility	increased role of organized groups throughout economic life	stewardship over natural resources propagated
regionalism, international organizations	the community widens across national borders	wide contacts sought; international travel and friendship promoted	international considerations affect economic life	interdependence of nations in common stewardship claimed.
prevalence of ideologies	widespread tendencies towards a total approach to personal, family, community, national and international affairs.			

III

WHERE SOCIETY CHANGES

In the discussion of the interrelations between 'prime movers' and 'catalysts' in society; or of the impact of forces leading to change and fields of impact, two lines of approach, or rather two dimensions in the approach may be discerned.

The first approach would view the effect of a single prime-mover-type of social force on a particular sector of the economy and thereafter study the gradual dissemination and penetration of the new attitudes, situations and institutions on a widening and, in the end, perhaps all-inclusive part of society. For instance, an economist may study the impact of attractive prices on growing export crops in a hitherto untouched valley and from thereon the consequences of a money economy. The missionary may make a similar study from the stage where the Gospel is first preached to the situation of a new church body.

The second approach would study a specific sector of social life—the family, the use of land, people's attitude to nature, food habits, etc.—and analyse the interaction of various 'prime movers', the catalysts and inhibitors especially operating in this specific case. Anthropologists and sociologists have often selected this way of analysing specific dynamic or stagnant fields of social life. We will use both approaches, as indicated in the preceding chart. It is evident that many interlocked changes can be observed in either approach. One single force may have profound effects upon traditional society in a variety of fields, and these changes may themselves reinforce or alter the direction of influences from other, seemingly unrelated sources.

The westerner, for instance, sees no connection, indeed an antithesis, between missionary and church activity on the one hand and the materialistic, rational economic approach of an entrepreneur on the other. Similarly, the cultural effect of schools seems to bear no relation to the political effect of two world wars. Asians and Africans, however, see all these emanat-

ing from the 'Christian West', and in their combined effect they undermine an interrelated 'eastern' society and way of life.

It would be desirable, not only from a scientific point of view but even more in order to facilitate policy making, if one could predict these interactions. Unfortunately, this is not yet possible and never may be possible.

The concept of 'the wholeness of culture', if applicable in the majority of cases, would be very helpful in this respect, but I am afraid that this is a dangerous simplification. The fact that strong interactions do exist, may mean that old society is doomed to be changed fundamentally, but it does not mean that a predictable new type of society will develop.

As we have said, some people with clear foresight, many others through intuition, felt that the old society would be shattered once the new forces or ideas gained foothold through only one important breach. In this sense, the 'prime movers' described in Chapter II belong together, as they are all rooted in western thought and institutions. Especially when change is offered in the spiritual realm, e.g. through missionary activity, society 'closes ranks' and grows weary of conversion on an individual basis because this has consequences of vital importance for the whole of the community. It may be that there is less reluctance to accept more ephemeral attributes of western society, such as an exchange of desirable products or money against labour, but in essence this also is a breach into old society which will cause change throughout.

There are, mostly in the West but also in the East, people who genuinely believe, or profess to believe, that one should not try to 'introduce change' through missionary schools, community development, agricultural extension and the like, 'because people are happy in their own way of life.' Even if this were true of a hypothetical tribal society untouched by international trade, radio, or the money-economy, the reasoning does not hold for present-day conditions even in remote mountain valleys.

There are also those who genuinely believe that they are justified in preaching the Gospel in western wrappings without concerning themselves with the complex economic and social life of the traditional societies they are disturbing. Unconsciously they may assume that it is precisely the concept of the 'wholeness of culture' which justifies their attempt to change the

spiritual basis of human life without touching the society in which man lives, leaving it to the people themselves to adapt all other aspects of their life.

Neither approach takes seriously enough the human and social problems in societies touched by isolated prime movers. It may be true that all social phenomena are so strongly interrelated with one another and with the personality structure and beliefs of the people, that in the end any one prime mover will change all aspects of personal and social life. But there is no moral justification for limiting change to one isolated area, nor is it socially effective. On the contrary, it is only realistic and responsible to study carefully the interrelated processes and to try to guide them so as to bring about more comprehensive, more rapid, and more harmonious change.

Nobody can deny that in this respect the communists in the USSR and China are masters of 'social engineering'. They have concluded, and have put their conclusion into practice, that in order to achieve their goals they must change all aspects of social life, and not only the ownership of the main means of production. Their strategy has been to make an integrated attack on old social structures as well as on the mental outlook and the social and personal values of the people. This becomes very oppressive for those who want to act on their own responsibility.

On the other hand, a paternalistic system, such as prevails in many though not all colonial administrations and many though not all mission boards, tries to introduce change piecemeal, gradually, in a balanced way, in order to avoid personal and group tragedies wherever possible. This becomes equally oppressive for those who want to develop independently. It would be tempting, but unjust, to end this analysis with a 'plague on both your houses' pronouncement. However, this dilemma forces us to undertake a deeper study of the processes of rapid social change itself, before we try to formulate a more general social ethic.

In the chart, pp. 48-49, an effort is made to sketch the impact on traditional society of a number of influences from the West, in four different fields. Of course, these charts could have been extended and further specified.

In the following chapters we shall deal with some aspects of this complicated and interrelated network of changes seen from

the 'field of impact' (vertical column), but at this point we shall select some of the important 'prime movers' (horizontal column) and indicate their impact upon various aspects of society.

Spiritual and cultural forces

The preaching of missionaries, in a surprising interrelation with western positivism, secularism and nationalism, has prepared many societies in Asia and Africa for profound changes.

The attitudes of the missionary, the teacher in a government school, and the civil servant coincided at one point: they encountered the deep-rooted inhibiting belief in the sacredness of natural phenomena. To the missionary this was idolatry, to the positivist superstition, and to the civil servant an obstacle to be carefully avoided in his relation with people. (If a sacred tree stood in the way of a new road, or a piece of ancestral land had to be sold to a foreigner, what else was there to do but to make sacrifices to the gods, the spirits, the memory of the ancestors?)

However, on the positive side, their appreciation of nature was quite different. The missionary would teach that God created the world, the positivist would teach gradual evolution, and the civil servant would—if at all possible—remain neutral towards traditional beliefs.

Man's acceptance or rejection of technological innovations is determined to an important extent by his concept of nature. In some societies surgeons have great difficulty in overcoming people's fear of becoming asymmetrical through an operation; this can only be explained by their belief that mutilations are carried forward in life after death. I myself have met farmers who asked 'the formula' for a chemical fertilizer—not the chemical composition, but the magic words to be pronounced when this powerful magic material was distributed on the field. It takes a spiritual revolution to make people believe in the material, predetermined effects of technical devices, but once the new belief gets the upper hand, people's relation to their daily work changes completely. The missionary sees here the danger that with the disappearance of idols people will feel no need for a belief in God. The concurrent presence of positivist materialist thought makes it essential that the churches distinguish between superstition, faith and unbelief! In traditional society, however, all areas of human life are touched by the basic magic concept of natural forces.

Primary social relations—in marriage, in the family and wider kinship groups, in the small community—are immediately affected by the spiritual forces introduced from the West. The Church introduces new ideals of family life, based upon the small monogamous family rather than the open, often polygamous or large joint family. In so doing, it clashes with the heart of traditional society. Yet this is done with the intent and purpose of bringing or keeping marriage and family life in direct relation to God. Nor does the Church want to increase generation tension although it is difficult to avoid this when young people want a marriage by choice rather than one that is pre-arranged according to family interests, endogamous or exogamous rules.

The secular schools and western literature and films do not have these inhibitions. Here family and kinship are reduced to a utilitarian arrangement. If there is violent tension between the old and the new generation, rights, values and virtues are all seen to be on the younger side.

In society as a whole, the churches—often unwittingly—attack tradition in a more fundamental way. When men are converted, profound conviction is able to overcome the inhibiting forces against individual deviation. The individual Christian needs and wants new community ties in the congregation, but where the congregation remains a minority group, society and its hierarchical leadership are broken. Over a period of time traditional society may be forced for various reasons to absorb the Christian community into a multi-communal framework; it may thus overcome the breach in its unity and stability and continuity may then be restored.

How can traditional society maintain its character and defend itself? There are two ways. It is possible to condone or even to organize a mass movement to Christianity (or to Islam, which has a similar expansionist tendency among tribal religions in Africa and South East Asia). In that case the emotioned mass movement sweeps away many barriers against changing old society.

The other way is to allow freedom of worship for various religious groups, but no freedom of conversion, no 'proselytism'. By making this rule—which is more social than legal in most modern societies—the existing order protects itself against individual deviation. And where the conscience of believers does

not allow them to refrain from evangelism, there may be persecution with all the fierceness of xenophobia. The persecution and extermination of Christians in Japan in the early seventeenth century is a cruel example of self-defence by a culture and society determined to preserve its wholeness.

Secular positivist thought, which also comes from the West, although basically no more tolerant—as communist persecution of Christians and Moslems shows—likewise questions the existing norms in traditional society. Generally this is expressed in relativist terms—authority and social structure must be constantly changing. It often acts as a protector of minorities, mainly because it sees in them the nuclei for further changes. The 'tolerance' shown by many anti-clerical movements in Latin America towards small Protestant minorities (following the example of France and copied by Italy) can be explained as a protest against the sacral order of society rather than as genuine appreciation of another spiritual reality.

The united impact on society of spiritual and cultural forces from the outside is ostensibly manifested in 'generation tension'. A new ideology may find a warm response in the hearts of those who overtly or subconsciously are smarting under rules for personal and social life laid down by their elders, the bearers of authority. No wonder the pupil and the convert reflect most of the outside influences and welcome the new opportunities in terms of 'freedom from . . .'.

Freedom from the powers of evil is a biblical thought, a promise to suffering, downtrodden humanity. Technological advance has secularized this idea into a promise to make mankind free of disease, of hunger, of want. In the four freedoms of the Atlantic Charter, freedom from fear and oppression is added to these promises of a secular renewal of the world.

A growing demand for individual freedom will soon find expression in a mass movement for liberation. Obviously, this will be more prevalent in the political field than in organizing new forms of economic or social life.

Economic forces

In this complex of 'prime movers' we have selected as a starting point in the economic sphere the introduction of a money economy into a traditional society. The need for money is stimulated by the opportunity to acquire imported products,

is accentuated by the levying of taxes and the charging of school fees. The opportunity to earn money is found in the gathering or growing of products for export, by working in foreign enterprises (mines, plantations, industry). The use of money is growing rapidly in nearly all societies.

In this field 'reward-awareness' is the main catalyst. The economist or social hygienist may point first to the introduction of capital goods for higher production, or of a 'higher' (in the objective sense) standard of living. He may be disappointed when the anthropologist or sociologist discovers that many new products become merely status symbols, of an ornamental nature, rather than a means of production, or expressing a change in consumption habits.

In the thirties, when the agricultural extension service in the Netherlands East Indies offered a fine plough as a reward to the winner in a cultivation test, it found that the addition of a flag greatly enhanced the interest of prominent people. But it also discovered that after two or three years the proud winner was still displaying flag *and* plough in his living room rather than running the risk of damaging the tool by use.

In 1959, I saw in Tanganyika a rather large number of well-dressed African gentlemen carrying hunting rifles. Were they hunters on safari? No, I was told, all well-to-do young men in the village and small town have a keen desire to carry a rifle, as they have so often seen white people do on safari. With game protection laws what they are, and the very high licence fees charged, most of these owners of a rifle never buy ammunition. But the status symbol is there.

On the other hand, a study of standards of living of African families in Nairobi—made in the context of the rapid social change study[1]—revealed that lump sums of money were most urgently needed for the payment of taxes, for school fees, and for house repair. This order of priority following the basic requirements for food and clothing, is quite modern.

If the use of money to buy capital goods is limited and is only developing very slowly, this can be attributed to fear of the risk involved in unfamiliar methods of production. It is often difficult to introduce new means of production in agriculture and to a lesser degree in industry because of popular beliefs in the magic

[1] C. M. Forrester, *Social Prerequisites for Economic Development in Kenya*, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.

element in nature. Even demonstrations in agricultural extension work can easily be explained by the superior magic of the white official.

The catalyzing agents operating through generation tension, moral indignation, and mass movements have little influence on the impact of the money economy on traditional society and the introduction of new production techniques. Governments have tried to accelerate the development of industries or export crops through arousing political feeling. With hardly an exception their exhortations have had little effect.

Slowly, however, the money economy and related changes in technology wear down such strong inhibitors as the sacral order of nature and society and generation perpetuity. In certain fields individual initiative and deviation even become acceptable. As a result these inhibitors are weakened not only in respect to the economic and technological fields, but also in other aspects of human life and society, such as the choice of a marriage partner, or the caste system.

Political forces

We shall postpone a discussion of the impact of political forces on society for two reasons. In the first place, in western society over the last century prevailing political beliefs have changed their content and character much more than have the spiritual, social and economic 'prime movers' described above. This holds true for the internal political structure of the West as well as its attitudes towards Asia and Africa. Secondly, the importance of political developments is so overwhelming that we shall devote Chapters V and XII to political developments.

In this general discussion of prime movers and catalysts, it appears that an emerging generation tension has a political effect on family and kinship relations. As a consequence of political authority extending over large groups, the step towards a mass movement is easy. Once criticism has been voiced, the political mass movement is by nature emotioned. Very few nations can use the referendum to reach a rational answer to a political problem.

The other catalysts are of less significance in political life. It is important to stress this point, because of two exaggerated appraisals of political movements which are very frequently made. On the one hand, the existing authority claims that the

new, revolutionary, political leaders are inspired by the profit motive or are seeking social status for themselves. According to this view, which is expressed as often by national dictatorial governments as by colonial administrations, 'reward-awareness' leads to political movements. On the other hand, there is the claim made by some political leaders—and even more by their admirers—that their movement is motivated by 'moral indignation' and that the words of the leader are 'prophetic pronouncements.'

Certainly for the new leaders there must be no 'fear of risk' to inhibit their actions. Nor can they have any concept of the 'sacred nature of the existing order' if they are to take fundamental, perhaps revolutionary, steps against the constitutional authority.

In 1960, the first viewpoint was perhaps expressed most emphatically by the government of the Union of South Africa, which explains that most of the unrest there arises out of intimidation of the largely submissive Bantu population by a small group of people seeking power. The second is vividly proclaimed by the government of Fidel Castro in Cuba. To the outside observer both situations seem much more confused than would appear from these claims. Good and evil, justice and injustice, are not all on one side.[1]

It must be conceded that the awareness of a 'sublimated reward' is necessarily present in any political struggle. It would, however, be falling into the same trap to explain the attitude of governments by their lust for power, or that of movements for change by their desire to attain power.

In my opinion, both ways of reasoning fail to stand up to closer scrutiny because they are based upon an ideology rather than research. There are several all-pervasive ideologies now operating as political forces. These include:

a) the belief that the existing order has been ordained by God in a historical sequence of events. This was the cornerstone of conservative monarchies in the romantic age, and it is the profound conviction of the nationalist party in the Union of South Africa;

b) the belief in the inevitability of the coming order to be

[1] The events in Angola in 1961 constitute another tragic example.

achieved by the Marxist revolution. Where a Marxist or Leninist government is in power, the coming order is, of course, already visible and equally considered sacred;

c) the belief in the sacral nature of the sovereign nation-state, especially potent where this state has not yet been realized or where it feels itself threatened by foreign political or economic interests.

It is characteristic of these ideologies—as of all others—that they are all-pervasive and intolerant. In order to persist, they try to strengthen as much as possible the inhibiting and conserving ideas of 'the sacral order' and the 'rejection of individual deviation'. Where necessary they will heighten 'the fear of risk taking' by heavy sanctions. They also develop xenophobia in various forms—an iron or bamboo curtain, racial hatred (the Nazi anti-semitism), or a persecution complex. (Castro and Verwoerd both believe themselves to be endangered, misrepresented and misunderstood.) As long as they are not yet in power, they will develop and use suitable catalytic forces such as generation tension, prophetic statements and emotioned mass movements. In many cases, early adherents are promised high positions and other rewards.

The idolatry of the ideology, whatever form it takes, is that it knows no boundaries nor restraints in human relations. It does not respect human freedom and dignity if these stand in the way of the doctrine. The family is not exempt from its all-pervasive influence, as demonstrated by legislation annulling or making illegal certain marriages. The millions who have become refugees because of race, religion or nationality are the victims of this widespread belief in false gods.

A new concept of nature

In traditional society man experiences a close spiritual as well as material dependence on nature, as it changes with the seasons, as it provides means of subsistence, and as it threatens and in the end, through death, destroys human life. Nature is ambiguous, the source of all life and at the same time a force to be feared. We shall not try here to describe, even less to rationalize, this feeling, and the religious and philosophical expressions and institutions which it undergirds.

Man has tried, through religion and magic, to safeguard and protect himself against the vagaries of nature, especially where these threaten individuals or small groups rather than the whole community. Efforts to forestall epidemics, floods or earthquakes are rare. The obvious irregularities of rainfall makes rainmaking seem a promising undertaking, even though risky, and a successful rainmaker is highly esteemed.

The inevitable rhythm of birth and death, growth and decay, coupled with differences in good and bad luck which defy explanation, gave man a sense of cosmic interrelation, of balance and equilibrium. Institutionalized in the great religious, philosophical and hierarchical systems of Asia, it has, through the ages, fostered continuity, resilience in the face of the onslaughts of human and superhuman nature, and personal acceptance of misery, disease, hunger and death.

Applied to *economic life*—hunting, fishing, agriculture—it has led to elaborate magic rituals, intended to safeguard the very basis of human existence. Here it has produced a keen awareness of lucky and unlucky signs and an intuitive understanding of living and inanimate nature, together with a meticulous ceremonial treatment of soil and water, cultivated plants, and sometimes domestic animals. Often, these practices are meaningful and stand up under the critical eye of modern scientists and agronomists; but often they are harmful according to the modern scientific view, and always they are extremely deep-rooted and almost impossible to change. Generally, they are designed to promote fertility and productivity. In Europe, where the Christian Church has been established for over a thousand years, until very recently, and even today, some country people continue many age-old pagan or animistic customs. It may be that the more sophisticated regard old fertility rites as folklore, and that the majority accord them only secondary or fringe importance. But to the anthropologist and psychologist they offer a fruitful field for international and historical research and comparison and establish the basic common human concept of nature.

When this concept is applied to *family life*, it gives rise to rites which run the full circle of human life: marriage, fertility, birth, disease, age groups, death, funeral or cremation. The profound sense of a relationship between the supernatural and the fate of families and individuals gives these family rites an overwhelming

importance in religious, social and economic life. Anthropologists see an extension of them in circumcision, baptism, confirmation, extreme unction, funeral rites and sacraments.

Matters of *sickness* and *health* are indeed of vital importance. The power to heal is one of the most important attributes of venerated men—prophets, 'witch doctors', and all those to whom magical powers are attributed. Obviously, the foreign doctor in his white coat, with his scalpel and drugs, must, in the eyes of the ordinary man, work very powerful magic.

In a number of instances, there has been pure competition between the medical and the magical expert. The struggle between a man without experience in the fight against unknown poisons, and the one who knew nothing about newly introduced 'white man's' diseases, was sometimes hilarious. More often, however, the battle for confidence and influence took more dramatic forms.

The belief that amputations will be harmful in the after life, makes people afraid of surgery. At this point, especially, great confidence in the power of the doctor or a new concept of resurrection is needed to overcome the inhibition.

In his *consumption habits* primitive man keeps his relation to nature intact through taboos (forbidden food). In organized religions these restrictions on the use of the gifts of nature are generally more sophisticated. In Buddhism the prohibition against killing animals led to widespread vegetarianism; to the Hindu the cow is holy; to the Jew and Moslem the pig is unholy. In neither case can the animal be eaten. There are elaborate laws on the use of meat in the Mosaic code, coupled with stringent regulations on the way animals are to be killed, food to be processed, etc.

In a number of cases, taboos and even less deep-rooted prejudices are an obstacle to better nutrition and economic development. To mention only a few examples: until very recently Japanese adult males were afraid to drink milk for fear of becoming impotent; in East Africa there is a widespread belief that eating eggs causes baldness. The difficulty of reconciling Hindu beliefs with an efficient use of cattle in India is well known. Here, however, the consumption of milk and dairy products is not only fully accepted, but they are the mainstay of the diet, as far as animal proteins are concerned.

Rationalization may erode the deeply ingrained patterns of

consumption, but this process is very slow. It might be said that only conversion can overcome the psychological barriers against consuming the unknown, or supposedly dangerous, food. It is not inconsequential that, in the infancy of Christianity, the apostle Peter had to learn to accept non-Jews into the church through a vision of eating what he had traditionally despised!

The reluctance to make full use of nature's bounties for human consumption does not, even in a so-called static society, prevent people from accepting readily newly imported foodstuffs and domestic animals. Taboos and prejudices are most often attached to animals and plants which are part of the cultural heritage of a nation. Admittedly, there are exceptions to this, as shown by the history of the potato in Europe. In 1600 Professor Clusius of Leyden knew that this root was unpalatable if consumed raw, but very good when boiled. But it was more than 150 years before the potato became an important staple food in Europe. We can hardly attribute this conservatism to an animistic concept of nature.

Basic new concepts of nature do not only arise from careful and analytical observations. In astronomy, for example, these have been made faithfully over thousands of years. Yet astrology continued to flourish. Nor do they arise out of a new desire to learn the secrets of nature in order to control its forces. Many forms of black and white magic are based upon this desire.

However, at various points in history, and especially since the Renaissance in the western society of the late Middle Ages, a society in which the Christian faith had profoundly affected the human mind, the notion arose that nature repeats itself in a predictable manner. This brought about fundamental changes in man's concept of nature. Unexpected events were no longer attributed to beneficial or inimical forces in nature, but to incorrect predictions. It implies also a sècularization of natural processes completely foreign to any previous concept of nature, with the possible exception of some old speculative philosophies (and even this is doubtful).

To the Christian the experimental and technological approach to nature as a means to serve man's needs is based upon the belief in God the Creator who maintains his creation and gives man stewardship over it. At the same time, also in natural processes, we believe we are in touch with the Unspeakable Mystery, only brought in view by God's revelations.

To the positivist rationalist nature is a given complex of structures and forces, to be neglected, used, or abused at man's discretion. At the same time, the more we have developed science, the more we know that we are surrounded by the unexplored. The world is unknown rather than a familiar place to live in.

Through western education and missions the new concepts of nature penetrated Asia and Africa. For example, the 'Dutch Studies', made possible by contact with the Dutch at Nagasaki in the Tokugawa period, enabled Japanese scholars to open schools for the 'study of barbarian books': the scientific and philosophical books of Europe of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century.[1] This process was primarily theoretical, but it found support in tangible technological and economic influences.[2]

A drug like salversan proved stronger and more spectacular than magic; tribal and magic ritualism had no meaning in industrial jobs, and in some cases chemical fertilizers have even made man less dependent upon nature. Especially in the rural areas, however, as we shall see in Part II, the old concepts of nature are still a vital force.

Where there is a strong belief that all of nature, dead as well as living, is the seat of spiritual forces, man's position in the world is determined by his ability to control these forces by spiritual means, by 'magic'. The visitor, the teacher, the government officer is then evaluated, on the basis of his performance in perhaps one technical field, as having or missing great magic power pervading his whole being.

Family and kinship relations

The kinship relation might well be called one of the basic principles of organization in traditional society. It was by tracing his ancestry that the individual derived his identity in the group, and it was the common ancestry which kept the group, and in fact society itself, together. Most of individual and social life, therefore, was embedded in these relations. 'Genera-

[1] E. E. Hagen, loc. cit.

[2] There is very little that is compelling, although very much that is conducive in applied natural science as proof against the animistic concept of nature, just as the choice between the Christian and the positivist views is a matter of faith rather than experiment.

tion to generation perpetuity' was the solid cornerstone of society.

The soil tilled by one generation had been passed on by the previous generation, and in fact 'belonged' to the family or the first ancestors who originally cleared away the jungle. Until at least a quarter of a century ago, peasants on Java used to make sacrifices in remembrance of the founders of their village.[1]

Thus, the kinship group, whatever form it took—polygamous or monogamous, matrilocal or patrilocal, more or less extended into clans or village communities—was the main economic unit in many societies. It was within the family circle that herds were tended and fields cultivated and that their products were consumed.

The kinship group was sometimes also the main unit of jurisdiction, as under Roman law; or the basic unit of religious activity: both a subject and object of worship as in many ancestor cults or a subject of worship as in Israel. It was from the family that the individual received his social status, perhaps as a member of a certain caste or of a class with high or low prestige. And often his safety depended on the family, as separation from the family often amounted to being outlawed and defenceless.

As a result other conserving forces, or inhibitors, were entrenched in family and kinship relations—the sacral order of these relations and the severe sanctions against individual deviationists. The influences from the outside had to be very strong to make a breach in this fortress of social organization.

However, western influences of all kinds, education in particular, gain a foothold even in kinship relations by means of increasing 'generation tension'. These tensions can operate in all fields, but they are particularly strong over rules concerning the choice of marriage partners. Here, change immediately invades the heart of family life.

When trying to summarize western influence on family life one might say that it started with an encroachment upon its closed economy. The introduction of taxes, of cash crops and of consumption goods, to be bought for money, certainly must have altered its way of living to some extent.

[1] E. de Vries. 'Landbouw en Welvaart in het regentschap Pasuruan', Wageningen 1931. 'Hurushiati Subandrio, Javanese peasant life, Villages in East Java', mimeographed thesis for University of London, 1951, p. 107.

It is difficult to say, however, whether the strong bonds in family relationships were influenced at all by this first penetration of a money economy. It is likely that these were only directly threatened when western plantations, mines and processing industries started recruiting wage labour on a large scale. But even then one may doubt whether personal attitudes toward the family may have been affected greatly.

Even when the labourers had to leave their homestead, loyalty towards the family remained strong. So for example the Chinese who emigrated to south-east Asia were known to remain faithful to the traditional family, in spite of long periods of absence. Most of them definitely intended to return.[1] So did the Indian migrants, those who went overseas as indentured labourers, as well as the coolies on the Assam tea plantations and, in a later period, those who—unwillingly but by sheer necessity—were driven citywards.[2] In Africa south of the Sahara, the majority of the urban population has remained transitory up till the present moment, and can be assumed at least to intend going home sooner or later.[3]

For these reasons, one may question, whether in the nineteenth century, before 'ethical' or 'constructive' western policy started to take action with respect to native welfare, any change could have been noticed in the institution of the family. As is stated in a different context by an author on Indonesia: 'the investment of capital in big plantations under western direction did not bring about any fundamental change in the social structure in Java', which remained rural in essence.[4]

Data on this subject are scarce, but the evidence to be mentioned in chapter VII on present-day resistances to change seems to provide a justification of our conclusion. In the terms of analysis of this book one could say that none of the single

[1] C. K. Yang, *The Chinese Family in the Communist Revolution*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, p. 139 (1959). Donald R. Taft and Richard Robbins, *International Migrations*, New York, 1955, p. 309 and 310.

[2] Kingsley Davis, *The Population of India and Pakistan*, New Jersey, 1951, pp. 99 ff., 116, 135 ff.

[3] J. Denis, S. J. *Le Phénomène Urbain en Afrique Central*, Bruxelles, 1958, p. 189 ff. Daryll Forde (ed.) *Aspects Sociaux de l'Industrialisation et de l'Urbanisation en Afrique au Sud du Sahara*, UNESCO, Paris, 1956.

[4] W. F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition*, The Hague-Bandung, 1956, p. 94. Due to the development of a western educated class, the change occurred somewhat earlier in India, *The Changing Pattern of Family in India*, Bulletin of the Christian Institute for the Study of Society, Bangalore, 1957, p. 53.

prime movers, neither colonial administration, nor western economy, could by isolated operation, change such a basic institution as the family. Neither could the missions, operating separately, accomplish that, as is illustrated by their struggle with polygamy in Africa. It is only the combination of the prime movers, spiritual and mass-communication forces included, which is nowadays bringing about a change in family life. What problems they are causing, powerfully at work in the present era, will be examined in chapter VII.

IV

ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

The Ascendance of Economic Development

THE concept of long-term, sustained economic growth is only a little over a century old. Former civilizations believed they could expand through military or cultural means, accompanied by wealth in the centre of the state, but they had little, if any, idea of continuous economic growth. It seemed that after a time of glory and expansion, decline inevitably set in. The Old Testament prophets attributed this recession to sin, engendered by wealth. Others accepted alternating progress and decay as a natural phenomenon.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, however, a number of forces combined to produce an optimistic interpretation of human destiny. This was based partly upon a rationalistic view of man and a positivist philosophy, and partly upon a new concept of evolution developed in geology and in biology, which held that natural environmental forces would bring about inevitable and irresistible progress. It derived also in part from the fact that new techniques based upon increased understanding of physical and chemical processes promised victory over the age-old enemies of man, hunger, premature death and dire poverty.

Europe, where these material and intellectual forces originated and culminated, rose to unprecedented power through the use of two innovations: cheap and efficient mass transportation (steamship, railroad) and superior armament made possible by technology for the first time in history. These two factors produced a nineteenth century characterized by the Pax Britannica, guaranteed by the British Royal Navy.

It is irrelevant to our discussion that this proud construction of victorious human endeavour was erected on decayed or decaying foundations, or that internal doubts soon disturbed it, or that large parts of the world had no share in the rapid

economic growth of the industrial heartland of the world. In a number of countries, in both Europe and North America, the economic apparatus, as expressed in the goods and services produced, grew by about 4% compounded annually, or doubled in about seventeen years. However, as a result of medical progress, the population of these countries also increased, so that *per capita* income grew less rapidly. According to a very rough estimate, somewhat less than half of the increase in production was absorbed by the increased population, leaving the remainder available to raise average income levels.

That any increment at all remained was accepted by the nineteenth century with some complacency. The more pessimistic view of the end of the eighteenth century had held that, under conditions of sustained long-term population growth, there would be no improvement, but rather a decrease in available food for the growing population. This warning note, expressed by the Reverend T. R. Malthus, seemed altogether superfluous to the nineteenth century. The bountiful earth was waiting to be exploited by the enterprise of daring, dashing and victorious Man!

We have no statistical data on changes in *per capita* income outside the industrializing countries (which, by the late nineteenth century, included Japan). Some authors point to instances of increases—admittedly restricted to easily accessible, small areas; others claim that the rapid growth of industry in Europe had a detrimental effect on the industrial process elsewhere. The nearest statistical evidence of the latter relates to the handloom industry in India, which was heavily damaged by the mechanical looms of Lancashire. We may assume that in most parts of the world at this time, the impact of economic and technical forces on *per capita* productivity and income was very slight, and that the exceptions were due largely to investments by Europeans who also retained most of the increase in net product. However, population increase, relatively small as it was outside the areas inhabited by Caucasians, was generally compensated for by increased production. In spite of the relatively static conditions until 1930, there was a rather optimistic note in discussions about the long-term effect of European industrialization on economic development in the raw material producing countries. It was believed that world trade and the transfer of capital for the building of railroads and

the development of agriculture and mining would cause rapid development in Latin America, a large part of Africa, and at least, the raw material exporting countries of Asia.

In the twenties, this optimism was strengthened by the idea that Europe was on the decline, that its rate of growth would henceforth be surpassed by that of overseas countries.[1] Of course, this situation, or rise-and-decline philosophy of the post World War I period in Europe, tended to underrate the development problems of the low-income countries in the tropics and sub-tropics.

At the time when there seems to be the opposite tendency, namely to underestimate the growth capacities of the less industrialized countries, it may be of value to quote some growth rates in the period 1913-1929.[2]

Per capita income (in USA dollars)

Country	1913	1929	Increase as a percentage of 1913 level
United Kingdom	507	538	6.1
France	596	778	30.5
Germany	378	382	1.0
Netherlands	347	461	32.8
Honduras	102	115	12.7
Japan	85	152	78.0
Philippines	120	130	8.3
Malaya	140	210	50.0
India	85	95	11.7

It appears that no firm relation existed between the level of income or the degree of industrialization and the rate of growth of per capita income. Some of the highest figures were found in Asia, some of the lowest in Western Europe.

The crisis of the thirties emphasized the interrelationship between industrial and non-industrial countries in a new way. Unemployment in the former, and disastrously low export prices in the latter, proved to be closely linked. The balance in favour of raw materials, disturbed by the waste of World War I, was now reversed, and economists began to ask whether the

[1] K. M. Panikkar, *Asia and Western Dominance*, London-New York, 1953–4, p. 263.

[2] L. Zimmerman, *Arme en Rijke Landen* ['Poor and Rich Countries'], The Hague, 1959.

more highly organized industrial societies did not have more resilience and better chances of rapid development.

According to this view, unbalanced development and stagnation were not only cyclical—a result of unjustified booms, followed by inevitable busts—but structural. In other words, they were not short-term but long-term phenomena.

However, whatever the underlying causes, it becomes clear, if one compares the situation in 1953 with that of 1913, that the low income countries did not progress economically, whereas the high income countries did.

Professor Dr L. J. Zimmerman[1] has calculated the average compound annual increase in production, population and *per capita* income between 1913 and 1953 in the rich areas (North America, Oceania, Northwestern Europe, Soviet Union) and in the poor areas (the rest of the world), as follows (in percentages):

Areas	Total Production	Population	Income per head of population
Rich	3.3	1.2	2.1
Poor	1.4	1.4	0.0

Although there was a slightly greater population increase in the poor countries, it can safely be said that over the first half of the twentieth century they remained poor because production did not increase sufficiently, and became relatively poorer because the rich continents showed a more rapid increase in production. The growing discrepancy, over a period of only 40 years, is shown more clearly by some other figures given by Zimmerman. The population of the Far East, China and South East Asia (52% of the world population) enjoyed 15% of world income in 1913, but only 9% in 1953.

During World War II, the allied governments, seconded and spurred on by economists and sociologists, devised a programme to alleviate in the future sudden fluctuations in the economic life of all nations, and made plans to ensure sustained and balanced growth all round the world, once post-war rehabilitation was completed.

At the same time, Colin Clark in his famous book, *Economics*

[1] L. J. Zimmerman, *Arme en Rijke Landen, loc. cit.*

of 1960,[1] predicted, on the strength of long-term trends over the last century, that around 1960 the raw material and food producing nations would enjoy a period of very favourable markets and prices.

Thus, there seemed to have been established, at the cost of a terrible and devastating war, a common determination in political circles 'never to let it happen again', with regard to both war and economic and social upheavals.

This was the atmosphere when large new independent nations were born in Asia (India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines, Burma, Ceylon).

During and immediately after World War II, the prices of raw materials had wisely been kept at the lowest feasible level and a raw material 'boom' developed only after the Korean war in 1950-1951. For a few years it seemed as if Colin Clark had been right and that the terms of trade had swung in favour of the raw material producers.

However, this soon proved to be an ephemeral boom, conditioned by a few isolated cases of shortages. Those economists who became interested in the basic structure of the world economy rather than in cyclical short-term movements started to look for long-term changes in the terms of trade in disfavour of the underdeveloped countries. Their doubts and fears expressed themselves partly in studies on basic problems of commodity trade, prices and wages, partly also in government policies.

The need for Industrialization

One of the most important problems for low-income, more or less stationary economies, is how to achieve, in a relatively short period, a considerable rise in *per capita* income together with continued economic growth.

To the superficial observer the *per capita* income, or rather the productivity per worker, seemed to be determined by the degree of industrialization. This observation easily led to the conclusion that some countries remained poor because they produced and exported mainly food and raw materials, and this seemed to point to the need for rapid industrialization. The examples of the United States and the USSR seemed to prove conclusively that this desirable goal could be reached under

[1] London-New York, 1942–3.

diametrically opposed social philosophies, and that rapid industrialization therefore had an automatic impact on national income.

At the end of World War II, with the new insights of economic theory, the new hopes for a world society and the new determination to progress of the countries of Latin America and the new nations in Asia and the Middle East, a definite pattern of world development seemed to be emerging.

A close analysis of the value of agricultural as compared with industrial products, made by some American economists[1] confirmed the opinion that the value of the product of the agricultural worker is much lower, and the differential seemed to be greatest in the technically less developed low income countries. Statistically at least, it was easy to show that the very transfer of workers from agriculture to industry would automatically raise *per capita* income considerably without any change in agricultural and industrial techniques.

One could suppose, for example, that out of 100 workers in a country, 60 are engaged in agriculture, each producing 100 units of value. The remaining 40, in industry and services, might each produce 250 units of value (these relationships are not uncommon). The 'average' productivity would then be 160 units. If the composition of the working population were changed to 40% in agriculture and 60% elsewhere, productivity per man in each sector remaining stable, the average would apparently rise to 190, an increase of almost 20%. This may seem obvious, but the execution of a programme designed to achieve this goal is by no means easy. In 1951, a United Nations commission estimated the amount of capital which would be necessary to achieve a comparable shift of workers from agriculture into industry, and arrived at a staggering figure.[2]

But the story does not end with the economic and technical

[1] Louis Bean, 'International Industrialization and per Capita Income' *Studies in Income and Wealth*, No. VIII, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1946.

[2] *Measures for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries*, United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, New York, 1951, p. 76. It should be noted that, in my opinion, this estimate is far too high and subsequent estimates—also emanating from the United Nations—have produced much lower figures. Paul Hoffman, *One Hundred Countries and one and one Quarter Billion People*, Committee for International Economic Growth, Washington, 1960, p. 46, arrives at a figure of $7 billion annual investment to achieve a 2 % annual growth.

problems of industrialization. There are the unavoidable consequences of rapid urbanization, of the social problems in housing and the 'municipal' infra-structure (water, commuter systems, power and light, schools, etc.). There are the problems of man's adaptation to the new environment as described in Chapter II, the human cost in the lives of millions who, at least for one or two generations, must live in slums. There is also the factor of the willingness or reluctance of rural people to leave their environment and the difficulty of training them for new jobs and a new way of life.

While it may be shown statistically that the transfer of people from agriculture to industry may greatly raise the *per capita* income, in actual practice this process creates all the problems dealt with in this book. Nevertheless, the idea that rapid industrialization is a cure-all for economic backwardness has determined the policy of a considerable number of countries in the post-war period.

A very strong determination to industrialize was shown as early as the period between the two wars by Soviet Russia and its example continued to stir the imagination of other countries. Its emphasis on heavy industry might be a euphemism for its armaments drive, but if heavy industry were the real keynote to rapid development, why not follow its example?

Far reaching technological developments, for example, in the processing of low-grade iron ore, in electrification and the new chemical industries also fostered important changes in the ideas of statesmen and economists. The differences in economic structure between continents had hitherto been 'explained' by the unequal distribution of coal, iron ore and fertile soil. Thus, they were considered to be unchangeable, or 'natural' or even part of God's will in creation. Or else, as we discussed in Chapter I, they were thought of as part of an inherent and irreversible pattern in the development of man himself—a high degree of economic development in the temperate zone, or in the Christianized or, even more narrowly, the Protestant countries, slow development in the tropics, among non-Christians.

These concepts culminated in Northwest European and North American feelings of superiority, sometimes coupled with a sense of gratitude, humility and stewardship in the face of unprecedented material prosperity if this were based on natural resources and historical events.

From Columbus and Vasco da Gama to Cecil Rhodes, van Vollenhoven (the French one), Krupp and John D. Rockefeller, the development of mercantile and industrial empires in the USA, Europe and overseas, and the belief in the superiority of the western way of life and production techniques went unchallenged.

The urge towards rapid development brought widespread resistance to either notion. In some cases, for example the larger part of Latin America, the presence of rich natural resources gave a vista upon rapid development. In Soviet Russia, and at a later date also in Soviet China, actual governmental policy showed the possibility of a rapid economic development, if only all other considerations were to be given secondary importance. The question then still remains to be answered —according to what pattern and by what methods?

In the West, for instance in the Pailey and the Haberler reports—written with a view to future raw material requirements of the United States and of the North Atlantic countries—a differentiation between 'industrialized c.q. western' and 'non-industrialized c.q. non-western' countries remained the point of departure.

Japan is in a position either to be considered a 'western' economy or to be the first exception to this assumption. In many as yet non-industrialized countries there is a strong desire to use home-produced raw materials and create eventually an export industry. This presents the western countries with a new and as yet unreconciled pattern of world trade and world economy. We shall deal with this aspect in Chapter XIV.

Individual countries have tried various approaches to their rapid development. The main issue, as it appears in the news, is very often whether or not agriculture has been given enough emphasis over and against industry.

Man's relation to his work

Change in the structure of society offers first of all new possibilities for the use of man's labour, and often also of his land. Where the first impact of change involves only the exchange of his crops, animals, furs, fish, forest products, etc., for industrial products, for adornment (beads), consumption (textiles), or production (ax), and where these products can be obtained in his spare time from spare land, his attitude towards

economic life does not necessarily change. Trade, especially international trade, will be mutually beneficial, unless the traders introduce alcohol, firearms and new diseases.

This attractive pattern may continue where it is found possible to expand the area given over to cash crops alongside that needed to support the 'normal' subsistence economy. Examples are found in the coconut groves on many South Sea Islands, the cotton fields in Uganda, and the cocoa plantations in West Africa. But even here, changes in economic and social life begin to appear. These become apparent when the prices of the export crops fluctuate violently. A period of high prices leads to the purchase of luxury goods, and this may result in new social relations and class-structures. But the test comes when prices fall sharply as they invariably do at times. Is the way back still open? Or will people start borrowing on a large scale from the merchant in order to maintain the higher standard of living? Have they become dependent upon imported commodities for the necessities of life (food, clothing)? In time peasants will inevitably have to rely on money income for taxes, school fees, and an increasing variety of goods and services.

It is just at this point that old value systems of work and compensation for work are shattered. Let us look back at the so-called subsistence agriculture, the backbone of traditional society. 'As a man works, so shall he eat'. There is a direct relation between the labour, the sweat and the forethought of the peasant, and the amount of food he and his family consume, with one highly important proviso: that nature does not destroy his works and shatter his hopes. Pests, disease, locusts, floods, drought may easily bring all his endeavours to naught, in which case hunger will be his fate.

However, the moment the peasant becomes dependent upon the market economy, far away, unknown, unpredictable, uncontrollable, but nevertheless vaguely human forces may reduce the value of the work of his hands suddenly and unexpectedly, even when nature is bountiful. Thus, effort and consumption level are disconnected. At a later stage, we shall consider the general consequences of this revolutionary change in the economic structure; we shall confine ourselves here to the attitude of the farmers.

In terms of 'reward-awareness', it does not deter the peasant, and sometimes even stimulates him to increase his labour effort

(his only abundant resource), but it makes him shy of even very short-term capital investment, such as fertilizer or better seed. Indeed, in a situation where the peasant has a fixed demand for basic commodities (food, clothing, shelter) and an unstable money income, it is extremely dangerous to increase the number and amount of fixed obligations, such as the repayment of credit. Governments have certainly given increased assistance to peasants through irrigation works, spraying and dipping campaigns, etc., to decrease the risks and insecurity imposed by nature. But agronomic and economic progress in agriculture has also greatly increased market risks, a new form of social insecurity.

In an early stage of economic development, the introduction of a money economy, the payment of wages, and the establishment of large agricultural, mining or industrial enterprises open up new opportunities for man. In this situation the relationship between an individual's work and the value of the ultimate product is largely obscure. The labourer has no way to compare the value of his labour in the productive process with the purchasing power of his money wage. At least as long as he is unorganized, he will be prepared to work, at least temporarily, for a wage comparable to the value of a similar application of his labour in agriculture. And in the short run, at least in slack seasons, the value of the latter is very low. The labourer is aware of this situation even subconsciously. This becomes apparent when in his 'own' society his presence has great economic or social value. Then he will despise a firm contract or a job at such a distance that he cannot maximize his return by 'commuting' between the two economic systems. Foreign western enterprise, and, in exactly the same fashion, national enterprises also, become at this stage of development a potent force in changing concepts of labour and of economic versus social values. To the enterprise, the labourer's behaviour is annoying, and decreases productivity. In the past large enterprises have often demanded, and sometimes received, legal penal sanctions for 'breach of contract' by the labourer. This system, though still in existence in some countries, mainly in the mining industry, has become increasingly repellent to the social conscience.

Concurrently, or at a later stage, management and government have tried to wean the labour force away from the old society through elaborate housing schemes, social services and

better wages. It has become clear that in heavily capitalized industries, the disadvantages of a rapid turnover of labour outweigh the advantages of low-wage levels. But what is the impact on a society in rapid economic development? For the labourer it is a very difficult and upsetting period in spite of the apparent or even real economic advantage he gains by moving away from his own community. He may stand more on his own feet, his consumption pattern may improve, but this does not mean that his life will become more rational and his fortune or misfortune more understandable or more acceptable. In the old society, even in village life as it went on after his departure, there was a keen sense of belonging, of the essential unity of the world, including human society as well as nature and the supernatural.

In this society everything has its 'natural' place and status. Although it is static, or perhaps because of this, social security is provided for. The individual knows his status, even if it is at the bottom of the social order. He is aware of his possibilities, even if he knows that he has to stay where he is. He knows that he must suffer and what he is allowed to enjoy. And this position is intimately linked to the work he is supposed, or even compelled, to perform. Clear-cut responsibilities and rights have generally been developed for men and women, for young, not so young, and old, for classes or caste groups. And nobody, not even the highest placed—the emperor, king or priest—can escape this interlocking framework of status and work. The transformation of society as a whole into a more dynamic and changing type may be painful at times, but the transfer of persons from one type of society into another completely different, demands even greater resilience and adaptability. Twice a week, planes from Mbeya in South West Tanganyika transport labourers to Johannesburg and Durban to work in the mines and sugar fields. Many of them have always lived in the mountains in a precarious agricultural and animal husbandry economy. Other labourers walk a thousand or more miles to work in the Rhodesias or on the sisal estates in North Eastern Tanganyika. In fact, throughout Africa the labour force on estates and in mines must leave, at least temporarily, its poor but protective environment for a life with more food, more chance of saving money, but much less community and personal life.

Many labourers in the rapidly expanding large-scale industry

and agriculture of Africa are caught right in the middle of this transfer. They have not seen fit to leave their ancestral homes and communities completely, partly because housing facilities at the place of their new work are inadequate—often shockingly so—partly because they do not earn enough to bring their whole family to the town, and partly because they do not dare to forego completely the social security (old age, sickness) attached to having a hut and land in the countryside. In the context of the World Council's study programme, Mrs Marion Forrester has made a detailed study, soon to be published, of the life of this group in Nairobi (Kenya). It shows the very precarious economic situation of people suspended between two worlds, threatened by 'proletarianization'. It also shows the inevitability of the movement to the towns and industry, and gives a memorable picture of the struggle to adapt, made by both the men and their wives.

We must now proceed with our analysis of the impact on traditional society of the new opportunities to earn money through the sale of products or labour.

How strong are Economic Motivations?

As we have pointed out, the profit motive does not generally seem to be a very strong factor in bringing about the transition from a predominantly closed economy to a market economy. Dr S. D. Neumark[1] has pointed out that in the majority of cases there is a normal response to the opportunity to earn money and that in other cases the lack of response is only apparent and not real. Where there is a real lack of response, he attributes this to restraining circumstances over which the individual has no control (such as the danger that outward signs of wealth or high yields of field crops will attract thieves), and finally he says that lack of response may result from a system in which the demand for money is a so-called target-demand. Close investigation reveals that the first three cases mentioned do indeed show a rational and economically-motivated response. However, the term 'target demand' needs more detailed explanation. The author uses the term where there is a demand for a given amount of money for a specific purpose, such as paying the year's taxes, or a bride price. In a

[1] 'Economic Development and Economic Incentives', in *Die Suid-Afrikaanse Tijdskrif vir Ekonomie*, Vol. 26, No. 1, March 1958.

more highly developed economy, people value money for the goods and services which step-by-step increases in earnings will bring. Money will buy almost everything, and the need for it seems to be constant and everlasting. But where there is a target-demand for money, people may limit their working hours, or production, if the payment they receive increases. This phenomenon appears most clearly where the opportunities to earn suddenly increase,[1] and is of only limited importance where people's incomes remain below those required to support recognized 'standards of decent living'.

The concept and recognition of a minimum standard of living is not limited to a fully developed money economy. It has often been observed, especially where people are dependent upon a single product for their money income, that production increases when the price drops. This phenomenon, rare in modern industrial society, is fairly common, although obviously within limits, in an agricultural economy. There is little, if anything, in these reactions to economic incentives which falls outside the scope of modern economic theory, contrary to what early authors on Asian and African village economy believed.

His ability to explain the slow or weak response to economic incentives may satisfy the social scientist, but it does not help to raise standards of living rapidly. If for social reasons—beyond the control of the individual—the response fails to appear, the question must be asked: can the structure or functioning of society be changed so as to provide more opportunities for economic progress? And what are the strategic points in the situation where change can begin?

[1] When, after World War II, Europe was in urgent need of timber and coal and wages in Norwegian forests and British mines increased accordingly, lumberjacks returned home from the icy woods in early November rather than by Christmas, and miners took shifts off to attend football matches.

V

THE CHANGING COMMUNITY

New Political Forms

TRADITIONAL society had a great variety of socio-political organization, ranging from extremely well-organized monarchies to loose tribal arrangements. It may seem strange that there should be this wide variation in the organization of society when the closed economy in a world controlled by spirits and magic is so universally characteristic of traditional societies. However, man has more freedom in organizing his social relations than in organizing production. The nineteenth century Marxist and classical-capitalist emphasis on the primacy of economic patterns over social and political systems is not substantiated when we look at the large variety of institutions in the pre-mechanical age.

It must be admitted, however, that the natural environment and its adaptation to human needs through irrigation has a profound effect upon social structures through the factors of population mobility and density. Nomads do not deliberately choose their life of wandering, but are forced into it by the need to find grass for their herds and water for man and beast. In most cases, shifting cultivation cannot sustain more than 50 inhabitants per square mile, often even less, and village communities necessarily remain weak when the population density is low.[1]

It would be interesting to analyse the acceptance or rejection of a money economy or of colonial administration and the adaptation to foreign influence on the basis of the form of social

[1] I cannot share the opinion of *Wittfogel* that irrigation systems inevitably lead to 'eastern despotism' through the control by pharaohs and emperors of irrigation systems. In Monsoon Asia irrigation has long been coupled with the 'village republic' or the small tribal unit. The feudal system used the irrigation channel as a tool just as it monopolized the mill in Europe as a means to destroy free peasantry, not the other way round.

organization and government existing at the time of the encounter with the 'West'. However, the scope of this publication does not permit such a largely historical study.

We must confine ourselves to a broad generalization, which in many cases will not take into account the many distinctive, significant, 'fateful' realities in the history of nations.

The foreign merchant, missionary, soldier and administrator practically always met indigenous society through its legitimate chiefs and elders. This put the hierarchy almost immediately to a double or triple test. Would the community suffer or profit from the acceptance or rejection of the foreign influence or demand or from the conditions imposed? What sacrifices would be justified in order to maintain the continuity of community (or national life), and under what circumstances would the existing hierarchical order be endangered?

To answer these questions often required great psychological, administrative and diplomatic skill. The early reactions, as recorded by the visitors, were often surprisingly mature and far-sighted. In other cases, however, there was corruption and subversion, sometimes through bribery or the fomenting of existing tensions within the hierarchy. No divided community could hold out against a strong and persistent outside force.

The encounter with western influences has, in a significant number of cases, immediately or eventually brought about new or changing political forms.

In Japan and Turkey it has meant a strengthening of administrative power and a structural disruption of the intimate tie between worldly and spiritual power. In Ethiopia, the same process can be seen, though the Emperor has first of all been out to strengthen the effective rule of peripheral parts of the country by central authorities.

It is significant to see the reverse in China after the clash with Britain in the eighteen-forties. There a weakened empire became more decentralized under provincial governors and 'warlords'.

In Latin America, after it had acquired independence from Spain and Portugal in the early part of the nineteenth century, little cohesion existed between different parts of one nation. Examples are Colombia and Peru. In Brazil and Mexico, efforts to obtain a strong central government through an emperor failed. There may be blame on the form of government envis-

aged or exercised, but the basic cause was lack of effective communications.

Colonialism

At this point it must be said that, in a number of cases, the westerner came with such overwhelming power or with such extreme demands—full surrender and conversion were not enough for the conquisitadores in Mexico and Peru—that the relation with the 'prime movers' was inimical and disastrous from the very beginning.

There have, however, been important differences in the approach of the various 'European' nations, which, in turn, resulted in different reactions by 'native' societies. The main objectives of the Spanish and Portuguese, as early as the beginning of the sixteenth century, were empire and church building overseas. They succeeded very well, even though at the expense of practically exterminating the American Indians and carrying on an extensive slave trade. The British and the Dutch, on the contrary, almost invariably started with trade and sought concessions for naval establishments from local rulers as much to safeguard their trading interests against European competitors as to 'protect' themselves against their Asian or African counterparts. They then often embarked on commercial, mining and agricultural enterprises, and they needed a colonial administration to safeguard their business interests. In a roundabout way they then became empire builders, but they generally consolidated their interests with those of the local hierarchy and contented themselves with 'indirect rule' through protectorates and treaties.

The Germans entered the field much later. They found an overseas world under a Pax Britannica, and as they were interested in overseas markets, they acted methodically, following up their first contacts as soon as possible with administrative settlements even in the far interior. The French started serious empire building only after their defeat in the 1870-1871 war. They employed a variety of systems and were very effective in bringing vast areas under their administrative control with a minimum of outlay.

A completely different picture is presented by Russian colonial expansion throughout Siberia in the eighteenth century. The contiguity of territory and the remoteness of the Russian

Asian empire hid the harshness of russification throughout this area from the public eye.

In North America, the penetration of white settlers into the hunting and agricultural areas of the Indians (and Eskimos) produced a predominantly white continent, at least north of the Mason-Dixon line.

It is an exaggeration to contend that the absorption of many hitherto self-governing territories, kingdoms, sultanates and tribal units into colonial territories is either the result of unbridled imperialism or of weak and corrupt government which would have made any economic and social development impossible.

The development of colonialism partly at least is the result of a queer 'demonstration effect' or of a contagious trend towards submission, whenever one of the stronger neighbours had been forced to submit to the exigencies of the foreigners.

In many cases this willingness to find 'protection' under the British or Dutch flag was based upon the conviction—as borne out by previous experiences in warfare—that if the danger of annihilation during wartime was averted, social life and even the existing hierarchy would not change fundamentally and much, if not most, of the old values could be salvaged. In this, they found themselves increasingly mistaken by the impact not only of new military power, but also of trade, mission, schools and civil servants.

From Colonial Administration to Nationhood

At the turn of the century, colonialism was still taken for granted in Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, in spite of the emergence of new states in North and Latin America a century earlier. The justification—if any— was found in purely technical, administrative, utilitarian advantages. These were often given a cultural sugar coating in the growing zeal to reconstruct native society along the lines of western civilization.[1]

But the axe was already at the root of the tree. The Boer War in South Africa put before the British nation the awful ethical

[1] J. S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, New York-London, 1956–7, p. 288, e.g., quotes as a new justification of indirect rule the theory that it was a 'means to graft our higher civilization upon the soundly rooted native stock—moulding it and establishing it into lines consonant with modern ideas and higher standards.'

problem of justifying the overthrow of small republics of white settlers who were undoubtedly Christians. The Boers may have been too reluctant to admit unlimited numbers of white foreigners, with their adjuncts of a massive black labour force, economic development with its accompanying slums, gold with social misery, but the British asked themselves whether the requirements of a world society based upon the gold standard justified a military expedition. The occupation of Transvaal and the Orange Free State was the last British colonial expansion of any importance. The urge to see the Union Jack flying over all foreign coasts was gone.

In 1900-1901 the British waged a full-scale colonial war against the Ashanti in Ghana, but it was their last. In the same year Chinese mobs rose in the Boxer Rebellion against barbarian western influence on the crumbling Manchu dynasty in Peking. As this mob action was directed indiscriminately against all foreigners, a crude 'security council' of western nations acted to restore order and make the Chinese Government pay compensation. But the Boxer indemnities were soon channelled away from the damaged foreign interests and into Chinese hospitals and universities, museums and libraries.

It is true that, until a much later date, the industrial 'overpopulated' countries of Italy and Japan were seeking relief for their domestic problems in overseas expansion. But their campaigns in Ethiopia and Manchukuo were carried on in direct defiance of a world-wide public conscience and by flouting a divided, impotent League of Nations.

The concept of a colony as a source of income for the treasury of the metropolitan country was also gone by 1900. Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands declared at the opening of parliament in 1901 that the colonies had to be administered in the best interests of the native population; that her government, and indeed the Dutch nation, had a moral obligation to that effect. This marked a turning point towards more intensive intervention in the lives of the people through schools, medical services, agricultural extension, credit, etc.

When, in 1906, there were reports of scandalous labour conditions in the Congo, the British House of Commons reacted with moral indignation, resulting in 1908 in the acceptance by the Belgian parliament of responsibility for the administration of what then became the Belgian Congo. But as history

records,[1] this small nation of middle-class people undertook this duty reluctantly.

British policy in India, as laid down by Lord Curzon, was to stabilize rather than to expand. Furnivall describes this as a period of 'constructive' rule in which not economic progress in the narrow sense, but native welfare became the foremost goal of British policy.[2]

In 1892 the British Government began to grant power to local councils and gradually introduced the electoral principle. This was, in essence, a response to the rise of a westernized middle-class whose political aspirations took shape in the Indian National Congress. In spite of official disavowal, this proved to be the beginning of Indian parliamentary government.[3]

In Africa, likewise, a new constructive policy was initiated when the British Government took over from the chartered companies. The twofold emphasis on economic development and the improvement of native welfare, which became known as the 'dual mandate', characterized this period.

In French and German colonies, the administration tried to establish as rapidly as possible an economic infra-structure through the construction of ports, railroads, roads and bridges. In Africa this meant a widespread use of the 'tribal turn-out', but it also meant the expenditure of considerable sums from the metropolitan treasuries.

Whatever the precise sequence of events and measures between 1900 and 1914, all over Africa and Asia the district commissioners, the civil service in general, became the direct contact between the foreign power and the people. They were devoted, hard-working, serious, incorruptible, carrying the 'white man's burden' in developing static societies. It was a period of intensified colonial civil administration, of efforts to exploit the natural resources, but also of the spread of education and the development of communications for the benefit of the inhabitants.

Investments by metropolitan powers generally had to be justified in their respective parliaments as a necessary basis for

[1] See, e.g., Tom Marvel, *The New Congo*, New York-London, 1948–9, p. 44.
[2] J. S. Furnivall, p. 288.
[3] W. H. Morris-Jones, *Parliament in India*, London-New York, 1957, p. 49; V. P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India*, London-Princeton, 1957, p. 8.

private investment in plantations, mines and industries, and by pointing out that, indirectly, the nation and the world as a whole would profit from the development of the tropics. Among French authors of this period it became fashionable to talk of the 'making valuable' (*mise en valeur*) of the under-utilized land, water and man power resources of Africa and Indo-China.[1]

An intensive and efficient public administration in overseas territories is difficult and expensive. It is difficult because the expatriate civil servant, judge and educator meet with completely unfamiliar concepts of right and wrong, social institutions, cultural requirements, and even mental reactions. Intensive study is necessary if justice is to be done, education successfully forwarded and production increased. It is expensive, because well-trained expatriate civil servants have to endure disease, isolation and privation, and consequently must have frequent home leaves and early old-age pensions, but also increasingly internal means of communication, housing, medical services, schools, etc.

If one assumes—and this was the rule rather than the exception before World War II—that each territory must pay for its own administration, these expenses become burdensome and means must be found to reduce costs. Two devices were applied, often concurrently. One was called 'indirect rule', which meant leaving or granting administrative and legal power to traditional princes and chiefs. This means, used to a large extent in British and Dutch territories, had several advantages. It left indigenous society, at least on the surface, intact. It left justice largely in the hands of people 'who know intimately'. It was cheaper, and also politically expedient because it maintained or created an upper-class favourable to continued colonial administration. Under the protection of the British or Dutch crown, many of them had 'never had it so good'. The other device was the training of officials and administrators to replace part of the 'white cadre' in the civil administration. This involved the establishment of training institutes and universities, and an increasing flow of students to the metropolitan area for training.

The consequences of these policies have been significant. Clashes of interest arose between 'poor whites' and the emerging new élite. Frequently, measures were proposed and promulgated

[1] e.g. Robert Doucet, *Les Colonies Françaises—leur avenir économique—leur mise en valeur*, Paris, 1921, avant propos.

to limit job and other opportunities for non-whites. Thus racial problems were fomented on the basis of job discrimination.

Also, the psychology of the new élite, based upon a school education, was quite different from that of the old or revitalized élite based upon social, often inherited, status. Students, even in Catholic Universities in the Philippines, or in a missionary institution like the American University in Beyrouth, came under the influence of western positivist thought, of ideas on equality and western democracy. When a select number went to study in Oxford, at the Sorbonne, or in Leyden, they became 'westernized' to a high degree. When they returned, they brought with them the ideas of freedom and nationhood.This was to be expected, but it put dynamite under the structure of modern colonial administration.

If the real beginning of this period is put at around 1900, the growth, flourishing, withering and decay of the system within one half of a century is remarkable. No comprehensive study has been written on the internal dynamics of this very rapid evolution. The emergence of nationalist movements throughout Asia and Africa is often attributed to general political forces, to wars, to subversive propaganda, and the 'demonstration effect' of successful resistance to western domination. Historical events speeded up the trend, which under any circumstances would have led to self-government of overseas territories and the independence of dominions.

The war between Russia and Japan in 1904-1905 raised doubts in the minds of a small but significant number of Asian intellectuals about the invulnerability of western armaments. During World War I, European battles were fought on the fringes of Asia, in the Pacific, and in the coastal waters of South America, over the Middle East and in the German colonies of Africa, with lasting effect. The British sought allegiance and support from India; the French brought Senegalese warriors to Europe; Asia and Africa became indispensable for European survival.

World War I also put dynamite under the political and social structure of Europe and the Middle East. President Wilson in the USA, in an effort to enlist the active support of the peoples living under the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and in the Turkish Empire, enunciated the principle of national self-determination. This principle, once accepted, did not respect

geographical boundaries. It led to strong nationalist movements in many colonies in Asia and North Africa. Lenin and his ideological successors were quick to spread the idea throughout the colonial empires of western nations, although the Bolsheviks dropped the principle for Russia as soon as they obtained military and administrative control.[1]

But the ideological forces remained at work, and events during World War II intensified them tremendously. What had been half-conscious sentiments became political principles. Latin America gained new aspirations from the 'good neighbour policy' of the United States government. Britain made far-reaching promises to woo India into waging a war against Japan and Germany on foreign soil.

The occupation by Japan—in a surprising push to Hawaii, Bengal, the Cocos Islands and the Solomon Islands—of large parts of the Asian colonial empires of England, the United States, France and the Netherlands, fanned the fire of nationalist aspirations to an extent scarcely imagined in the wildest dreams before Christmas 1941. The fall of impregnable bastions like Corregidor and Singapore, the sinking without outward signs of resistance of the pride of the British Navy—the 'Renown' and the 'Prince of Wales'—the humiliation of hundreds of thousands of white soldiers and civilians, swept away the myth of European military superiority. The Atlantic Charter and the foundation of the United Nations formalized the new era of nationhood for all and nationalism above all.

But these events, sweeping as they were, are not sufficient to explain the rise and fall of colonial administration within less than half a century. It was indeed a very short-lived type of political and administrative structure, two generations at most. In this respect, it resembles the brief period of benevolent dictatorship in eighteenth century Europe (nineteenth in the backward part of the continent), between the time of the feudal system and that of administration through public officials. Perhaps one reason is the structural and psychological similarity between the rule of a benevolent dictator-prince and that of an ethical governor-general. Formally they can rely on force, on police, and even military power, but substantially they are dependent upon the voluntary submission of people to their

[1] Samad Shaheen, *The Communist (Bolshevik) Theory of National Self-determination*, New York, 1956.

wisdom and authority. It is difficult to find a successor to a benevolent dictator who is neither benevolent without being a dictator or *vice versa.* It is difficult for a governor general, labouring under the dual mandate, not to abdicate piecemeal by leaving more and more responsibility to his beloved and trusted subjects.

The tragedy for both types of well-meaning rulers is that too often their good intentions are misunderstood as weakness. In matters of power *l'appetit vient en mangeant*, and what seem to the initiators to be sweeping reforms soon appear as lukewarm responses to heated demands for the transfer of more power. In many historical situations this has led to revolution. In a 'normal' civil war there is strong conviction on both sides, but in a colonial revolt there is passion on only one side, and on the other at the most, determination to hang on. Besides, the lines of division are not only between loyalty and rebellion, or the interests of workers and peasants against those of feudal lords and capitalists. They are soon drawn between 'expatriates' and 'traitors' on the one hand, and patriots on the other, between people of different creed, colour and race. It is the irony of history that bloody clashes along these lines have occurred in an age when serious attempts are being made to eradicate discrimination on the basis of religion and race.

Thus, the process of education into self-government and emancipation for nationhood inevitably brings unprecedented generation tension. An enlightened colonial administration is necessarily bound by its sense of responsibility to guide the new nation on its path into the future; the political leaders of the new nations are keenly aware of their duty to assume that same responsibility.

We shall deal more extensively in Part II with the challenge of this dynamic process to all parties and groups, and to Christians and churches.

VI

THE HUMAN PERSONALITY IN FERMENT

In the foregoing chapters we have discussed changes in social structures, political upheavals, new opportunities for those who have been to school, and many other striking phenomena which together are known as 'rapid social change'.

When the World Council of Churches, at the Evanston Assembly in 1954, and thereafter in the meeting of its Central Committee at Davos, 1955, decided to make a specific study of the areas of rapid social change, it was well aware that churches were not called primarily to join the army of universities, government agencies and inter-governmental bodies to make a scientific investigation. There was a call to the churches from Asia, Africa and Latin America, to share responsibility for people, for men, women and children in an age of transformation. In the forefront of these studies have been the sufferings, but also the hopes and aspirations, of our brethren around the world.

The first three sentences of the report of the Committee on Church and Society to the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches in 1955, read as follows: 'The peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America are in ferment; they have awakened to a new sense of human dignity. They are in revolt against political and social conditions that deny human freedom and seek release from traditional customs and institutions that enslave. The urge to build new patterns of society in which fundamental rights, economic welfare and social wellbeing can be attained is widespread.'[1]

The urge for dignity, freedom, bread and justice are at the roots of rapid social change.

The report on the World Conference on Rapid Social Change,

[1] *Statement on the Common Christian Responsibility toward Areas of Rapid Social Change*, prepared by the Working Committee of the Department on Church and Society, Davos, 1955.

Saloniki 1959, shows the other side of the coin, equally true. 'Social change affects the human personality profoundly. Men must pay a price for the revolutions involved . . . the price is seen in lostness, loneliness, frustration and disillusionment; in the strains and tensions in many areas of human relationship: in the family, between the generations, between employers and employees, between town and country, between different tribes and races that confront each other in the multi-tribal, multi-racial communities,[1] created by the demands of expanding industry and commerce . . . men and women are also asked to suffer.[2]

Thus there is an interaction between changes within man's mind and the changes in the world around him. Two questions might be posed: 'What happens to society when people are aroused to demand self-determination?', and 'What happens to man when society is undergoing radical change?' One brief answer may be: In a time of social change people are forced to determine for themselves how to live, how to work, how to react. And in this self-determination they are removed from a sheltering and limiting environment into the loneliness and wider horizons of a larger society.

Let us review briefly what our considerations so far have revealed.

In the transition from a life based on subsistence agriculture to life in a town working for a wage, man detaches himself from the source of the main necessities of life. He may become less dependent upon the vagaries of nature, but he is in perpetual danger of losing his job. His neighbour, rather than being a colleague who suffers from the same drought and pests, becomes a stranger and perhaps a competitor. Mutual help in case of a heavy work load or misfortune is no longer a function of society, but becomes one of person-to-person relations.

The peasant who produces for the world market must endure passively the price fluctuations, yet he is responsible for choosing a particular crop. The subsistence peasant, without any appreciable technical preparation or any time for adjustment, hangs between being a proletarian and an *entrepreneur*. He suffers the frustrations of both.

[1] This is particularly true of African cities.
[2] *Dilemmas and Opportunities*, p. 8.

When I visited a South African hospital in 1958, I was told that recently the first cases of neurosis among Zulus had been observed. The managers' disease is on its way.

When children go to school, competition soon develops as there is only limited opportunity to move from a 'bush school' (as in Tanganyika first and second grade) to a normal primary school. When the pupils move up from the middle school (8th grade) to secondary school, there is a full-scale struggle for places. Admission to university is almost a miracle.

In India there are about 2,000,000 unemployed high school graduates and 200,000 unemployed who are proud possessors of a BA. The Philippines have about 100,000 unemployed college graduates. These are the people who have been 'awakened to a new sense of human dignity.' But where are bread and freedom? Is there any wonder that at university exams, perhaps in physics or biology, people resort to magic or astrology and try to have their exam set for a lucky hour? In Japan, but also in countries with less acute feelings of family obligation and socially controlled behaviour, failure in an exam may lead to suicide. Formal schooling therefore creates serious personal problems, while at the same time widening opportunities.

In political life the old village, clan or tribal loyalties made local administration and the meting out of justice personal and understandable. In the local sphere opinions were measured rather than counted. The old and wise had the final word.

But modern administration and courts cannot operate in that way. What a predicament for justice and freedom when adultery can no longer be punished by death, and the lawful executioners suddenly become murderers! There are examples of people who first meted out tribal justice and then with dignity and composure underwent the severe punishment called for by the new civil laws.

Under Mosaic law, and still today in a number of countries, it is not only permitted, but in accordance with law and justice, to kill an unfaithful woman. When it was modernizing its legal system, one government declared this old practice to be murder. At the same time, it instituted leniency towards juvenile delinquents and even built reformatories. What a fatal twist of justice, when people found the legal loophole of having boys of 12 or 13 years old commit the customary killing! This gulf between traditional thought and modern institutions, dramatic-

ally illustrated in this case, is discernible in many instances and causes almost unbearable tensions.

A general phenomenon in changing social structures is the new pattern of responsibility in the duties and tasks of people in small and large societies. It is indispensable for a man to know his responsibility if he is to behave in a balanced way. In the old static society this requirement was fulfilled: men and women, old and young, noble and common, rich and poor, free man and slave, knew exactly what was expected from them. Everyone was educated from a very young age in the specific responsibilities given to him or her, and rights were related to duties. New tasks and privileges were given to people at a certain stage in their life. Society had also developed stringent safeguards for this pattern of human relations.

But the world market enters peasants' life, people leave to pursue their own interests, some go to school, some gain positions in or through government rather than by right of birth or age. Patterns of responsibility are shattered. Government officials who did not belong to the old society assume power. The government interferes in people's lives through new taxes, public works and perhaps new voting procedures. In this reshuffle, who comes out on top? Is it the wise or the shrewd? Is it the grey, experienced man or the young fellow straight from school? What moral values remain intact when escape from control is so easy? Young Puerto Ricans in New York may turn easily to juvenile gangs, and similar phenomena are not unknown in the new cities of Africa. Whatever they are called —'beatnik', 'Halbstarke' or 'nozem'—young people in search of new goals in life are found in Tokio, São Paulo and other metropolitan centres.

A growing distance between men and their society means a widening chasm between the generations. The old people cannot understand the motivations of the young and the latter have no respect for the opinions of the old. Very often youngsters with only a few years schooling will say to their parents: 'You do not know anything about real life. We have been taught at school.'

On the positive side there is, in the urge to freedom and human dignity, a *fervent hope and expectation of change*. This is most remarkable in a static and traditional society. In itself it proves that deep changes have occurred and are to be expected in the

not too distant future. Indeed, men's attitudes and performance are strongly linked to his expectations, even the dreams of his youth and adolescence. Similarly, nations are largely guided by their expectations.[1]

To the objective observer many personal and national expectations seem unrealistic. The goals of increased strength, production, welfare and freedom may not be within reach; there may be serious obstacles or setbacks. But the fact that hope survives these setbacks and that obstacles may be overcome by hard work is of great importance.

In the study of the World Council of Churches on areas of rapid social change we have come across some heartening examples. The Kiyosato Educational Experimental Project (KEEP), north of Tokyo, Japan, is sponsored by the Brotherhood of St Andrew in Japan and the North American Committee for the Japan Brotherhood. This is a project of land reclamation in an alpine region, where a previously unknown kind of mixed farming had been introduced in this largely paddy-growing country. Its success raises the hope that much more land can be made productive, and, at the same time, provides a stimulating example of community development for the surrounding villages. The importance of such a project can perhaps best be expressed in the words of the report: 'The Japanese people in general were quite convinced by their own militarist-orientated propaganda that there was not enough land for them to support themselves, that every available acre of land had been put to productive use, and that not a bushel more of rice could be raised in Japan, and therefore unless foreign countries extended some substantial help, Japan could not live as a nation. This project was based on the flat denial that such a notion should be glibly accepted by the Japanese and struck a note of hope that their problem was not unsurmountable and challenged their imagination, conscience and tenacity.'[2]

Since 1946, settlements have been developed in the most

[1] F. L. Polak, *De Toekomst is Verleden Tijd* ('The Future is Past Tense'), Utrecht, 1955. This Dutch author tries to explain the rise and decline of cultures by their expectations for the future. On a smaller scale, examining short-run effects of expectations, see R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Glencoe 1957, chapter on 'Self-fulfilling Prophecy'.

[2] *Background Information*, No. 21, December 1958, p. 22, WCC, Geneva.

northern part of Hondo by repatriates from Sachalin. In a remarkably pioneering spirit these farmers, with the help of the Japan Church World Service, loans from the Government and the International Bank, started cattle breeding and experimented with raising various kinds of grass and clover. It was here also that the first experiment in contour-ploughing was made in Japan. In the Kamikata area another project is under way which will develop at least 12,000 acres of new land.

When travelling in West Africa in 1955 in preparation for the Rapid Social Change Study, Paul Abrecht reported on another inspiring example in the village Rochen in Sierra Leone. Here was a thoughtful tribal chief who was constantly concerned with village improvements. His first undertakings were to build a school and develop agriculture. Then he discovered that rice could be grown on some swampy lands near the village, but that heavy tractor-drawn ploughs would be needed and that a road was necessary to bring in the tractors. Communal labour was used and in ten days 14 miles of road were built. The chief hoped that as new land was made available in this way, the youth would stop migrating to the cities. In this way he proceeded from one project to another, constantly telling the people that they must take responsibility for economic development and not wait for the central government.

Defence mechanisms, regressions

People cannot live in a constant state of inner conflict. They may, for a while, go through a real crisis of doubt and searching for a new meaning of life, but some defence mechanism soon develops. In a time of rapid social change these are particularly powerful and necessary.

First of all, the individual has a tendency to shield himself from the impact by not fully acknowledging the importance of the new.

What extends beyond the limits of our comprehension, even after mental transformation, fills us with awe and is kept away from our conscious considerations as much as possible. People coming into contact for the first time with the mystery of a slip of paper resulting, through reading, in impersonal yet precise transmission of command, were dumbfounded. This awe for the incomprehensible cannot be wholly foreign to modern man, baffled by the mysteries of atomic research.

Secondly, the reduction of the new and unknown to familiar categories enables man to maintain the feeling of the continuity and wholeness of culture and the unity of his inner self. This feeling, however, is rooted in man's deepest convictions (value systems in sociological terminology) rather than in scientific observations or a logical pattern of reasoning. Action and behaviour is more closely related to these convictions than it is to scientific insight. In that respect, there is not much difference between types of societies, nor change through the ages.

Thirdly, this reduction of the new to an old category shields man from the necessity of making immediate personal decisions by providing him with a stereotyped reaction to a variety of challenges and frustrations. The stereotyped answer, especially in social life, is a powerful shield against recognition and response.

Especially when a defence mechanism is used by a community and develops from a common attitude into a joint action, it can often be recognized as a regression, i.e. as something which 'belongs' to an earlier cultural pattern, the parallel of younger age in the individual. What one might call 'social memory' is often surprisingly strong.

Since a defence mechanism generally develops when the human personality has to undergo the heavy stresses and strains inherent in the process of rapid social change, the paradoxical situation may develop in which the rapid change itself brings back to life attitudes and actions which had been considered forgotten or superseded by a new pattern of thought and social structure. In these situations a very careful analysis is needed to distinguish between relics of the past and birth-pangs of the future.

We shall mention a few attitudes, which promise the individual or the groups protection against too heavy pressure and strain.

(a) *The Transference of Guilt*

In the mind of the man caught in rapid change the question rises: 'Who is to blame for my misfortune? Who has caused this differentiation which has made some people rich and influential, while I remain poor and insignificant?' In a static society this question made no sense; if it were expressed as a lamentation to the gods, the answer would have been: Karma, fate, punishment for sin, or just bad luck. Apart from individual cases of

black and white magic, there would have been no answer except endurance. Now, however, people are told that through the application of knowledge to nature and society, they can influence their environment. They see powerful foreigners with bulldozers, guns and injection needles, and they expect commensurate magic behind these technical wonders. Why, then, is this magic unattainable? The answer is that the knowledge has been *wilfully withheld.* The 'cargo-cult' in New Guinea has become the symbol of this translation of the craving for better conditions and magic strength in a broken world. We mention this messianic movement, not as a caricature of belief in magic, but as an illustration of the moving forces in a world in turmoil.

More widespread is the stereotype, developed in western social thought, which blames the unbearable conditions of the poor on *wilful exploitation.* The appeal made by Marx and his followers to the masses of labourers in industrialized countries and, since Lenin, to the peoples of the non-industrialized countries under colonial administration, seeks to evoke a massive, monotonous answer: exploitation by capitalist, imperialist, colonialist bosses is to be blamed for all drudgery and misery.

The regressive element in this appeal can be found in the generally subconscious belief that if only these bosses were abolished, deposed, expelled or, if necessary, killed, all would be well. Of course, as soon as national or ideological leaders take over and themselves become responsible, they learn that only hard and efficient work, privations and sufferings can lead to a better future. The masses, however, looking for relief or for political freedom, could not be aroused into forceful and united action without the stereotyped, automatic answer to all questions: away with the oppressors!

(b) *Messianism*

In a number of respects, the fervent and colourful hope for a nearby paradise, or the Kingdom of God on earth, is the counterpart of putting the blame on existing earthly powers. When men loathe their present state of subjection and are unable to see how they can rely on their own responsibility and action, the figure of the righteous ruler, a Messiah, soon arises in their imagination.

Historically, Messianism has found expression in pre-Christ-

ian times, and during the age of the Church, as well as completely outside Christianity. It has been recognized and described in a great variety of situations during the process of rapid social change.[1]

It is significant here to stress the soothing effect of a messianic belief on present misery and suffering. It is one of the most tenuous and pressing responsibilities of the Church to distinguish between the self-blinding and regressive elements in messianic movements both within and outside the churches, and God's promise of new life, including a new social life, through acceptance of his grace. For one thing, earthly messianism is *in a hurry*. It promises a world without taxation and free from white domination, which seems more quickly attainable than a world without greed and envy.

There are few governments which have the courage to outline a goal for agricultural and industrial development over fifty years—even if this were technically feasible. Rather, they develop a series of five-year plans, short enough to be grasped by the ordinary man's imagination. It takes the maturity of a government like that of India to refrain in these plans from startling promises.[2]

Secondly, earthly messianism can remain *passive*. There are examples of dedicated hard work and struggle for a messianic movement. However the leaders may hope for mass emotion in order to succeed, but not for general individual acceptance and dedication. In the messianic expectation there is great readiness to receive a new status, new glory, new wealth, but little spur toward sacrifice. The expectations of the disciples of Jesus during his life on earth are all too clear. This is a general characteristic of messianism.

(c) *Glorification of the Past*

Glorification of the past as a sweetener of the present is a very general phenomenon. The psychological basis for the cult of

[1] K. Schlosser, 'Der Prophetismus in Niederen Kulturen', *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, LXXV, 1950; G. Balandier, *Messianisme et Nationalisme en Afrique Noire*, Paris, 1957; F. C. Kamma, *De Messiaanse Koréri-bewegingen in het Biak-Noemfoorse Cultuurgebied*. The Hague, 1954; A. F. C. Wallace, 'Revitalization Movements'. *Am. Anthropologist*, LVIII, Nr. 2, 1956; A. J. F. Köbben, 'Profetische Bewegingen als Uiting van Sociaal Protest'. *Sociologisch Jaarboek* (ed. by the Dutch Sociological Society) XIII, 1959.

[2] Of course, government planning has many rational elements which far transcend their symbolic significance, as seen by the impressionable masses.

national history is obvious. The heroism, the glory, the cultural achievements of earlier generations must persist potentially in the present generation. One need not analyse this belief scientifically nor substantiate it logically, nor is it indispensable to demonstrate it by action today.

Very understandably, most new nations re-discover their pre-colonial past in the process of nation building. It matters little whether the former national glory or culture flourished 500 or 5,000 years ago, but it must have preceded the passing colonial period. It is indeed hard to admit that a living and progressive culture or national life could have submitted to foreign domination in the recent past, for in that case, history might repeat itself.

(d) *Mob action*

Repressed feelings develop the urge to move and act bodily. In times of strain and stress this urge often expresses itself in mob action, designed to destroy or be destroyed.

This very general social phenomenon is found outside areas of rapid social change, historically as well as geographically. Throughout history there has been hidden or open fear of the masters, the ruling classes, the oppressors. The downtrodden can unite in action much more easily than in thought or word. They may suddenly turn against the powers that be and set off a destructive explosion.

For destructive it is, and many social tragedies are interwoven with mob action. But for the suppressed, it must be considered as a crude defence mechanism against external despair and internal doubt. When old ethical values no longer seem to have validity and the structure of external authority is undermined, mob action is one possible outlet.

In modern western society it explodes in gang fights, lynchings and violent demonstrations against the police.

Looting and arson are irrational but sometimes irrepressible reactions against extremes of wealth and poverty, or rather expressions of despair of the achievement of better living conditions through 'normal' lines of education and work. They may be coupled with hatred of the possessors of this wealth, but that is often not the starting point. Under these circumstances, rape and killing are to be considered looting and robbery, rather than murder.

In the low income countries undergoing rapid social change, mob action is just around the corner in any situation of built-up tension. Everyone, including myself, was, I believe, surprised, on the very first day after the surrender of the Netherlands East Indies army to the Japanese occupation troops, to see shops looted and sugar factories attacked and demolished by ordinarily quiet village people. There are many such examples in the history of every country. The symptons are very similar—the trigger effect of some minute immediate reason in a hypertense situation participation by the most unlikely people—matrons, young girls, students—a sudden tidal wave of contagious short lived emotion.

It is indeed surprising that in the process of political emancipation there is so little mob action. One can explain this only by the self-restraint of political leaders—who act rationally and do not want to be destroyed in action when victory is around the corner—and by the strong confidence of the masses in their leaders. Mahatma Gandhi, by enunciating his principle of passive resistance, channelled much potential mob action into a controlled emotioned mass movement. All too often, it seems to me, inexperienced administrators do not distinguish between the two. In many colonial or dictatorial regimes any political movement is treated as the nucleus of mob action, whereas the opposition leaders may be even more afraid of uncontrolled mobs than are the governments. In racial and ethnic tensions (e.g. in some of the Southern States in the USA, and in the Union of South Africa) the ruling groups seem particularly unaware of the fact that their political opponents are more afraid of violence than of anything else.

If, in the long run, defence mechanisms offer only deceptive outlets like artificial hatred, an orgy of action, or an elusive promise—a *fata morgana* about tomorrow and a nostalgia for the day before yesterday,—what other constructive ways are open for tormented man in turmoil and stress?

Emancipation

We shall deal with 'responsible' answers to a number of social problems in the following chapters, but must point here to some of these roads towards a new equilibrium. Some lead around the snake pit of frustration and temptation, others go in a diametrically opposite direction. I shall centre my remarks at this point on the concept, 'emancipation'.

At the risk of painting an over-simplified picture of real emancipation, I want to state the following characteristics: to accept responsibility for one's own position, rather than blaming circumstances or other people; to evaluate and take the necessary risks in working towards a better future; while recognizing the great gifts of history and tradition, not to look backwards, and finally, although looking forward to group action in the community, to refrain from seeking a mob following.

When seeking emancipation in the process of rapid social change, it is more dangerous to fall into regressive attitudes related to some sort of defence mechanism, than it is to cling to the old values of the past.

When the Rapid Social Change Study was launched, its subtitle called for 'responsible emancipation'. As we spell out what emancipation means, it may be called responsible. There are many examples in the countries of rapid social change, inside and outside the churches, of emancipated peoples and groups and of movements for emancipation.

Among the latter, mention must be made of many constructive women's organizations and youth organizations. Among these, if new nations find their way to emancipate in the international world, there is a double process of emancipation. The changing role of women and the strains of a strong generation tension inside developing societies are often intertwined with the groping for nationhood. Thus one finds women and students almost everywhere in the inner core of movements for change, influencing greatly its speed and direction.

This leads us to a concluding remark in this general survey of human ferment. There is a direct relation, in times of turmoil, between the emancipated individual and the general trend of social and political life.

Anticipating an analysis of certain contemporary social situations and conflicts, it can be said that adequate *leadership* is the most pressing need in the new societies in order to help people overcome the dangers of the very rapid transitions.

Leadership and authority should not be confused, although there are obvious links. In leadership one finds an expression in the community of new attitudes, aiming at a following. This may, but not always does also lead to executive authority in the hands of the leader. Whilst authority is needed to safeguard the

framework of society in preserving law and order, leadership extends into the roots of social life.

In a period of rapid changes, leadership becomes the crucial element in the process of emancipation of the masses. If responsible, it will help larger groups to wake up into positive emancipation. If perverted, it will yield to the temptation of becoming a servant of the masses in their trend towards regressions.

Christian witness, as many examples in the study show, can most fruitfully be directed to helping responsible leaders—non-Christian as well as Christian—in the process of emancipation. Experience shows that the national leaders have need of local leadership at many levels and in a variety of fields in order to undergird sound national policies. It is the biblical role of the yeast in the dough and the salt in the food, fermenting and conserving at the same time.

PART II

SPECIFIC ISSUES OF RAPID SOCIAL CHANGE

INTRODUCTION

In Part II we shall deal with some of the specific issues of rapid social change today. Part of the material was collected, developed, and evaluated in the four-year study initiated by the World Council of Churches.

At the outset it should be said that 'rapid social change' has been used somewhat loosely to describe many different situations which, when they are observed more closely, are found to contain many cleavages and disparities.

Expectations often outstrip reality; consequently, there is as much yearning and struggling for more rapid change as there is joy over the changes which are actually occurring. Change itself is ethically neutral. In the end it may be for the good of man and society, but it destroys many values both old and new. Can change be directed and guided?

Since World War II political change has been occurring at a much faster pace than technological or economic modernization. In turn, economic development, industrialization, and urbanziation have proceeded at a more rapid rate than social improvements. Man's inner beliefs are much less easily influenced than are his attitudes towards secular life. And, likewise, the rate of change in institutions, attitudes, and value systems varies from situation to situation, and from country to country.

Consequently, in most situations we find gross disparities, many discrepancies, many inner contradictions. They defy generalization; they must be understood by people on the spot, from within the situation, those at the helm. They make for suffering, for tension, and strife.

In each situation Christians are called to face the facts realistically—in faith, hope, and obedience. As those involved in the study on rapid social change have said repeatedly, anything less is inadequate. This does not mean that churches or Christians

have the answer to a host of technical, organizational, social, or political questions. The churches and Christians everywhere must make it their first duty to discern moral issues in the facts of the situation. As a consequence they must prepare themselves for difficult choices, for responsible action. Such an attitude does create the basis for sacrificial participation in the processes of change.

The following description of problems must necessarily be a grossly over-simplified one. In actual life social change is experienced and moulded by hundreds of millions of men, women, and children. They feel the tensions in their physical and social life. They also are the bearers of renewal.

VII

FAMILY LIFE

The Strength of Family Ties

As has been suggested in Chapter III, the family seems to resist change for a long time. Even in the case of migrant labour, where members of the family are physically separated, the attitudes and emotions involved in the institution of the family do not die easily. Unfortunately, in the study of Rapid Social Change, there has not been much opportunity to investigate this subject, but whatever material has been uncovered will be used here. The above impression has been gathered from existing sociological literature. It is one of the conclusions drawn from an enquiry into the effect of emigration on families left at home in China. Four-fifths of the income of the latter appeared to be provided by family members abroad.[1] It is also suggested by a study of the budgets of labourers in Nairobi. Here, the subsidy flows from the rural family to the members who have migrated to the cities and thus an even stronger force binds the latter to their homes.[2] Where labourers are accompanied by their wives, frequent visiting between rural and urban family members is customary, and in many areas women return to their village for childbirth.[3] Funeral and marriage rituals also provide a strong tie, and some tribes are said to maintain close bonds with the land of their ancestors, and never to settle permanently in town.[4] The Africans' insistance on retaining the

[1] Donald R. Taft & Richard Robbins, *International Migrations*, New York, 1955, p. 314.

[2] Marion Forrester, Preparatory Paper for the Rapid Social Change Study Conference in Salonica, 1959; published by the Department on Church and Society of the World Council of Churches, *The Economic and Social Relationship between the urban African Worker and the Rural Areas.*

[3] A. Phillips (ed.), *Survey of African Marriage and Family Life*, London-New York-Toronto, 1953, p. 41.

[4] J. Denis, SJ, *Le Phénomène Urbain en Afrique Central*, Bruxelles, 1958, p. 189 and pp. 205–6.

tradition of marriage payment in the form of cattle, which is nowadays being propagated anew by nativistic movements as an intrinsic element of Bantu culture, is another example of the strength of traditional values in family life. The transfer of cattle—retraceable in some cases even after years—is a better safeguard for the marriage bond than the transfer of money.

The validity of the idea that in India the joint family is losing ground is challenged by Kapadia on the basis of two investigations, the first carried out in 1930-1932 and the second about twenty years later, which suggest a growing sentiment in favour of the joint family among the university graduates (36% in the first and 61% in the second investigation declared themselves in favour of this way of living)[1].

In Japan, the small family unit is replacing the composite family, but on the other hand, it is claimed that the short distances between urban families and their rural kinsmen guarantee the maintenance of solidarity.[2] The importance of the family as an agency of social security is borne out by the fact that only 11% of the city people interviewed explicitly stated that they did not rely on their children for support in their old age.[3] Among rural people the percentage would certainly be smaller still.

Theories which use the term 'cultural lag' also suggest that it is not exceptional for deep rooted social institutions like the family to outlive material change. Davis sees, in the exceptionally high percentage of men in India's big cities, evidence of such a cultural lag in the persistence of the institution of female seclusion.[4]

The persistence of these institutions sometimes limits change

[1] K. M. Kapadia, *Marriage and Family in India*, London-New York, 1958, p. 259. Other research cited here shows that a majority of the population in some smaller towns still lives in a joint family, while many of those who live in nuclear families do so for reasons not of their own choice, and retain joint family relationships (mutual obligations, sharing of income and property, participation in essential ceremonies).

[2] UNO, *Report on the World Social Situation*, New York, 1957, p. 137. See also Kazuya Matsumiya, 'Family Organization in Present Day Japan', in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. LIII, No. 2, Sept. 1947.

[3] R. P. Dore, *City Life in Japan*, International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction, London-Berkeley, California, 1958, p. 131. See also 'The Common Christian Responsibility toward Areas of Rapid Social Change', *Change in Japan*, Tokyo, 1959, p. 17. Kapadia refers to this same fact with respect to India, p. 266.

[4] K. Davis, *The Population of India and Pakistan*, New Jersey, 1951, p. 140.

or sets its pace. Thus the custom of mutual sharing—sometimes contemptuously referred to by western authors as family parasitism[1]—often hampers the individual's efforts to raise his standard of living. However, the family as a social unit may embark on economic enterprises along western lines; examples are the Zaibatsu families in Japan, and the trade associations of Haussa kinsmen in the Congo and Equatorial Africa.[2] A survey made in Canton, Southern China, revealed that, even in 1950 after more than a century of trade with the West, 94% of the 20,000 odd industrial and commercial enterprises were family businesses.[3] In Africa it is precisely the urge to fulfil traditional family obligations, such as the marriage payment, and assistance to parents in paying their debts, which, under modern conditions, makes young men enter into wage labour relationships. A family system, in which authority and wealth are transferred on the basis of heredity rather than of accomplishment, is sometimes held responsible for hampering modern political development.

Sometimes, however, it is the strong family tie that makes a breakaway from traditional life possible at all. The Hindu and other joint or large families make great sacrifices to enable some of their members to study at a university, even abroad. The young men in matrilocal society in Central Sumatra (Minangkabou) are encouraged by their families to travel abroad, to Singapore and the cities of Java, in pursuit of trade. Seasonal agricultural labourers by the millions leave their wives and children safely under the protection of family, kinship group, and village community in order to earn much needed money. Even the cultivation of tree cash crops, the exploitation of forest products, and the establishment of new villages would be difficult or impossible without the strong and safe background of kinship relations.

Disintegrating factors

Since the beginning of this century, however, the 'prime movers' have been increasingly extending their influence in the institution of the family.

[1] Daryll Forde (ed.), *Aspects Sociaux de l'Industrialisation et de l'Urbanisation en Afrique au Sud du Sahara*, UNESCO, Paris, 1956.
[2] J. Denis, SJ, *op. cit.*, p. 144; Daryll Forde (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 123.
[3] C. K. Kang, *The Chinese Family in the Communist Revolution*, Cambridge, 1959, p. 138.

As the money economy increasingly penetrates the rural areas, it fosters individualism, as shown by the appearance of individual landownership in areas that in the past knew only ancestral or communal property. Family land, hitherto inalienable, may become a commodity on the market.

Migration to the cities is increasing more and more as a result of growing population pressure in densely occupied rural areas, but also as a response to more and more diversified job opportunities in factories and offices.

Female labour outside of the subsistence sector in family income and consumption is generally a disintegrating factor.

But the effect of such factors seems most disturbing where they operate in conditions of such overt disproportion between real income and minimum standards of living that people consider themselves, and are considered by others, to live in squalor and abject poverty.

Poverty

Because of the urgency of this problem, the initial questionnaire issued in the study project on Rapid Social Change put poverty foremost. Its effect upon family life may be gathered from one of the replies (from Mexico):[1] 'In the country regions the problem of poverty is evidenced by the great number of men pressing to go to the United States as agricultural labourers. In some receiving centres thousands of men have congregated for months, waiting for a chance to go, living in deplorable conditions and, without funds, posing a difficult problem to the city concerned'.

In the cities poverty results from unemployment and together with miserable housing conditions puts a great strain upon the family. The reply to the questionnaire quoted above says: '. . . Many are flocking to the city where lack of employment and soaring food prices cause hardship and suffering . . . The population is growing so fast that the city is unable to provide water and sanitary arrangements for the underprivileged in the growing suburbs'. Nearly all studies of urbanization in areas of rapid social change deal with the crowded, inadequate housing and the slum conditions in the cities (see Chapter XI). It is inevitable that health, self-respect, and family welfare are

[1] Department on Church and Society; *A Reply from Mexico* (unpublished paper), Geneva, July, 1955.

severely damaged in such an environment. It is nearly impossible for an individual family to maintain a measure of respectability when surrounded by general poverty. 'The achievement of more cleanliness already requires so much effort from the women, that they cannot look after the children as well', says an investigator of a suburb in South Africa.[1] To this burden is added that of sickness. The Rapid Social Change Study in Japan revealed that in poor families (i.e. those receiving governmental assistance), 16.4% of the members were ill, while in 'normal' families, the rate appeared to be 3%. Tuberculosis occurred among 6.5% in the first group, in only 0.7% of the second.[2]

Female labour

The family farm requires a huge amount of female labour and in many countries the number of hours spent in the fields by women and girls equals or even exceeds the number of hours of male labour. On plantations, estates and in the latifundia system of Latin agriculture there is a large extent of male labour in agriculture and a large proportion of female labour is in domestic services.

Opportunity for female labour is a blessing rather than a curse. In the annual cycle of agriculture in traditional society it is taken for granted that women assist in carrying the seasonal peaks. This adds—in many societies—to their status in society and undoubtedly to the stability of the household. It is especially true where the men are fishing, hunting or tending the cattle and the women take care of food crops.

The differences in the structure of the female labour force in low and high income countries are striking. In the former there is the same percentage of employed women in older and younger age groups, or a higher percentage among older women. In the latter, the percentage appears to be considerably higher among younger women, reflecting greater job opportunities for young girls in a highly developed economy, but there is a sharp drop in the percentage of older women employed.

In many societies women also tend to monopolize trade in

[1] A. Phillips (ed.) , *loc. cit.*, p. 45.
[2] National Christian Council of Japan, *The Common Christian Responsibility toward Areas of Rapid Social Change in Japan*, Tokyo, 1959, p. 19.

local products. In some areas, among which may be mentioned certain West African countries, this has been the stepping-stone to women's enterprise in the distributive and wholesale trade and modern transport.

In the transition from traditional to industrial society, however, a great percentage of men may have no regular employment, or wages below a modest subsistence level. In such cases it is absolutely necessary for many women to work for a money income. This may have a depressing influence on their well-being, health and social status. Notorious examples are well-known from the textile industry in Japan, as they also occurred fifty to one hundred years earlier in the textile mills and coal mines in England.

But a sudden transition to not being able to work and earn is likewise detrimental. In the study on Rapid Social Change in the Copper Belt in Northern Rhodesia, Dr van Doorn found the position of the housewife living in the small and neat cubicles of the compounds near the mines depressing and disturbing. With their children they followed their husbands to the mining town where they no longer have an opportunity to grow basic food. Nor does the husband understand why the woman suddenly needs so much more money. Neither can she usefully spend her time and energy in looking after her one—or two—roomed house, and her children who spend the daytime in school. And, again, city regulations do not allow her to do much trading. In these circumstances—as in South Africa—'illegal' brewing as a source of income and prostitution are a way out to a more rewarding life.

Women and girls, therefore, have to bear the burden of economic and social development in different circumstances in a variety of ways. It is, of course, impossible, to keep them occupied in traditional ways at least seasonally, in agriculture. To the women, also, the new opportunities of the town, of industry, of economic and political development promise a new and better way of life.

Before leaving the subject of female labour, we want to consider some data on the importance of 'unpaid family workers' in agriculture. In order to make the comparison more meaningful, a distinction is made between unpaid and paid female labour in *agriculture*. These data are being collected by the International Labour Organization.

Number of 'Unpaid Family Workers' per hundred female workers in agriculture

Family Farm Type		*Latifundia Type*		*Mechanized Farm Type*	
Algeria	95	Argentina	19	Norway	30
Thailand	88	Colombia	19	Sweden	26
Japan	84	Nicaragua	15	Australia	15
Netherlands	84	Costa Rica	15	England/Wales	14
Yugoslavia	83	El Salvador	14	New Zealand	13
Czechoslovakia	81	Venezuela	12		
Philippines	80	Portugal	11	*Mixed Type*	
Denmark	78	Ecuador	6	US	52
Poland	77			Switzerland	52
France	75	*Plantation Type*		Canada	49
West Germany	67	Malaya	23		
Italy	63				

The general conclusion seems clear—in most of Asia and Continental Europe where the family farm prevails, female labour is recorded to a large extent as 'unpaid family worker'. There seems, in this respect, little or no relation with the general level of income, degree of industrialization, or even political system. Most of Africa appears to have the same structure but for this continent the data are scarce. In other types of society, however, if women are recognized as working in agriculture, they work for a wage rather than in family labour. In a plantation economy or on latifundia, as in Latin America, this reduces the percentage of female workers in the statistics. Similarly, in Anglo-Saxon society and in Scandinavia, there is little unpaid female labour on farms, but for a completely different reason.

There are obviously great differences between 'Latifundia' society and the highly developed countries. In the former a large proportion of the women are registered as domestic servants; in the latter the majority works in factories, offices or in distributive trade. In labour statistics these may all be called 'services', but the type of service and the economic and social position of the women differs greatly.

From ILO statistics we shall take a few illustrations, in the same order as in the table above.

In contrast to the earlier table we find in the 'family farm countries' that the percentage of women and girls in services depends upon and rises with national income. Netherlands and Denmark have a ratio as high as the countries in the third row.

Percentage of women recorded as working in the 'services sector' of the economy

Family Farm Type		*Latifundia Type*		*Mechanized Agriculture*	
Algeria	3	Argentina	49	Norway	42
Thailand	2	Colombia	52	Sweden	41
Japan	15	Nicaragua	54	Australia	37
Netherlands	42	Costa Rica	62	Great Britain	37
Yugoslavia	7	El Salvador	46	New Zealand	41
Czechoslovakia	13	Venezuela	60	United States	42
Philippines	16	Portugal	37	Switzerland	42
Denmark	42	Ecuador	24	Canada	47
Poland	11				
France	25	*Plantation Type*			
West Germany	23	Malaya	12		
Italy	16				

However, nowhere in this group of countries is the figure as high as in low income Latin American countries.

There is one more difference in the structure of female labour, relevant to our study. In highly industrialized countries a large proportion of the girls and young women, aged 15-25, is gainfully employed. This proportion then falls off considerably for older groups. In non-industrialized countries, however, there is no such top in employment in the lower age groups and little fall off at high age. Some—admittedly selected—figures comparing countries show this tendency.

The effect of this employment structure by age group is very important for family life. Few sociological and economic comparative studies, however, have been made and in the churches more attention should be given to structural changes in this respect.

Percentage of economically active women by age

	15–19 years	20–64 years	65 years and older
Western Germany	77	40	10
Netherlands	49	25	6
Australia	68	25	5
Morocco	35	41	10
French West Africa	15	29	30
Ceylon	30	33	24
Peru	38	48	36
Poland	38	63	35
Japan	50	59	31

These statistics reveal striking differences in the structure of female labour in different parts of the world and at different

levels of income and industrialization. But they are rather consistent in one respect: in low income non-industrialized countries a large number of older women are registered as 'economically active'. In the high income, industrial countries this percentage appears to be considerably higher in the younger age groups, reflecting greater job opportunities for young girls. The figure in most of the latter category of countries drops quickly after the age of 25 or 30.

The social corollaries of these statistics are obvious: in the low income countries more mothers have to work, mostly manual work. In the high income countries the young girl acquires more independence through job opportunities in industry and the services sector of the economy. A shift of this nature may take momentous pace where a society becomes rapidly urbanized and industrialized.

Migration and commuting

In a sense, it is a statistical expression of the fact that girls as well as boys with a school education flock to the expanding towns, creating in these towns serious problems of social adaptation—as shown in the studies on Rapid Social Change, e.g. in Japan and Sao Paulo.

People, mostly the young and impressionable ones, are suddenly offered an opportunity for physical mobility, leaving the family for a short or long period. The problems for the churches in this respect are pressing both in the villages and in the towns. For family life this internal migration is of the greatest importance. But the consequences of even shorter, but frequent periods of absence of the parents may likewise be a distingegrating factor.

In a great number of urban families the mother is away in daytime, leaving the small children to a neighbour or to their own initiative, insofar as they do not earn also. This is especially serious, as the absence of compulsory education is another aspect of poverty in many countries. Juvenile delinquency is a frequent complaint and lack of control by adults or idleness a frequently assumed cause.

In areas or among groups where the main problem does not consist of poor material conditions, other difficulties put strain on family ties. Traditional habits, for example, often appear inadequate when it comes to adaptation to new situations.

Under conditions of wage labour, where the adults are away for the greater part of the day, one cannot rely on imitative play or on assistance in adult activities as a means of initiating youngsters in their future role. The age group, the social institution which regulates the whole life of a young person, is broken up by migration and schooling. Customs like the sleeping together of all boys of a village in a special common hut, are inapplicable in the mine compound.[1]

The impossibility of carrying out necessary rituals for marriage, puberty, etc., can be mentioned as another problem. The contracting of a marriage in town may involve considerable travelling if the ceremonial prescriptions are followed, while the indispensable family elders are living elsewhere. The requirement that a bride should live with her husband's people until the mother-in-law thinks her fit for having her own hut, causes a young couple to be separated for a long time in cases where the husband does not live with his family, but is away in town.

Confrontation with western ways of life

All these disintegrating factors would not have changed indigenous family systems greatly, had they not been accompanied by an increasing confrontation with foreign norms and a foreign way of life. 'Disruptive forces alone, without an accompanying creative concept, will not lead to the rapid development of new institutions', one author on Chinese family life states, after having described the difficulties the communists encountered in changing the age-old traditional family pattern.[2] We are not certain whether all concepts brought home by returning soldiers and students to indigenous society from western universities, or western literature and films, were creative[3] but, anyway, they were presented as superior. Rationalism, stress on personal autonomy and freedom for the individual undermined the traditional authority of parents, weakened indigenous forms of social control and raised doubts about formerly accepted supernatural sanctions.

[1] C. L. van Doorn and Mrs W. S. F. van Doorn-Snijders, 'Report about the study concerning Areas of Rapid Social Change,' *Copper Belt*, April-December 1958, 1st edition, Geneva, 1959, p. 68 ff. See also A. Phillips (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 30 ff., 33 ff. and Daryll Forde (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 208–9.

[2] C. K. Kang, *The Chinese Family in the Communist Revolution*, Cambridge, 1959, p. 197.

[3] In *The Changing Pattern of Family in India*, p. 29, a psychiatrist mentions the effect of cinema cliché's he observed with some of his patients.

Some authors thus explain the frequent occurrence of adultery, concubinage and prostitution in African cities. Time and again, it is said that women prefer living as prostitutes because of the greater liberty they thus have. This tendency has been explained as a revolt against the rigid discipline at home. This may not be the only cause, but, nevertheless, many of these women appear to have run away from their husbands, without efforts of reconciliation having been made by their families, as would have occurred in tribal conditions. Curious is the case quoted from Richards,[1] where transgression of sexual norms is supposed to be eased because of new technical equipment. It concerns a tribe, where sexual intercourse is believed to be polluting and purification rites are considered necessary, one of which is the kindling anew of the hearth fire. Without this, the food cooked on that fire is believed to be dangerous. Adultery can, because of the performance of this rite, easily be detected, since a woman has to borrow fire from one of her neighbours after each act of intercourse. This is no longer the case since matches have been introduced. Thus there is escape from former sanctions, though the underlying superstition remains as strong as ever.

Meanwhile, the escape from control is not the only factor that can explain the widely observed transgression of sexual norms. Other factors such as the long absence of husbands who have to earn money away from home,[2] the unbalanced distribution of men and women in the city population[3], sometimes the lack of other opportunities for women to earn money[4], but in many cases, their economic independence from marriage, exert their pressure on moral behaviour also. They would not be influential however, unless the traditional norms had ceased to be regarded as valid.

[1] A. Phillips (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 104–105.

[2] This does not always appear to lead to increasing instability of marriage, or adultery. And if it is, the latter may sometimes even meet with approval (ibid., pp. 24, 68–9, 71, 106, etc.). See also p. 153; there is no evidence that divorce has increased under these conditions, though this is generally assumed.

[3] This is Wilson's explanation for the fact that most women were found to be living with their second and third husbands (ibid., p. 110).

[4] Wilson, p. 150; this is especially said of educated girls, who can only live according to the standard they think fit by associating with a foreigner. See W. C. Klein, *De Congolese Elite en haar Problemen*, Kon. Inst. v. d. Tropen, Amsterdam, 1957, p. 47, where a plea from educated women for more job opportunities is reported.

Perhaps these encroachments upon traditional norms would not cause serious disturbance, if the newly presented world were to offer clear cut standards, suited to the modern situation. But this does not lie within the possibilities of western culture, suffering as it does with its own incongruities, torn by doubt, full of complaint about similar 'problems of rapid social change'. The sexual morality it presents ranges from that of the Kinsey report to that of the Roman Catholic Church. Its increasing rate of divorce stands side by side with its official creed that the family is the basis of society. Its concept of love, itself grown throughout an age-long cultural development, is a source of confusion.[1] Its highly idealized standard of marital happiness can be a factor working for instability rather than stability of marriage.[2] Its understanding of parenthood, though perhaps developing more and more from the idea of possession to that of responsibility, is being complicated by difficult and contradictory educational theories. The last 40-50 years, writes Goodsell, it has become obvious that the family does not function under industrial conditions.

Emerging Incongruities

Judging from the outside one cannot help but observe a great amount of incongruity and haphazard adaptation in the way people react to all the impinging forces mentioned above. This emerges, for example, when adaptation to a new urban environment is seriously attempted but fails to be achieved; and this can happen for a variety of reasons. Sometimes the old environment may retain its claims, as, for instance, the matrilineal societies in Western Africa appear to do.[3] Very often the new environment fails to fulfil the indispensable conditions for such

[1] W. Goodsell, *A History of Marriage and the Family*, New York, 1934, p. 495 ff.

[2] R. Prigent, *Renouveau des Idées sur la Famille*, Paris, 1954, stresses the fact that the ideal of love, as developed in Western Europe, was an extra-conjugal love, and that only recently has it come to be identified with conjugal love, p. 167. W. Goodsell, *op. cit.*, p. 519.

[3] In Daryll Forde (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 108–109, an account is summarized of the conflict between a growing sense of paternal responsibility and the claims of a matrilineal social environment. Another account on p. 90 reveals the wife's consequent insecurity as regards heredity and even subsistence rights. It is impossible to resist such claims when the greater family is the only source of security in cases of emergency. A. Phillips (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 150.

adaptation. And also lack of understanding of the new situation can be a severe hindrance.[1]

So a kind of middle path is usually followed, involving frequent visits home, paying off some of the obligations to the family or tribal authorities, having recourse to the rural homestead for some of the important events of life[2] on the one hand, and adoption of western habits or of completely new ones, on the other hand. Return for marriage, for childbirth or for other ceremonies is frequent, as in some areas is the sending home of the children for a tribal education. Marriages contracted in town are accompanied by ritual, but to a far lesser extent than in the tribal situation, while it is to be noted that traditional rituals are maintained wherever their performance is possible, as, for example, in that part of the mining town Broken Hill in Rhodesia where people live on private plots in a way resembling village conditions.[3]

This also occurs in the example mentioned earlier, in which necessary ceremonies for contracting a marriage can only be fulfilled by long travelling. It is reported that the expenses may be so great as to leave people destitute for a long period, or the couple may get impatient because of the long procedure and set up for themselves, 'often to drift apart after a while'[4]. It also happens when a young woman follows the custom of spending the period of her first childbirth and subsequent feeding (often a few years in Africa) with her parent family. In the tribal situation this would usually be a short distance from the husband's place, but when the couple lives in town it may involve a long separation. The case of polygamy may also be mentioned as an example of new and rather incongruous habit formation. Some may maintain that western norms concerning monogamy are impossible and openly stick to old habits, but in the urban situation and under conditions of modern hygiene where many more children may survive, a polygamous household is liable to become a burden. Additional taxes required for more wives are another hindrance. The wish to be 'modern' also makes its claim and so the modern form of polygamy—marriage with one wife and keeping concubines who are economically independent

1 E.g., of parents concerning the necessity of school attendance for their children, A. Phillips (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 31.
2 Daryll Forde (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 114, 163, 172–3, 207, etc.
3 A. Phillips (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 109.
4 Ibid., p. 35 ff.

in other parts of the town—is originated. Other ways of paying respect to monogamy while continuing polygamous practices could be mentioned too. The kind of incongruities that may arise are indicated by Jahoda's description of the young men who were entangled in relationships with different girls, some of whom they had made pregnant (which need not always be anything extraordinary according to traditional norms), but who at the same time were vehemently opposed to the idea of polygamy.[1] Incongruous too is the fact that transfer of goods at the occasion of marriage tends to be replaced by money payments under western influence and this strengthens the commercial aspect of marriage which westerners particularly have tried to combat in Africa. This is the more incongruous when the amount demanded is increasing, as is reported from all parts of this continent, and thus prevents a couple from legalizing their union. What was originally a safeguard for the stability of marriage becomes a hindrance to its legal contraction!

Not all reactions pose problems of incongruity. Sometimes suitable new patterns occur, as for example the 'guided choice' of a marriage partner, which is becoming accepted in India today, a combination of free individual choice and parental control. But it also happens that individually accepted new patterns, as, for example, intercaste marriages in India, meet with serious resistance, and cause great pain to the persons involved.[2]

Thus the list of incongruities and partial adjustments might be extended. Rather would we point however to an omission in these and similar analyses, which seems to us quite disturbing.

Formation of Indigenous Opinion

It is within this context of economic stress, outdated traditions, haphazard adaptations and confusing modern ideas that the churches have to point a way to a family life which is in accordance with man's true destiny. They have done so often by identifying themselves with western standards and by relying on government legislation[3] or on such disciplinary methods as

[1] G. Jahoda, 'Love, Marriage and Social Change', *Africa*, Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. XXIX, 2 April 1959, p. 177 ff.
[2] *The Changing Pattern of Family in India*, p. 41/42.
[3] Thomas Price, *African Marriage*, IMC Research Pamphlet, no. 1, London, 1955, p. 47.

were used by many missionaries. It has become clear in the last few decades that much identification has failed—not only because of the negative reaction it provokes, but mainly because it is not on the desire to westernize African or Asian society that the churches ought to base their witness. Imitation often leads to sad distortion, as, for example, the display of wealth and consequent burden of debt that accompany church weddings in many parts of Africa and some parts of Asia. Moreover the greater the differentiation and confusion within the western world itself, the more obvious it is that western culture and Christian standards are two different things.

Thus superficial legal westernization does not show a way out. But neither does uncritical adoption of standards as they have developed within the western churches, as, for instance, our stress on the nuclear family, on the conjugal bond as prevailing over all other family bonds, our romantic conception of conjugal love, our patriarchal tradition and our remnants of church jurisdiction over marriage.[1] One may sincerely ask whether these are indispensable elements of Christian family life, or rather products of western church history. In any case one needs to be aware that in many of the areas under consideration they are utterly foreign. It has become obvious that under conditions of rapid social change new solutions have to be worked out which will become part of the people's own convictions. In his extensive treatment of the missions' encounter with family life in Africa Harries rightly states that the future of Christian marriage in this continent depends on the development of Christian public opinion.[2]

However, in descriptions of problems of family life in the areas under consideration, very little attention is paid to indigenous opinion. It is only by Dore and Rapadia that any opinion research is mentioned. Harries himself only mentions African opinion incidentally.[3] One cannot help the impression that at least as much effort and funds should be used in investigating directly the African's own definition of his problem, as was used in this compilation of missionary policy.

[1] A. Phillips (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 345 ff., e.g. p. 391:(One author puts it: 'Missions readily subscribe to the theory that . . . the African family plus polygamy, plus matriliny or patriliny, plus bride-price, could be replaced by a patriarchal Christian family, based on Roman Law, the Code Napoleon or English Civil Law').

[2] A. Phillips (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 456. [3] Ibid., p. 333–4.

An example of such direct treatment is the already quoted article by G. Jahoda. This contains an analysis of letters about love and marriage problems, published in advice columns of West African newspapers. Naturally only the problems of the literate elite, and probably only of a small section of this, are presented here, but they are described at least as seen by the Africans themselves. So from Dore's description[1] we learn about the misunderstandings created by the western concept of 'romantic love', or about the conflicts of those who are torn between their own and their families' ideal in choice of a marriage partner.

But such studies are rare. Therefore we wholeheartedly agree with Price's statement that more information is needed on public opinion.[2] Only when the churches know what doubts, what arguments, what feelings of guilt and temptation, what expectations too, live in the hearts of the people, can they help them to find, each in their own situation, such adaptations as will enable them to stand—in the midst of all confusion—as 'the salt of the earth'. Perhaps the 'Report of a Group Convened at the Behest of the Archbishop of Canterbury, 1957', called *The Family in Contemporary Society*[3] may finally be quoted: 'We account it an axiom that the church—each local church—has a duty, under the Holy Spirit, to study the local situation and so to order its teaching and pastoral ministry and organization that it can perceive and do the will of God in that situation'. We are sure that such study, which takes indigenous conviction and arguing seriously, will work out new ways of adaptation, which will be neither 'traditional', nor haphazard, nor artificially "modern".'

[1] R. P. Dore, *op. cit.*, p. 157 ff. [2] Thomas Price, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
[3] Reproduced as a Project Paper (no. 18, August 1958) by the Dept. on Church and Society of the World Council of Churches, also London, 1958.

VIII

EDUCATION

In the process of economic and social development education, as the way in which an older generation transfers its experience, culture and skill to the younger generation, is of crucial importance. It should be noted that the field of education is much wider than the western type school. The latter has often been a 'prime mover' in the field of social life, deeply influencing the relations between the young and the old.

In traditional society life itself conveys education to the children and young men and women along various channels. In many ways, the mother as a nurse to her child, a worker in the field or as a grandmother telling stories, prepares the younger generation for life. The father and other older members of the family or clan are the example for the boy in hunting, fishing, animal husbandry, war and community affairs. In many cases, education and initiation are given in the social framework of age groups, binding individuals together in a narrow community. Formal schooling was not altogether lacking—especially in the field of religion and philosophy—but it had a less important function. It was destined for the select few rather than for the masses. Illiteracy was no obstacle to a rewarding life, a high position or even a successful career.

The introduction of western-type schools has completely changed the picture. 'Illiteracy' has become an expression of contempt for traditional society, although literacy in itself is by no means a measure of culture or a guarantee of skill. In a society where people have little opportunity to read it seems that the spread of knowledge by word of mouth is very effective and people's memories are often astonishing. Also, in these circumstances people can often learn by seeing others perform. However, the communication of knowledge, skill and wisdom is only possible in the narrow circle of personal contact in time and space.

Education, preparing children for their lives as adults, is an end in itself. Training can only be considered as part of the more general objective of educating people. If training becomes divorced from its general framework and roots, people themselves become degraded to tools in a technical or social process. The latter may go as far as ideological brainwashing, the former to preparing a man only for a single operation at an assembly line.

Education and training are possible without formal schooling. But governments and national movements have very soon learned to consider a general spread of school training an indispensable part of development. It must be recognized that Christianity and Islam are the religions of a book. Islam relies more on teaching boys the recital of holy texts, but Christian missionaries have done more to promote the nineteenth century western school than any other agency. In some parts of the world, mission and church continue to play a most important role in education and this fact alone puts a heavy responsibility upon them to provide the right type of school training.

In our considerations we will proceed from the basic principles that in any society schools as an institution should only be tools in the general process of education through home and society, and that they should help to prepare the child for its own type of society, taking into account the transformations in society likely to occur in the forseeable future.

In that context we will discuss briefly some problems in contemporary education.

The Village School

At the primary level some practical questions require an answer. What kind of knowledge and skill will a peasant in an Asian village or an African conglomeration of huts need? What will be his needs if the chances are great that the boy will move to town, to a factory or mine? If the village school confines itself to the 3-R's, what is the use of writing and reading, if there is no communication with the world outside the village? And what is the use of arithmetic, if the peasant in his later life gets paid for too low a weight, or is paid too low a price because he is heavily in debt with the merchant? The only 'benefit' would be that he knows slightly better to what extent he has been cheated, or rather—what price he has to pay to

his creditor for having saved him in the preceding hunger season.

But more basic changes in mentality are at stake. The saying 'knowledge is power' was not invented in rationalistic circles in Europe; it belongs to the world of magic and witchcraft. Knowledge, acquired in school (or church), likewise tends to be considered as a magical power in traditional society.

The western method of bringing young children under the influence of a foreign magic—though it may be white magic and in many ways beneficial—was a cause of astonishment in the earlier days of the village school. But it was accepted—for boys more easily than for girls—that it gave the younger generation a new status. There is ample evidence that the school inspired a strong desire for development, for renewal, for change. The inevitable result has been a strong 'generation tension' in a new relation between those who went to school and the old authority. Everywhere conservative and discreet teachers and professors have educated progressive and even revolutionary students. The psychology of education, the specific relation between teacher and student, has usually kept unimpaired the initial admiration for and close contact with the teacher, even where the ex-pupil denounces the very ideals for which the teacher stood. Missionary schools and colleges have not escaped this incongruous situation.

If this inevitable effect of the school is painful to the educator, the impact upon traditional authorities is even more disrupting. This is true in colonial territories as well as in independent nations. In both circumstances students are more often than not the ferment of revolutionary change. Generation tension after all is not discriminatory; it attacks all authority—of parents, of traditional chiefs, of government officials, of church hierarchy. The question whether this could have been avoided is now a purely academic one. One hundred and fifty years ago Europe itself believed in the power of knowledge to relieve all evils; the 'red-brick schoolhouse' was the cultural centre of the rural areas of the United States. There were very few people who believed in introducing artisan and agricultural techniques rather than, or simultaneously with, writing and reading.

European tradition therefore brought a predominance of the arts and humanities over simple technology into the new countries and the tide cannot be turned. However, there remain crucial problems to be solved in the field of education. One

problem relates to the value of 4-, 5- or 6-years of primary education throughout the nation, in rural areas, for boys and girls. Should primary education be made compulsory? Japan took this measure in 1889, Canada, however, only in 1941.

Those who answer in the affirmative have a diversity of arguments. Some feel that it is degrading to be illiterate, or that it is essential that everybody should be able to read the New Testament. Others believe that economic development, also in the rural areas, depends heavily upon the ability to read and write. Others again simply call it a question of social justice that everybody should be taught.

Those who question have a diversity of questions. How much good is primary education if the ability to read and write is required only a few times a year? How can elementary education be made profitable for future life, if it is not applied for a period of about ten years? Is not the countryside deprived of its best elements, if there are little or no jobs in the rural areas which require school education? How can improvement of agriculture, of village administration, of industry, be fostered through uniform, ubiquitous primary education?

Churches, missions, governments have offered a variety of answers. The main difficulty is that one cannot do everything at all levels at the same time for lack of staff and lack of money. Some started to build the pyramid of education from the top. Spain built universities in Lima and Ciudad Antiqua (Guatemala) in the early sixteenth century and in Manila in 1611, but left the countryside illiterate.

In the Belgian Congo the pyramid of education was built from the bottom upwards. Other areas begin in the middle. Which was or is the best policy? Obviously, there is a relation between educational policy and the basic philosophy of society. The aristocratic attitude of the Spaniards and the paternalistic approach of the Belgian colonial government had a decisive influence upon their respective policies of school-construction.

In primary education, especially in rural areas, it remains of the utmost importance that the parents should take an active interest in the education of their children. French experiments in this direction are very promising. It may be that in the 'mansions familiales' parents pay heavy fees, as parents did in Japan in the Meiji period, but this sacrifice appears to be one of the cornerstones of success.

Quite recently the conference of Unesco set out to eradicate illiteracy through primary education, throughout the world, in a very short period. It would seem that education requires more than the 'double negative' of disappearing illiteracy and should be directed to the positive functions young people must perform in society.

Education of adolescents

Of vital importance, for boys and for girls, is the training of adolescents (14-18 years), especially in the rural areas, in all such subjects as adaptation to techniques in agriculture, home economics, hygiene, co-operative undertakings, etc. A large proportion of effort, time and money spent on primary education is lost, unless it can serve as a foundation for a less formal school training (generally in the late afternoon or evening) for adolescents. In some countries in North Western Europe—Denmark, the Netherlands—this type of education in the nineteenth century served to lay the foundation for the agricultural extension service, the co-operative movement, etc. On Java, in 1938-1941, promising experiments were initiated on the same basis.

It should be noted that these examples, scattered as they are, may help to solve the almost insoluble problems inherent in making investments on a very long term in countries short of capital and human resources.

The knowledge communicated to adolescents can almost immediately be put to good use in the field and in the home. At this age people are interested because they are looking at their own immediate future. Generally these young people will be more flexible and more eager than the older generation are when 'adult education' is offered along conventional lines. Even agricultural extension officers generally begin with stimulating interest among the younger generation.

Last but not least—this type of education makes it possible to enlist village school teachers in the battle for development.

Training for local leadership

Another type of training, so far developed only on a minor scale in comparison to the need, is intermediate training for local leadership in government and community. Training courses for people with an intermediary (lower-high school)

education are available in most countries, but they are insufficient in number, and very often inadequate in their programmes. Here again the question arises, whether the school has a creative or a disruptive effect in the meeting of civilizations which is part and parcel of the introduction of western-type technical schools. It is often said that the pupils are mainly interested in social status and in earning a satisfactory income after graduation. This may be so, but it does not mean that they need only be interested in 'white-collar' jobs. A small selection of examples taken from a variety of cultural environments shows that it is possible to make Asians and Africans, as well as Europeans and Americans, proud of agricultural labour or a 'blue-overall' technical job. The example of Europeans and Americans generally earning a high salary in a white-collar job is not conducive to respect for manual labour. It also is no longer possible to preach the nobility of manual labour—which was, as Max Weber said, a cornerstone of Protestant labour ethics—and demonstrate the symbolic status of an administrative job. Yet, in intercultural relations, the new concepts of labour introduced by the Church are often subservient to the equally new concepts of western-type city life in all its glaring ostentation.

The number of well trained people needed for local leadership in government, industry, society and church is staggering. Even if one estimates this need at the very low level of one for every one hundred families in Asia, Africa and Latin-America (with a total of some 400-500 million families) 4 or 5 million local leaders would be needed in a large variety of functions. And it should be remembered that the rapid political, social and economic developments everywhere make the dearth of well equipped local institutions a serious threat to society. It seems to me that the communist countries have understood the basic importance of the local cadre earlier and better than everybody else, with the possible exception of Japan.

University training

At the university level the problems are equally large. The general undergraduate education, as given at Anglo-Saxon universities and colleges, is heavily biased in the direction of the arts and humanities. Partly as an imitation, partly for financial and organizational reasons, this type of college has spread widely.

Too many lawyers, too few social scientists and technicians is the result. It must be added, however, that medical schools—and in the Spanish tradition also theological schools—were developed at an early stage. Nevertheless, there is an urgent need to expand and at the same time to reorganize university education. In some countries (India, Philippines) there are huge numbers of unemployed people with a B.A. or even M.A. degree.

It is mainly a task for governments and for universities all over the world to take up this challenge. Special emphasis should be given to the establishment, the expansion and the equipment (laboratories, libraries) of institutes of higher learning in the areas of rapid social change.

The churches and the ecumenical movement will not have the funds to spend on many new university colleges in areas of rapid social change. But they are deeply involved in programmes of student and teacher exchange. The vast majority of students from Asia and Africa, studying in the West, want and need personal and human contacts and Christians will find here an unlimited field for expressing their interest and solidarity. There is also a small ecumenical fund for scholarships. So far this has been limited to grants to students of theology. It would be a great step forward if the churches would widen the terms of reference of this fund to include any graduate or post-graduate study of importance to social development.

Education for girls

In the above we have not given much attention to the specific aspects of educating girls. In the early stages of school-development girls have less chances than boys, partly because there is a fear of co-education among parents and partly because the economic importance of school-education for girls is much less obvious.

Information from countries like Korea, Japan, Java, to name a few examples, tends to show that in the villages catalyzing forces taking their impetus from the school are particularly strong where a fair proportion of the girls receive primary education. The young women remain in contact with the outside world through reading and writing to a much larger extent than the young men.

In the adolescent stage, training for child care, for hygiene in

the home, for the preparation of food and other subjects in the general field of home economics, is again of very great importance. Training for young housewives, to be found at various institutes, but more systematically, for example, at the Mindolo ecumenical centre in Northern Rhodesia is most important for creating responsible leadership in society.

Finally, women are the bearers of culture. Social development through family and home[1] depends to a large extent upon the active participation of women, such as can only be achieved when women have ample opportunity for training.

In the field of education and training for girls and women, churches and missions have been pioneering perhaps more than in any other fields of social development. Governments and secular agencies have lagged behind, but are now catching up rapidly. In these circumstances it is particularly important for the churches to accept gratefully the moral and financial support springing up around their own institutions and, at the same time, to try to break new ground in adapting methods of education and training to the new circumstances in the area of rapid social change.

[1] *Social Development through Family and Home*, report of a conference held at Oxford 7–25 September 1959, London, HMSO, No. 58–9142.

IX

FOOD SUPPLY AND POPULATION

IMPROVEMENT of medical services, in conjunction with other social forces, has operated as a 'prime mover' in accelerating the increase of population in areas of rapid social change.

The demographic, economic and even political consequences of this sudden increase in population have penetrated the whole of the social life of these countries and even of the world. A full treatment of these problems would require several volumes and the co-operation of a large number of specialists. In our treatment of the matter we will confine ourselves to a broad outline, based largely upon the demographic studies in the framework of the United Nations. An officer of the World Council of Churches has recently published a study under the title *The Population Explosion and Christian Responsibility.*[1]

Throughout history the density of people has differed greatly from country to country and from continent to continent. Even in 1750 only a few millions lived in the western hemisphere and Oceania. A belt stretching from Japan westward to the Mediterranean has always carried over half of the world's population. This undoubtedly was due to a combination of the soil, of irrigation possibilities and the cultural level of the nations in that area. Yet death through epidemic diseases and starvation through natural disasters were well known even in that part of the world. Elsewhere it was worse; a simple mathematical calculation would show that a continued 2% increase in population —easily reached in times of adequate food supply and absence of epidemics—would in a few thousand years fill every available piece of land from the offspring of a single couple.[2]

Human life through the ages has maintained itself in a very precarious balance against the forces of death.

[1] R. M. Fagley, *The Population Explosion and Christian Responsibility*, New York, 1960.

[2] The formula is $2 \times 1.02^{1000} = 800$ million, 2×1.02^{1100} already $= 2.7$ billion or equal to the present world population.

Modern medicine has acted to change the balance, at first in a successful fight against smallpox, cholera, plague and other dangerous highly contagious diseases; secondly by promoting the survival of babies and young children through medical and hygienic services and thirdly by environmental sanitation. In the latter field malaria control is well under way.

In the very recent past areas of rapid social change are characterized by a dramatic decrease in death rates. Many countries have achieved, in this respect, in twenty years what took a century in Europe. But there is also, even though it is less conspicuous, a tendency towards increased birth rates where these were high already. Comparing the period 1954/58 with 1945/49 the UN statistics indicate the growing difference between the low- and the high-birth rate countries (below 30% and above 34% respectively).

Number of countries	Birth rate up	equal	down	Total
Low birth rate	6	6	27	39
High birth rate	19	2	4	25
Total	25	8	31	64

According to the UN estimates, at the beginning of the Christian era, the world's population amounted to about 250 million. It took sixteen centuries to double this figure, but at the present rate doubling can be expected in thirty-five years.

The following table gives an approximate idea of the rate of the increase in population.

Year	Asia	Africa	Europe incl. USSR	Western hemisphere and Oceania	World
0	150	50	45	5	250
1650	300	100	90	10	500
1750	450	100	130	20	700
1850	660	100	290	50	1100
1900	900	120	380	200	1600
1950	1350	200	600	350	2500
2000[1])	3900	500	1000	900	6300

In Asia population doubled between 1750 and 1900 and also between 1850 and 1950. In contrast to this slow increase it is

[1]) a conservative estimate

expected almost to treble in the second half of the twentieth century. In Africa population hardly increased between 1650 and 1900, due to the slave trade and epidemic diseases. The western hemisphere and Oceania were virtually empty until 1850 and thereafter gained much by immigration from Europe.

In recent centuries the diffusion of population has been more uniform. The plains of Siberia, Australia and the western hemisphere were settled by people 'of European descent' in the last two hundred years. The impact of Europe is much greater in these continents than it ever could have been in Asia and Africa, where large nations with their own culture persisted for thousands of years. In other continents the nomadic people were, however, largely absorbed or annihilated.

The percentage of population in the 'area of European settlement' rose from 20% in 1650 to 31% in 1850 and 38% in 1950. Inevitably this will be reduced in the future and may reach 30% in 2000.

One must remember that Europe, between 1650 and 1950, through its superior means of transportation and armaments, could extend its influence over four 'new' and open continents (Siberia, North America, South America, Australia (New Zealand)). This fact alone would have enabled European men to sustain in their own society the forces which, in Asia and Africa, appear as 'prime movers', as forces from the outside. One must also remember that this is the result of a unique configuration. Apart from Antarctica and the moon, both rather inaccessible, there are no new empty continents left. Nor do Asia and Africa find any such new continents on their path of development. This is true even bearing in mind the large stretches of uncultivated land in tropical Africa and South America.

Political circumstances will most likely prevent a settlement by some hundreds of millions of Indians in Africa or of half a billion Chinese in Brazil. Over a century this would be the extent by which Asia would need to spill its new generations into 'empty lands'. Yet it is also clear that the individual Indian or Chinese can be as energetic and dynamic abroad, if he has the opportunity, as his European fellow-emigrant. Instances in South and East Africa, in South Asia or in isolated cases in Latin America, prove the case. In this respect also the situation of man in a changing Asia and Africa is completely different. These continents must find a place for their people at home.

The same applies to sources of food and raw materials to feed, shelter and clothe the new generations. Europe has developed, on an unprecedented scale, imports of primary products for food, fodder and factory supplies. In agricultural products especially the newly developing countries must largely supply themselves. Admittedly there would be supplies in the world market, but they are so desperately in need of capital goods —also to be imported from the West—that they could not become large food importers as well.

In effect, the areas of rapid social change have a problem of population increase and food supply different from the countries in the West for three reasons which, taken jointly, have a tremendous impact—(i) death rates which have dropped dramatically in a few decades, (ii) the absence of empty continents into which to spill any excess population, (iii) lack of purchasing power to buy, on a large scale, imported food.

The agricultural potential

At present 60% of the world population lives on 7% of the land area of this globe. The three main areas of dense population are respectively: the Asian Monsoon area—1,100 million people on 2.4 million square miles; the temperate zone of Europe—400 million people on 1.2 million square miles; the Atlantic coast of North America—100 million people on 0.4 million square miles. The problem is that there are in the foreseeable future no other areas where a similar concentration of people and economic resources seems in prospect. It is a well known fact that the larger part of the world's surface is too dry or too cold for the cultivation of crops. At present roughly 10% is under cultivation, 20% is pasture land, 30% is woodland or forest and 40% is without agricultural value. An expansion of crop land at the expense of pasture and forest is possible and necessary if future populations are to be fed, but much land must, in the interest of sustained fertility, never be ploughed up.

Also an increase in yields is both possible and urgently necessary. At this stage, it should be pointed out that the cropland of Europe and Asia produces much more than other continents.

It is only by a bold estimate that one can make any prediction about potential (sustained) yields. Here nearly all depends on the standard of the treatment which man gives to the cultivable

earth. I entirely disagree with Colin Clark, who takes as a basis present yields in the Netherlands or Japan. These countries (with Egypt and a few others) are in such an exceptional position, that they will remain exceptions rather than the rule. If I am to indicate a goal, to be reached in half a century or more, I would estimate that Europe, Asia and North America can double, and that the three other continents can eventually treble their yields. Thus, the agricultural potential of the world as a whole may be three to four times the present production. Although this would mean a further inroad upon pastureland and forest, it may be assumed that the potential of dairy production—if not of meat—and also of timber is at least three times the present production. The potential of the oceans in fish production is undoubtedly still larger.

If one considers, technically, how many people this earth can feed and clothe, one must also take into consideration that for two thirds of the world's population the present food supply is insufficient in quantity and/or in quality (in protective foods). Improvement in diet obviously reduces the carrying capacity of this globe.

But, secondly, one must take into account that at least one limiting factor to food production could be reduced. If it were feasible to produce, economically, fresh water out of salt or brackish water, large areas which now are desert could be irrigated.[1] If this goal were reached—and it seems within reach within this century—one also would want cheap and virtually inexhaustible sources of energy, because much of this water will have to be pumped over long distances. However, this also may become feasible when the atomic forces can be fully harnessed. In my estimate these two developments in combination might add at least 50% to the world's food potential.

The conclusion therefore can, in my opinion, be drawn that for the foreseeable future it will *technically* be possible to produce enough food.

[1] At this point, I expect more from future technology than Colin Clark in a recent, sobering, publication (*The Economics of Irrigation in Dry Climates*—Institute for Research in agricultural economics, Oxford, 1960). For the Middle East and India he quotes figures for 'irrigable' land, barely double the present area and he concludes with regard to the possibility of desalinization: 'it will be seen that, not merely present costs, but the most hopeful estimates of future costs, still put the price of this water above the amount any farmer is likely to be willing to pay for it'.

The problems are regional and world-wide

There is a further paradox in the problems of world food supplies—they are at the same time regional or even local and they are world-wide.

Speaking in terms of continents, there is everywhere a possibility of increasing food production. This is particularly true, when one leaves out of account the tremendous social and economic obstacles. But even without that there is an inverse relation between the technical possibilities and the need for increased production.

Let us look again at the figures for land use and food production in the various continents. In the following table the main products are expressed in 'cereal-units' by reducing root crops to half their weight, and doubling that of pulses, oilseeds and sugar. Similarly, in the total density of domestic animals, goat and sheep are put at 25% of their number to compare with cattle, horses and camels. Pigs are not included because they are mainly fed from crop lands. In this way a rough comparison of the productivity of crop land and pasture land can be made.

According to these figures, Europe has the highest average yield per acre crop land, followed by Asia. But they have little land per inhabitant. South America, Africa and Oceania have very low yields per acre, but large acreage per capita. The

Item	Europe	North and Central America	South America	Asia	Africa	Oceania	World except
Million acres crop land	375	640	180	1060	580	65	290
Acres per inhabitant	0.9	2.6	1.4	0.7	3.4	4.6	1.
Million tons prod., cereals equivalent	230	265	55	520	66	11	115
Tons/acre average	0.62	0.41	0.30	0.49	0.11	0.17	0.4
Tons/inhabitant average	0.56	1.08	0.43	0.34	0.38	0.78	0.4

world average of productivity per acre coincides with the average level of North and Central America. As a result of great differences in density of population per acre of crop land, North and Central America, followed by Oceania, have a high yield per inhabitant. Europe has a lower figure and it seems logical that it imports food. But the 'areas of rapid social change'—

Asia, Africa and South America—have an even lower average production of food per inhabitant.

It must be added that in the western hemisphere and to a somewhat lesser degree in Europe, coarse grains (corn, oats, barley) are to a large extent used for fodder and only indirectly for human consumption. Asia and Africa do not produce enough cereals to allow for this conversion, which makes for a better quality food and at the same time constitutes an emergency buttress.

The use of fodder, produced on crop land, makes the comparison of the area of pasture land and the number of domestic animals even more precarious. The differences from continent to continent, however, are so enormous that it seems worth while to give some idea of the size of the different units.

Item	Europe	North and Central America	South America	Asia	Africa	Oceania	World except USSR
illion acres pasture	200	900	720	1080	1500	940	5340
illion 'cattle units'	170	170	210	500	180	70	1300
nits per acre	0.83	0.19	0.29	0.46	0.12	0.075	0.24

In density of domestic animals per acre of pasture Europe, followed by Asia, again greatly exceeds the other continents. Productivity per animal-unit probably differs even more than productivity per acre of crop land. The following figures are purely tentative; they do not represent a unit of milk or meat.

dex of production per animal .	2	1.2	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.7	—
dex of animal production per acre	1.66	0.23	0.20	0.23	0.06	0.05	—
sture land acres per inhabitant .	0.5	3.7	5.7	0.7	8.7	67.0	2.15
dex of animal production per inhabitant	0.8	0.85	1.2	0.16	0.5	3.2	—

Exceedingly rough as they may be, these figures show very clearly that Oceania and Latin America though producing little per acre have, by virtue of the large area available, a very high production per inhabitant and in fact are the main exporters of animal products. Europe and North America are well supplied, but Asia and Africa less so. The latter continent has—for climatic reasons—huge areas with a low production

and inevitably must rely on the mobility of its herdsmen and animals to produce meat and milk. Asia is in the very unfortunate position that production per inhabitant is very low. In the dry areas of Asia the position is similar to Africa, but in Monsoon Asia very little pasture land is available and most people are forced to a near-vegetarian diet. Of course the interrelations between agricultural land, climate and food production are much more complicated than can be set out in these few pages.

The conclusion however seems inevitable, that Asia and Africa—including the Middle Eastern countries—are through a combination of causes, the problem continents as far as food production per inhabitant is concerned.

The position of Asia—and a subdivision in smaller areas would show North Africa to be in a similar position—is extremely dangerous. This continent has the lowest production per capita, in spite of the fact that the production per acre is above world-average. It has by far the lowest production of food of animal origin, in spite of a dense occupation of pasture land.

If one calls this 'a regional problem', one should not forget that 60% of the present world population lives in that region. This makes it a world problem.

Levels of consumption

Although international trade has to some degree the effect of levelling off consumption levels (some high-production-consumption areas import food!) differences in production per head of population largely determine levels of consumption. Caloric intake in low income countries is about 60% of intake in high income countries. The differences in protein, and foremost in animal protein, are much greater. They have a direct relation to income levels.

Area	Calories per day	Intake of protein, grammes per day	
		total protein	animal protein
North America, Oceania . . .	3200	100	65
North West Europe	3000	80	50
Mediterranean	2500	70	20
Japan	2000	60	12
Southeast Asia, Africa	1800	45	8

These are averages. Some countries only reach a level of 5 or 6 grammes of animal protein (dairy products, meat, fish, shell fish) per day. Obviously, the poorer part of the population in the low income countries consumes less than the average. At these low levels there is no margin against fluctuations. And in the rural economy it often is feast or famine. Years of an abundant harvest are followed by disaster years. Only regular money income would allow for a replenishment, but a very small proportion of the total population can help itself by buying food.

And in most sub-tropical and tropical countries there are long periods between crops—nearly as much as in winter at high latitudes. At the end of the dry season acute food shortages, even acute starvation, are a common phenomenon.

More and better food therefore is one of the main goals in the countries of rapid social change.

The size of the task

This technical conclusion should not lead us to complacency. On the contrary. There are at least three socio-economic problems of utmost importance, which make the progress in the medical field a challenge to agriculture.

The odds are all against the areas in rapid social change. First of all, present diets must be improved; secondly, in low income countries a larger proportion of additional income will be used on food and thirdly, in areas of rapid social change population increases more quickly than in highly industrialized countries. If we put modest goals—a 1% per annum improvement in diet, 60% of an annual increase in per capita income of 2% used on food and a 2% increase in population, it follows that food production should increase by $1 + 1{,}2 + 2 = 4.2\%$ per annum. India's third Five Year Plan has a realistic goal of 4.5% per annum in view of the need to make India more resistant against the vagaries of the monsoon and reduce the need for emergency food in certain parts of the country. In Europe, with a similar increase in per capita income and a 1.5% increase in population, the increase needs only to be about 2.3% or half the speed of India. An increase in food supply, over a large area on a long-term basis, of the magnitude now envisaged for India has hardly ever been reached in industrially highly

developed countries. And in the latter it is possible to finance agricultural development out of savings in the industrial and commercial sector. In low income, agricultural countries the reverse is true. Here, the agricultural sector is even required to help develop industry and the economic infra-structure of railroads, ports and the like.

The fairy tales of fabulously rich lands in the tropics have been dispelled by soil classification. There are undoubtedly fertile soils waiting for the plough. Some of these are located in remote mountain valleys and the cost of transporting any surplus production may be prohibitive. Other areas may recently have become a real source of food through malaria control, but even these cases often require expensive irrigation and drainage works. Large stretches of land can only carry a dense population if water became available and the cost of dams and canals is often beyond the means of the country.

The short length of daylight in the tropics, especially where lack of rain shortens the growing season, reduces the yields which can be obtained. Even if one takes into account that tree crops are eminently suited for tropical conditions and some other crops (sugar cane, cassava) have an extended growing season, it may be doubted whether average production per acre in the tropics can ever equal productivity in the temporate zones with long daylight in summer. Weeds and insect pests, however, seem to thrive very well in higher temperatures. Therefore the tropical peasant cannot compensate for lower yields per acre by the larger acreage of his farm. The contrary is true. Thus, income per hour of work and even per annum is almost inevitably far below that of his more privileged colleague and competitor at higher latitudes.

In dry lands production can be increased — perhaps four-to fivefold—by irrigation. This follows from a combination of double or triple cropping, higher yields per harvest, a change into more valuable crops and a reduction of the risk of drought. But only a very small part of the available land is irrigated, altogether an estimated less than 150 million acres (5% of total crop land). A doubling of this area, indeed a gigantic and capital intensive task, would add 20% to the world food production—enough for less than one decade of increase in population. But this is not all. Even in the poorest conditions people will spend part of their income on other essential needs and in order to keep the

balance, industry must increase two or three time more quickly than agricultural production.

In order to take care of the rapidly increasing population, towns, factories, schools, roads and ports are as necessary as fields and farms. And, if standards of living are to improve, the relative importance of investments and development in non-agricultural sectors of the economy, increases.

The peasant's role

Governments and international organizations may devise ways and means for improved agriculture and higher standards of living, but they stand helpless unless the peasants of the world respond. There are 400 to 500 million peasant families and, at least in the eastern hemisphere, the women and even children help produce food as much as the men. In no branch of enterprise is production divided over so many small units. And in no other field are producers so hard to reach.

In more developed countries the facilities to implement research, to organize education and training, to reach farmers through extension services, by printed material or by radio, are highly developed. But in the rural areas of Asia and Africa peasants are largely illiterate and hard to organize. Most importantly, the inhibiting factors retarding change are very strong in the countryside. It is there that the problems of food supply for the coming generation must be solved. These problems are human problems—mentality, attitudes, incentives, organization. We will deal with them in the next chapter.

X

RURAL DEVELOPMENT

THREE out of every four people—over two thousand million altogether—live in rural areas or in small towns dominated by rural interests. In Asia and Africa six out of seven people live in a rural environment. There are four to five hundred million farm families.

There are also four to five hundred million farm households, producer and consumer units. Taking the lower figure, so as to exclude Communist China, out of these 400,000,000 farm units at least 300,000,000 are self-employed. The rest may be workers on a Kolchos, or labourers on estates or larger farms.

Peasants live to a large extent in villages. There may be two or three million of these nuclei of human social life. If one wants to develop peasants economically, and improve their standards of life, of education or child care, it is necessary to approach them through the narrow channels of village (tribe or clan in certain areas) community life.

The reduction to two or three million channels of communication with the outside world is already important, as it would be impossible—with few exceptions—to reach the peasants individually. The low rate of literacy among peasants in Asia, Africa and Latin America aggravates this problem.

Among the city dwellers there still exist some romantic ideas about the idyllic life on the farm, 'so close to nature, so peaceful'. This relic of eighteenth century European thought has not yet completely disappeared, even among members of the Church. But this Shangri-la concept has now been pushed back to far-out-of-the-way islands, such as in the South Seas, or Bali.

The reality is different. In most of the rural areas in rapid social change, food, health, shelter, clothing are in a precarious balance with hunger. In spite of irrigation water and fertilizer, fluctuations in yield because of pest and diseases, drought and a

variety of weather conditions remain an important unbalancing factor. In agriculture as opposed to industry it is not possible to control the level of production.

With the penetration of the money economy peasants also become dependent—and to an increasing degree—upon the forces of the world market. The main effect of trade in foodstuffs on a global scale is a short-run price equalization. It has become an exception for local prices to fluctuate against local supplies. But in this way the rough justice resulting from high prices in case of shortage, and low prices in case of a glut, has been removed. Peasants now carry the risk of local crop failures to a much larger extent than before.[1]

However, prices on world markets fluctuate under the impact of world-wide economic forces, employment levels in industrialized countries, levels of investments, etc. The peasant has to accept these changes. The more isolated and remote his village, the more violent are the changes in the price he receives.[2] For lack of national and international organization the peasant stands practically defenceless in the world market. In this respect the local small industrialist is better off. His market is restricted but the process of production can be controlled. Even when industry grows, it generally produces for a national, not an international market. In times of distress governments are generally able and willing to help industry through duties or quotas.

In the case of agricultural products even governments as a rule are not in a position to give adequate support to farmers; the example of the USA and European agricultural exporting countries gives ample evidence of this.

In the old days farmers would simply tighten their belts if yields or prices were low. But even in Asia and Africa modern times bring fixed or only very slowly changing charges on his

[1] To some extent rich farmers or merchants in grain in the past would even have profited a great deal from famines, but this did not apply to the average peasant.

[2] This is the result of slowly and mildly varying costs in transport, trade and processing. In 1928 a Papuan on the coast of New Guinea would receive $35 for a ton of copra, which, landed San Francisco, would cost $60. When the latter price dropped in 1932 to $40, the Papuan producer received only $18. And when the USA imposed a processing tax of 2 cents per lb/oil ($27 per ton of copra) in order to protect the American farmer, even more was deducted from the return of the peasant and the nominal price at the Papua coast dropped to $3 per metric ton. Production virtually stopped as copra from New Guinea could no longer reach the USA market.

budget. Taxes and school fees are among the most important inflexible obligations. But if organized credit develops, or the rent of land is expressed in money rather than in kind, the farmers' enterprise per se also becomes burdened with fixed charges.

Besides these drawbacks of the money economy, which are part of the risks of business cycle, there are also problems of a structural nature in the development of agriculture.

Structural problems

Land use and *land tenure* are one of its basic problems. In the pre-market age, when rural life was completely embedded in the subsistence economy, land use and land tenure were generally ruled by tradition, supervised by the elders. Only where—under rare, privileged circumstances—population density or, rather, scarcity of good land became a problem, would land use problems arise. Increase in population and cattle would, in due course, be wiped out or checked by epidemics.

But all this changed when the doctor and the veterinarian appeared on the scene, when, at the same time, land became valuable and scarce, and especially when western (including Islamic) legal systems started to interfere with the old customary law. In most countries this has further limited the security of rights to cultivate the ancestral land (the usufructuary rights are, as a rule, very well defined and safeguarded in a traditional society).

In all areas of rapid social change rural people are particularly anxious lest modern development should reduce their opportunities to fall back upon the rural community once they have severed ties by working in towns, in the mines or on estates. It is an important matter to feel socially secure. A strong village organization can, if emergencies arise, absorb a remarkable number of people—unemployed, sick, aged, widows and orphans.

Must this be sacrificed in an attempt to raise productivity per worker on the land? If so, what other form of social security can society provide? We know from experience—not much until industrial society has penetrated the whole economy. Thus the peasant becomes squeezed between the need to change and the dangers inherent in the change.

Furthermore, *land and water* are increasingly becoming *capital*

goods. From a national point of view this requires supervision, legislation against neglect and abuse. It means—as is the case in England—that bad farmers cannot be allowed to farm, or, at least, that economic (through competition) and legal measures against waste of resources are justifiable.

The churches and the Christian should rejoice, if governments put into practice, at this vital point, the Christian principle of stewardship. Unfortunately, in most countries Christians are, even more than non-Christians, entrenched in the dogma of sacred private ownership, and thus may become a stumbling block, an inhibiting factor against rural development. Land reform and land consolidation, however, which is not based upon the principle of stewardship—both by the individual and the community—violates human dignity and becomes authoritarian oppression.

It is clear from the Rapid Social Change study, that in many lands people are wrestling with these problems. At the São Paulo consultation (November 1955) it was mentioned that at times whole villages, with farms, church, school, etc., are evicted because somebody found, in a hidden archive, a title granted by a long-forgotten emperor of Brazil, extending over vast areas which, a century ago, were wilderness. Insecurity of holding on a smaller scale condemns many peasants, in a variety of countries, to the ignominy of being squatters only. Social justice requires, first of all, that governments initiate legislation and registration which gives more security to peasant holdings.

This again, however, is no easy procedure. The injustice which is inflicted upon peasants wholesale in some societies is frequently done piecemeal at the village level by prominent farmers against the poor peasant or farm labourers.

Where a country is underpopulated, redress of land abuse and of inequitable land tenure systems is relatively easy. But a large part of the rural population of the world is concentrated in a very small part of the globe. Increasingly, a very dense rural population makes rural development almost impossible.

In south India an old farmer once told a research team: 'When I was young, we had two regular meals and our land could have a rest, lie fallow, every fourth year. Now there are so many more people in the village that we have only one regular meal a day and the land never can have a rest'.

An observer in South Central Java records the very high

density of rural population in poor limestone hill country.[1] 'In the last hundred years the hills have been denuded of forest and now stand like gaunt rocky cemetries, bare but for a few pockets of soil here and there, each pocket planted with a thin stick of cassava. It is difficult to see how there can be any soil left at all on the hill slopes by the end of the century. In this district there is a population of half a million, increasing by over 11,000 a year, thanks to the low death rate caused by the relative absence of malaria. The chief aim must be to prevent further nutritional and agricultural deterioration—but the necessary soil experts are lacking. The erosion process appears also to have gone beyond hope of repair. The forest, soil and water have been misused and, consequently, perhaps lost for ever. Death stalks over the land and the people.

In many other parts of Java the lessons learned from the Gunung Kidul story may still be applicable. More especially in the less populated isles it is essential to take effective steps to conserve forest, land and water, before their wilful exploitation causes irreparable damage'.

The observer continues: 'In such a context it behoves Christians to study the situation in all its grim nutritional and agricultural aspects. Government and people may be so occupied with short range problems that longe range planning may be forgotten. Perhaps the Christian minority should speak as the conscience of the nation on the matter of population control. Is this the new form in which Christ's healing ministry is to be carried on in Asian society today? In India, China and Japan some plans and some progress have been made. In Indonesia some Islamic groups have done more earnest and far-sighted thinking than the Church'.

The report ends: 'Tragedy may be inevitable in Gunung Kidul but it is the responsibility of Christians to take stock of the situation, its cause and possible remedies, and especially to help effective government action to prevent further misuse of resources. To face this situation and to act effectively in its urgency will test fully the faith and vision of the younger churches in Asia'.[2]

[1] According to the census of 1930, thirty years ago, the density of population in this area already amounted to 313 persons per sq. km. of land (80 per sq. m.).

[2] K. V. Bailey, M.D., *Agricultural Change and Hunger in Java.* Background Information, March 1960.

Appropriate *land legislation* is indeed a primary need. Governments have, especially after the Second World War, made great efforts to reduce the burden on tenants-at-will (more stable rights, maximum rents) and, in a number of countries, also by sub-dividing large holdings among peasants.

The latter is often called land reform in a more narrow sense than is now customary in United Nations usage.[1] Some of the most successful examples are to be found in Japan (sub-division with some compensation to former landlords, part of which is paid by the new owner) and Taiwan (reduction of rents as an important introductory step). Egypt, although operating on a selective basis, has also made good progress. Strict rules on the use of irrigation water on large blocks of cotton, wheat, rice etc., have helped here to carry out the reforms successfully. India abolished the zemindar system—originally a method to collect taxes—but it is still struggling with the problem of making available to the small independent peasant the means of production, credit and marketing facilities. It is also in the Indian spirit that Vinoba Bhave started the *bhoodan* movement, a spiritual movement amongst landowners to give to the poor one-sixth of their property, and to villages as a whole for communal land-ownership and the co-operative cultivation of the land (*gramdan*), the villagers working together and sharing the harvest. Understandably, *gramdan* has not spread as rapidly as *bhoodan*, but as an application of the philosophy of Gandhi it is very important. The willingness of thousands of people to give up all their land into a community pool may, to a large extent, be an expression of despair by village people of the money economy. And it may be doubted whether real progressive production is possible in the *gramdan* system. We may also ask whether it is indispensable to give away one's possessions in order to be a good steward. All this cannot remove the profound

[1] Among the vast literature, attention is called to: United Nations, *Progress in Land Reform*, Second Report. Analysis of replies by governments to a UN questionnaire, New York, 1956. J. F. Timmons, *Improving Agricultural Tenancy*, a FAO land tenure study, Rome, 1957. S. Klein, *The Pattern of Land Tenure Reform in East Asia after World War II*, New York, 1958. Food and Agricultural Organization, *Interrelationship between Agrarian Reform and Agricultural Development* (E. H. Jacoby, 1953); Food and Agricultural Organization, *State of Food and Agriculture*, 1957; Ch. IV: 'Post-war Changes in some institutional factors affecting agriculture.' United Nations, *International Survey of Programmes of Social Development*, New York, 1959, p. 136.

challenge to responsible living and social ethics in both the free enterprise and the communist agricultural ways of life.

In Africa land tenure and land legislation problems take a different form. In most countries, densely or sparsely wooded plains are used for extensive grazing and cropping; fire is still one of the main agricultural implements. Generally, a seasonal rainfall and scarce water resources force cattle and people to a mobile, even nomadic life, and necessitate communal or tribal use of the land. It is of vital importance but extremely difficult, to devise land use rules which are technically, as well as socially, acceptable. In some areas where tree crops (coffee, cocoa) are important, or where agriculture is highly developed owing to climate and dense population, individual rights on the land are an urgent need.

Again, Latin America is different. The Spaniards and Portuguese brought a rural organization with sharp differences between, on the one hand, a landed gentry holding large tracts of land in private ownership, and, on the other, farm labourers rather than tenants. The type of enterprise is thus completely different from the feudal patterns in Asia and Europe. In the human relations, however, there is much similarity, and one might call the Latin type pseudo-feudalist. There are exceptions, such as Costa Rica, settled by soldiers rather than officers of the Spanish army. There are also the Americo-Indian settlements, very similar to the African and Asian ones. But Latin America as a whole is struggling for the family farm in contrast to the *hacienda*, *fundo*, or whatever landlordism may be called in different countries. In the nineteenth and twentieth century West European settlements in Brazil, Chile and some other parts of the continent, the large modern family farm has been established successfully on virgin soil. How to change the *hacienda* system is another matter. Mexico has done so by bloody revolutions lasting half a century and culminating in village communities of the Asian type. But it took decades to overcome the destruction brought about by the revolution and to establish peasant organizations. In Latin-America, the Roman Catholic Rural Workers Association has made a frontal attack on obsolete and unsocial systems of land tenure and rural organization. It is making an increasing impact upon society, enlisting the support both of clergy and laymen, as is shown by the first Latin American Catholic Congress on Rural Life Problems, held at

Manizales, Colombia, in 1953, in which, for example, the way in which land is withdrawn by large landed estates from the small proprietor, was openly criticized.[1]

The churches in the ecumenical movement have, as a rule, taken no part in land tenure problems. To some extent this was done in recognition of the truth that there is no single 'Christian' form of land tenure or method of cultivating the soil. But Japanese Buddhism, Indian Hinduism, Islam and the Roman Catholic Church, when faced with appalling conditions in the rural areas, have at least in some cases taken strong and imaginative action.

The family-type farm is considered, for example by the churches in the USA[2], as having 'a high value as a desirable pattern of land tenure'. 'We favour a widespread ownership of agricultural land consistent with efficient production, sound conservation and adequate family income.'

It is these three conditions which must make us ask—is the agricultural estate, or the *kibbutz*, or the *sovchoz*, or the *gramdan* village, or the communal grazing ground essentially less desirable? The document issued by the USA churches rightly continues: 'We recognize that the prospects for early attainment of anything approaching the family farm ideal are utterly remote'.

At the first All-African Church conference at Ibadan in January, 1958, when discussing rapid social change, the churches —'believing that the land question in various countries of Africa is one of the greatest barriers to the achievement of racial peace'—appealed to the World Council of Churches and the International Missionary Council 'to investigate and report upon the question so that the churches of Africa may be able, with greater knowledge, wisdom, and Christian charity, to endeavour and reach some common mind.'

Plantations, or capitalist settlements in a rural area, have been, and still are, a powerful instrument of economic development. In some countries a large part of the employed labour force works on estates (Ceylon, Malaya). Here, and in others (Indo-

[1] 'The Conclusions of Manizales', quoted in: Richard Shaul, *The Church and the Problems of a Responsible Society in Latin America*—Ecumenical Study Documents on Social Questions, June 1954.

[2] *The Churches and Agricultural Policy*—published for discussion in the churches by the Department of the Church and Economic Life, National Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA, New York, (early 1952, no date).

nesia, Kenya, Tanganyika), a large part of agricultural exports and foreign exchange income is derived from estates. In these countries agricultural estates are a very useful tool of economic development.

However, they also create social problems. Often, the government, in order to attract the indispensable foreign capital, have made large tracts of cultivable land available. Where this land was not used before, the measure can only be applauded. In some countries, however, the government too soon assumed that the land had no recognizable owners or the land was declared crown land as a result of conquest. Here, inevitably, serious tension between the foreign settler and the surrounding population must arise. In a number of African territories the clash between African and foreign (European and Asian) settlers is aggravated by government measures restricting Africans to 'reserves' or allowing settlement, in other areas, to estates only. The social problems, severe in themselves, thus became entangled in political issues.

In Southern Rhodesia about 49%, in the Union of South Africa about 89%, is alienated by the government. Although originally a measure for soil protection, the restriction in purchase of land in the remainder of the country in Southern Rhodesia, has the same suggestion of discrimination as is shown quite flagrantly in the Union of South Africa by the division between European and native settlement areas.

Labour problems

Another social problem of the plantation is centred in the *labour force*. Large scale enterprise requires discipline. If estates are established on 'empty' land, labourers must be recruited on a long term contract. There has been a struggle between business interests and insufficient performance on the side of the labourers. Governments have, in the beginning, often interfered on the side of the business interests, but after World War I (International Labour Office) increasingly on the side of the labourer. In spite of many improvements, the human and social problems of 'industrial labour in agriculture' are still urgent in many countries.

In the study it appears that labour leaders in the Philippines have given special attention to the social, and economic problems of labourers in agriculture. The seasonal character of

agricultural activities is a serious drawback to effort designed to improve their lot. It makes contracts of a long duration almost impossible and it encourages itinerant labour, especially in the harvest season, covering long distances.

Housing, *health* and *education* on estates in many countries have been very substantially improved under the influence of government regulations and the better social insight of the entrepreneurs. Yet the functional clusters of houses or barracks which have arisen, hardly constitute a rural community.

Migrant agricultural labour, in many countries, is not confined to estate agriculture. Indeed, estates are often in a better position to care for temporary labourers than farmers who only occasionally hire people. Often the migrant labourer on the land belongs to a landless proletariat. The greater the mobility of these labourers, the more difficult are their problems. The example of Mexican seasonal labourers in the United States is in this respect a striking one.

In Uruguay—and this country is no isolated case—in some areas of large scale cattle or sheep raising, the estates do not provide accommodation for the families of the workers and the workers themselves are semi-migratory. Their women and children congregate in temporary settlements outside the estates and are visited and supported only irregularly by the men. Such rural slums often have no legal existence, no claim to the land they occupy, and receive no service from the State.[1]

Social and educational conditions

If the churches have done little to change the basic structure of rural life, they have been very active in improving the *social* and *educational conditions of village life.*

In this field, missions and churches have often done pioneer work. The whole life and the witness of the nineteenth and twentieth century missionary movement in Asia and Africa (with the exception of Japan and some Middle-East countries where the missionary workers concentrated on the towns) is an extension of the accepted church responsibility for rural life in Europe and the United States.

The village community readily responds, in its size, composition and structure, to the notion of community life in a congregation. Solidarity is easily aroused and maintained, as the

[1] United Nations, *Report of the World Social Situation*, New York, 1957, p. 184.

basic interests of all people, even seasonally, are very similar. The approach to rural life has varied in order to keep in step with differences in situation and the development of thought on the basis of experience gained.

In most cases where village life was strong, efforts were made to develop 'Christian villages' either through mass conversion or by establishing new villages, on the basis of the new faith, in no-man's land. This has been the rule in Asian society. In Africa, where people are traditionally more scattered, missions have created villages around the mission post cum church cum school. Very often the early beginnings were the creation of a new social environment for the freed slaves. The ideal however remained of the establishment of a church based upon a large number of small congregations in small social communities. Even in Latin America Protestant missions have found the coincidence of congregation and village community a protective force.

This whole notion has also its great drawbacks. Unless a whole area is christianized (parts of Sumatra, Celebes, the Moluccas, Philippines, Uganda), the church isolates itself from society as a whole. One observer has noticed this effect in Latin America[1], without, however, suggesting any alternative. Where all available land is already settled, it becomes impossible to form a group of converts into a new village. Such has been the case for centuries in the Middle East and in most of India. I must note, however, that in the recent development in the Thal desert, in West Pakistan, one finds 158 new Muslim villages, one Roman Catholic and one non-Roman Catholic Christian village. The unity of religious belief indeed helps people to overcome the economic and social difficulties of the hard environment. But it makes evangelism in other villages almost impossible, an act against religious co-existence. Also, to a large extent, an act, as it were, against the religious community. It hampers the witness of the Church in social aspects of life.

The present study has shown that the churches everywhere are struggling to find new ways of expressing their concern with human problems in village life. Christians are aware that they are called to serve all people, regardless of their religious adherence. This can best be done if they are not separated from

[1] James G. Maddox, *Technical Assistance by Religious Agencies in Latin America*, Chicago, 1956.

others in 'Christian' villages. Freedom to witness and serve, which many governments strive to guarantee, is its necessary corollary.

But how can a small Christian minority hope to achieve the far-reaching changes which are called for by modern developments? The prime movers in rapid social change—with the exception of world trade and mass medicine—often bypass village life. The catalyzing forces mainly emerge in towns, the inhibitors are strong in village life. Only if the action of thousands of small peasants in one way or another gets combined into a concerted effort, can any change be expected.

It is in this context that Christians and minority churches could serve. Obviously, people who have already moved towards renewal and emancipation are in the best position to help others.

In Europe and America, a century ago, it was a combination of the school teacher, the pastor or the priest, the (rare) physician and an odd civil servant which brought about the change. These people acted as catalysts; they often came at an adult age from the (small) town to the village.

In countries of rapid social change governments today are trying to operate in the same way, but with more determination and planning. They try to develop through credit facilities, community development, co-operatives, village schools and a variety of other means. As institutions these are designed to act as prime movers in each little community. They need catalysts in two forms—people to carry the idea of economic and social change into village life and people in the village to accept the changes. Peasants and local officials, and similarly teachers and parents, must trust one another. Everybody knowing village life and the traditional relations between the peasant and other groups knows the difficulties. The only real active agent in the process is selfless devotion. In a small environment people can soon distinguish between self-centred and selfless service. Village people will reject the former and accept the latter.

This rule applies not only to Christians; it is equally true for all sorts of secular activities. But it offers a wide field of service for Christians in the village community. As a rule this service must be performed through secular channels, generally through governmental services. In most countries governments accept people with Christian motivation in their village work,

because they are desperately in need of dedicated people, willing to live in a village.

The first task, therefore, of the churches and the ecumenical movement in the rural areas seems to be a twofold one: firstly, to train a larger number of people capable and willing to serve in socio-economic village institutions; and secondly, to help to maintain, through spiritual and technical pastoral care, the spirit of dedication and the effectiveness of these people.

To that end, there is a need for training and demonstration centres. Perhaps the best ultimate service of older isolated 'Christian' centres is their transformation into modern, dynamic training centres. Agricultural Missions Inc. is an example of an effort in that direction.[1]

I am convinced that in the 'Freedom from Hunger Campaign' sponsored by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, the ecumenical forces can make a particularly important contribution, if they concentrate their efforts on the training of officers in rural development work. And long after this five years campaign is over, this effort in training and assisting local leaders should go on towards greater effectiveness.

We began this chapter by stating the number of rural communities. That is some indication of the size of the job waiting to be done. But it is particularly significant that it is only through a very large number of individual people, well trained, well equipped and completely dedicated, that it is possible to reach the rural masses.

We must end this chapter with one last reminder: half of the people on the land are women. Very often the housewife plays a prominent part in determining the organization of agricultural and village life. Naturally, it is as important to win the confidence of the peasant's wife as it is to win his own. Therefore, all work for improving conditions in rural areas must have the active support of the women.

[1] I. W. Moomaw, *Deep Furrows*, New York, 1957.

XI

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND URBANIZATION

Industry develops, but how fast?

One of the most spectacular features of a dynamic society is the rapid development of the non-agricultural sectors of the economy. The basic cause of this shift is the changing pattern of consumption in the process of development. In the low-income, static village economy about 70% of the time of the inhabitants has to be spent on the production of food. Most families will produce part of the other necessities of life—housing, clothing, etc., and only a few people will produce no food at all. However, statistically speaking, one peasant family can, under these circumstances, produce food for its own requirements, and two families enough surplus to feed one third family. In a highly developed economy, in North America or Western Europe, 10-15% of the people produce enough food to feed the whole population—one farmer can feed his own family plus seven or eight more families. These other families are available for the production of manufactured goods as well as for services. Industrialization, therefore, is the corollary or counterpart rather than substitute or competitor of improved agriculture.

For the world as a whole, on the basis of UN statistics, I estimate the relative increase of population and main branches of economic activity to have been:

	1938	*1948*	*1958*
population	100	110	126
agriculture	100	107	135
food	100	106	132
minerals	100	132	150
industries	100	146	250

It may be stated that in the world as a whole there has been a

rapid expansion of industrial production. This statement, however, calls for some qualification. Rapid though it may be when compared to agriculture, in many countries it does not rise rapidly enough (per capita) to allow a noticeable rise in the standard of living. Some doubt also arises out of the fact that industrial statistics are hard to compile. As statistical methods have improved and, for example, many small enterprises are included in later years, statistics have the tendency to overestimate real progress.

A few figures may suffice to show the tendency if not the real magnitude of the change in a crucial area[1]—the Ecafe region (Asia and the Far East, excluding Mainland China).

	1951	1958
Population	783 million	865 million (plus 13%)
Agricultural production	100	113
Food	100	113
Industrial production	100	193
Cotton yarn	100	152
Steel	100	175

Whereas food production just about kept up with the increase in population, industrial production rose by about 70% per capita in seven years.

In African countries, as far as data are available, industrial production likewise rose significantly in the period 1950-1957. (Algeria by 70%, Belgian Congo by 156%, Egypt (UAR) by 43%, Union of South Africa by 54%[2].

In most of the countries of Latin America statistics show a very rapid increase in indus trial production, although in 1957 and 1958 the increase in many manufacturing industries was slowing under the impact of a combination of adverse circumstances, mostly balance of payment problems. In what the United Nations call 'centrally planned economics' much emphasis has been laid on the production of capital goods and armaments, resulting in a rapid expansion of heavy industries.

For the structure of the world as a whole, one of the main issues is whether, in the as yet non-industrialized countries, the

[1] United Nations, *Economic development and Planning in Asia and the Far East, Social aspects*, New York, December 1959.
[2] United Nations, *Economic survey of Africa since 1950*, New York, 1959.

process of industrialization is fast enough. In other words, over the last few decades have the low income, non-industrialized countries managed to 'close the gap' in productivity or in structure of production?

The following figures are illustrative of the period 1955-57[1]:

Production, 1928 = 100	Primary producing countries	Industrial countries
Total	173	213
Food	146	153
Raw materials	201	163
Manufacturing	260	245

In this table, eastern Europe, the USSR and Mainland China have not been included; North America, western Europe and Japan constitute the industrial countries. Owing to the heavy impact of agricultural production on total production, the primary producing countries have lagged behind in overall increase in production, they have outstripped the industrial countries in the production of raw materials, and have held their own in the development of manufacturing industries.

Similar data on the post World War II period (1948 to 1955/57) show a somewhat different picture.

Production, 1948 = 100	Primary producing countries	Industrial countries
Total	138	146
Food	129	120
Raw materials	168	121
Manufacturing	151	159

According to these figures, the primary producing countries have over the last decade or so increased the quantum of raw materials produced very rapidly; their food production rose more rapidly (restrictions in the USA!) but in view of the rapid increase in population, per capita production of food increased in the non-industrialized countries less than in the industrial

[1] United Nations, *World Economic Survey 1958*, New York, 1959, p. 17.

countries. Moreover, in manufacturing industries the total development has been less rapid than in the industrial countries, even taking into account the low initial figure which would naturally facilitate a high percentage of increase.

In some countries, or in areas in some countries, the pace of industrialization may have been rapid, but the total for Asia, Africa and Latin America, at least since 1948, does not in fact show a sufficient increase.

Impact upon society

Industry does not necessarily imply the use of mechanical power, but in modern times it does. Human or animal power and even waterpower in watermills cannot compete with machines driven by steam engines, combustion motors or turbines generating electricity. In the nineteenth century part of the handloom weaving industry in India was killed by cheaper products from mechanized looms. In broad terms, however, industrialization has increased the productivity of human labour and in adding to the income of the nations, has improved standards of living.

Industrialization would, therefore, be important if it had no other function in the processes of rapid social change. But it has many other effects as well.

First of all, industry gives a greater opportunity than agriculture for specialization. Therefore, there is more room for entrepreneurs in industrial business, applying new technical processes to their enterprise. In agriculture a man has to perform a great variety of duties, for a number of crops and animals, but in a given region the duties of the majority are the same. In industry the duties of a man remain the same throughout a long period, but the operation varies a great deal from plant to plant and even inside the establishment. Specialization may lead to boredom and this requires special attention in industry. But it also opens the road to a continuing rise in productivity per man-hour, especially when more and more machines and mechanical power are being used.

Secondly, work in industry makes a man independent of the narrow setting of his community. For many young people in the rural area, economic independence is a way behind the horizon, if there is no new land to be developed. By moving into industry their income no longer depends upon family or community

property and joint labour. It is said that for many young men and women industrial labour is the main liberating force in a changing world.

The changing role of labour

Industry, including in this context also mining and plantation agriculture, is an important economic 'prime mover', affecting peoples' concept of paid labour as a means to earn a living.

In traditional society work on the land, in and around the house, or in the community, has a direct purpose in tangible, useful things to be produced, or services to be rendered. Even where the exchange economy encroaches on rural areas, money is only the direct vehicle expressing the value of products to be sold and bought. Any currency—as the widespread 'Kauri-shell-money' shows—can be useful in this respect. It is quite a change when people begin to barter or sell their muscle and brain power during a certain time for money, to be used for the purchase of products or the payment of taxes. However, in the transition to exchange economy, money transactions in respect of labour performance are usually easy to introduce. As in the case of products people feel that they are selling or bartering a certain amount of work for an amount of another desirable economic good.

For modern industry, for capital intensive enterprise in general, this new concept of labour, which could easily be divorced from persons, is not adequate. Industry needs and wants a regular flow of labour which can only be achieved through a continuous contract, not by a day-to-day exchange of labour for money.

Continuous labour obligations, of course, also exist in traditional society, but for a specific purpose (tribal or feudal obligations), which in extreme cases may involve total slavery. An agreement to 'sell one's labour' continuously to the same manager or labour boss can be made understandable in terms of semi-traditional society as an obligation to pay off a debt; otherwise it would involve a loss of freedom unworthy of a human being. Repayment of the debt on the other hand cancels all obligation to continue the labour contract.

In the Japanese textile mills labour by girls 'sold' by their parents for a sum of ready money was felt to be honourable only so long and so far as there was a debt-relation between parents

or girl and employer. Everybody who has lived in Asia will know the keen desire to receive a 'money-advance' at the start of a labour agreement. This desire is the reverse of profiting without performance. The advance sanctifies and purifies a contract involving loss of individual freedom.

A contract resulting in a legal obligation to stay on a specific job for two or three years, even if there is no 'advance payment' involved, is contrary to this concept of labour. In despair at the large scale occurrence of 'breach-of-contract', employers and government have been reduced to making it a crime to leave a job before the contract has expired. Under national and international pressure these so-called penal sanctions were largely abolished in the first decades of this century. They were surely a quite unsuitable method of making people from traditional society fit into the necessary disciplines of modern enterprise.

Employers have been experimenting, and still are, in many cases, with various incentives to improve the continuity of the labour effort or, to put it negatively, to reduce absenteeism.

Social incentives are used, for instance, in the tea plantations in Assam, but also in other countries, by recruiting people through 'labour bosses', who guarantee a certain number of labourers for a given contractual period. These 'bosses' undoubtedly use the traditional method of binding the individuals through money-advances at the time of enrolment. Real wages in this case are generally low (the 'boss' takes the lion share), social conditions of work bad and—worst of all—there is no opportunity to get more pay for extra skill and no opportunity for advancement. It is therefore mostly used for unskilled seasonal labour.

A completely different social incentive is provided in many areas in Asia and Africa, by building houses for labourers with their families. Originating on remote estates, the method is spreading throughout industry. This incentive tends to perpetuate the contract; it is most successful where there is permanent, skilled labour and it is therefore a very constructive force in a developing society. One of its limitations and dangers is the sudden concentration of people into the 'grey area' of a town, in mass society, where very large groups of labourers are housed in one compound, as is the case in Johannesburg and other rapidly growing cities of Africa. It must be said, however, that a 'grey area' is better than the kind of slum area which

prevails wherever government or enterprise does not take responsibility for housing. The main problem with the compound is how to improve the actual standard of living inside the area, as well as provide opportunities of getting out of it whenever development makes this desirable. Also it hampers the development of real community life.

Economic incentives work both ways. In some cases employers believe that they serve their ends best by paying wages at about subsistence level. This would force the labourer to work almost every day of the month and the year. In some other cases employers feel that they should pay attractive high wages in order to tie the labourer to a particular factory. The bare-minimum-wage theory bases itself on the view that a substantial increase in daily wages leads to a strong desire for leisure time, and sometimes even maintains that increased absenteeism proves the lack of economic sense in the employees.

As a matter of fact, a sudden increase in income will most likely have this effect but this is not confined to a particular type of society. Salaries too far above the average obviously lead to the danger that the privileged few will form a closed society and often create the abuse of heavy payments to a 'middle man' to get into the club.

Other economic incentives are found in the use of savings or bonuses accruing automatically to those labourers who have worked regularly for a period of a year or more. Finally, all the modern means of attracting and keeping labour are nowadays used in a number of large industries and mining companies.

In the transitional period—and this can be a long one—the position of the man or the family living half in modern, and half in traditional society requires special attention. We have, in Chapter VII, already touched upon the acute family-life problems when men and women live half way or half time in two worlds—worlds with a different economic and social structure, with a different social ethos also. The man in between often gets the worst of these two worlds. He loses the security of traditional society, but cannot take part in the chances of progress in a dynamic society.

Wage levels

Statistically, the average income per worker in manufacturing

industry generally is two or three times the average income in agriculture. But a large part of industrial income never reaches the labourers. Therefore, very often nominal wages for the average (unskilled or semi-skilled) labourer in industry are not much above the income of the average peasant. And nominal wages do not compare easily in the different sectors of society. In a study, made in the thirties in and around Djakarta, it was found that the cost of living, at as equal a standard as could be imagined, rose from 70 in villages at 20 miles distance to 100 in the outlying residential areas of the city and to 140 in the industrialized areas near the port. The main differences were in the cost of housing and the cost of food.

Although there is a continuous flow of people from agricultural to non-agricultural employment and from the countryside to the towns, one may safely assume that real wages of the unskilled industrial labourer are at the level of the income of the small peasant who cannot live from his land alone. This relation is somewhat better in areas where employers have to recruit labour for their enterprise, and often pay transportation cost to the mine, estate or factory.

In densely populated countries, and especially around small or unorganized industry, even nominal income may be below the income of the peasants, because the industrial labourer also suffers greatly from disguised or open unemployment. Millions of people in the intermediate state of industrialization live a precarious life, at or below subsistence level—examples are known from many densely populated areas in process of industrialization. These also live between two worlds—less dramatic, but more pathetic than their colleagues in, for instance, Africa south of the Sahara. They are expelled by one world for lack of cultivable land, not admitted by the other for lack of work. This is a proletariat living under sub-human conditions. It is significant that it occurs in countries on the way to industrialization rather than in raw-material-exporting countries. It is also important to note that the Malthusian checks on population—misery, hunger and disease—are most prevalent in this shadowland between town and countryside, between agriculture and industry. A rapid increase in population, without adequate economic development, may intensify this problem until it becomes insoluble.

The position of the unskilled labourer on the rim of the over-

flowing metropolis is particularly unbearable in an inflationary situation. This has been noticed, among others, by Richardson in present-day Indonesia. Here wages have kept behind the continuous rise in price levels, especially that of the staple food, rice[1].

But even where urban unemployment is rare and inflation absent, needs and expenditures in town are much higher because of the so-called demonstration effect of better-off people, of shops and advertising. Subjectively, then, the overall living conditions of the urban worker are often less good than those of his family in the village.

The research done by Mrs Forrester in the framework of the Rapid Social Change study on budgets of African families in Nairobi, showed that approximately one-third of the labour force was able to stay in town only at the expense of subsidies or savings from their rural homestead. This indeed illustrates the precarious position of the man living between two worlds who is not at home or adapted to either of them.

The bargaining position of labour

In the early stages of economic and industrial development the bargaining position of the labourer or would-be labourer is generally very weak. This was the case in Europe and the United States a century or even less ago, just as it is the case at the moment in areas of rapid social change.

At first sight this phenomenon is readily understandable where the countryside is very densely populated. Here one may expect the heaviest pressure on people to leave the agricultural profession. This is the case in most countries in Asia, the Near East, and the Mediterranean area.

But it is also true in South America and in the new cities of Africa, at the mines and on the agricultural plantations. Illiteracy and ignorance about the real cost of living in town are often given as the main reason. But this can hardly explain the widespread and persistent phenomenon. Perhaps the main determining factor is the still prevailing orientation in the direction of farming. The full-time unskilled industrial worker always

[1] J. Henry Richardson, 'Indonesian Labour Relations in their political Setting', *Industrial and Labour Relations Review*, 1958/1959, p. 57. Measures taken by Government to keep paddy and rice prices low in the process of inflation, have in turn often led to a declining incentive to the peasant to sell and even to produce a surplus for sale.

finds in his way a large number of hopefuls, who are looking for a temporary job but ultimately want to return to the village. Migrant workers are hard to unionize, and generally easy to get when organized labour is bargaining hard for better wages. Strikes can easily be broken by bringing in new people from the neighbourhood.

The labourer also comes to believe that the way to better his position is not so much by organized collective action, as by moving on to another job which promises a higher income. Housing legislation in Nairobi is particularly discouraging here. Workers can only find a house or 'bedstead' on a compound of one of the large firms, as long as they keep their jobs. Shifting to another firm which might offer a better job is very difficult because a man loses his home without a real chance of getting another house elsewhere in town. Physical mobility of labourers as well as tied housing therefore are, in the transitional period, an obstacle to social mobility in society as a whole and to an organized labour movement.

Labour unions

Labour unions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have sprung up under conditions completely different from those in Europe. Having recognized them in the industrialized countries after a long and often bitter fight, employers and governments in the newly industrializing countries started out with the idea of having to deal with labour unions as an accepted and even desirable situation. In India, Japan and many Latin American countries membership of ILO involved, as far back as the 'twenties, the necessity of organizing a delegation representing labour. In these countries, but in non-self-governing territories as well, this fact caused the labour union to be more a political and less an economic institution. For a long time between the two wars, Indian labour unions were the only channel of political expression for the Congress party. The political nature of the labour movement in colonial territories is taken for granted. Communist propaganda—although labour unions are 'not necessary' in Soviet countries—has helped to foster the revolutionary character of many labour movements. Brazil shows a striking example of the ensuing incongruity. The Government wanted labour unions to develop. It therefore allowed, by law, the deduction of union dues from the wages and the

transfer of these funds directly from the employers to the unions. Thus membership in the union became a formality and few labourers interested themselves in the management. Among these few a majority were communist. The Government, being strongly opposed to communism, outlawed the party, but at the same time kept it alive and subsidized it through union dues, paid forcibly by anti-communist labourers.

In most cases, however, government recognition and even support of labour unions did not help to strengthen them or to increase membership. Trade unionism for all these reasons developed mainly among skilled and clerical workers. It still relies more on governmental encouragement than on popularity among the masses of industrial labourers. Where labour unions are organized along racial lines (Union of South Africa, the Rhodesias) the fight of the union of white labourers is often more directed against the 'advancement' of coloured labourers than is consistent with the policies of large enterprises or (in Northern Rhodesia at least) of the Government.

In these circumstances, the social advantages of industrial labour are confined to a small privileged community, even in countries where no racial barriers exist. One might say that the social structure, both in the village and in the mining and industrial compounds, is in harmony with the mobility of the individual in a static society. Consequently, low productivity and low wages in industry coincide with low productivity in agriculture.

Churches and Christian groups have as a rule only in the last few years seen the tremendous potentialities of organized labour for the welfare of society. In some cases—notably Japan, the Philippines, Brazil, a few African territories—they have also helped labour unions to organize themselves better for constructive economic, social and political goals.

If churches cannot do much to strengthen the leadership of the labour movement, there is a very obvious and promising field for assistance by organized labour in the industrialized countries. Fortunately, one may note that in the very recent past the co-operation between the leaders of labour unions in developing and in highly developed countries has been strengthened.

Urbanism

According to UN Statistics[1], 21% of the world's population lives in towns of over 20,000 inhabitants and 13% in the larger cities of over 100,000. Urbanism, or the degree to which people live in large agglomerations, varies from continent to continent and this has been the case even before the processes of industrialization accelerated further urbanization.

Even at present, only a small proportion of the population of Asia and Africa lives in towns or cities of over 20,000 inhabitants. The Near East and Latin America are and have, over a long time, been much more urbanized.

In each cultural area there is a connection between economic development, industrialization and urbanization, but there is no simple and straight correlation. The highest figures for urbanized living (taking towns of 20,000 and over as a yardstick) are given for England/Wales (69%), Australia (57%), the Netherlands (56%) and Argentina 48%). Yet, one may rightly consider Australia and Argentina heavily dependent upon agriculture and animal husbandry.

The following range—taken as an illustration from the UN data—shows more examples of striking similarities and dissimilarities.

Degree of urbanism (people living in towns of 20,000)

USA	43	Belgium	42	Japan	42
Chile	40	France	33	USSR	32
Egypt	29	Mexico	24	Finland	24
Costa Rica	14	Yugoslavia	13	India	12
Pakistan	8	North Borneo	0		

One can only conclude that certain cultural and ecological patterns—basic relations between people and nature—favour or militate against urbanism. Industrial development is one of them, landlordism and large enterprise in farming, another. Before the industrial revolution big cities were either centres of administration or of trade (with few exceptions).

Urbanization

Granted all structural and cultural differences, however, all

[1] United Nations, *Report on the World Social Situation*, New York, 1957, Chapter VII.

existing data point to a rapid process of urbanization in very recent times. We again take a few examples from the United Nations reports.[1]

Percentage of population in towns of 20,000 and more

Australia	1911 — 43 %	1947 — 57 %
USSR	1928 — 12 %	1955 — 32 %
Mexico	1910 — 11 %	1950 — 24 %
Chile	1920 — 28 %	1950 — 40 %
Japan	1920 — 23 %	1950 — 42 %
India	1911 — 4 %	1951 — 12 %

India indeed still is largely a country of village dwellers, but the USSR and Mexico were at the same level only a few decades ago. Countries like Australia, Japan and Chile were indeed already urbanized to an appreciable extent forty or fifty years ago, but the process has not stopped.

In Asia, between 1900 and 1950, the number of people in cities of over 100,000 rose from 19 to 106 million; in Africa this figure increased in the same period from 1.4 to 10 millions. For the world as a whole, the increase was relatively much less pronounced, but the explanation at this point is simply that Europe and the United States, respectively, started a century and half a century earlier.

Social problems in urbanization

Whereas the change from agricultural to industrial pursuits is primarily an economic process with important social and psychological side effects, urbanization is essentially a social process. Closely, but not irrevocably interconnected, urbanization also affects man in all his relations to his fellow man and to nature. Especially for the first generation city-dweller the social and psychological adjustment to his new environment requires all available moral stamina and social flexibility.

In the study of rapid social change it appeared that these problems are essentially similar all over the world, regardless of the pattern of culture or religion. This would be true especially in the larger, rapidly growing urban agglomerations. For Africa and Asia, the general social problems involved in rapid urbanization have been described in publications of the United

[1] United Nations, *Report on the World Social Situation, loc. cit.*

Nations and its organizations.[1] There is a good deal of general sociological literature on the subject.[2]

The rapidity of the process—São Paulo has seen its population increase a hundredfold over the last sixty years, from 35,000 to 3,500,000—in almost all the larger towns in Asia, Africa and Latin America would in itself cause difficult social problems. In the midst of inviting prospects it can give rise to human tragedies when different cultures meet and ways of life clash. The individual is suddenly deprived of the sheltering influence of his community. He is faced with hunger not because of drought or locusts, but because of unemployment. He is surrounded by thousands of people, but for the first time isolated and perhaps even lonely.

Wherever feasible, people of the same tribe, or tongue will cling together in the towns in a vain effort to preserve the traditional social ties. Inevitably, new associations develop, new social strata become apparent.

Economically some people do well. Others, for lack of training or opportunity, miss out and drift into the low-income quarters of the town. In many cases these socio-economic dramas of disappointed expectations come about when hundreds of thousands flee the countryside (starvation, war conditions) into the towns, hoping for food and security. The push from the land rather than the pull of the town is often the dynamic factor.

Slum conditions in cities

This combination of factors causes in and around many of the great new cities disgraceful agglomerations of densely populated slums. In various parts of the world these are known under different names, but their characteristics are the same everywhere.

In the new cities of Asia and Africa the main slums are in the suburbs, very often just beyond the boundaries of an active

[1] To mention a few: International African Institute, London (under the auspices of UNESCO), *Social Implications of Industrialization and Urbanization in Africa South of the Sahara*, UNESCO, Paris, 1956, *Urbanization in Asia and the Far East*, Calcutta, 1957.

[2] Cf. J. Denis, SJ, *Le phénomène urbain en Afrique Centrale*, Bruxelles 1958, with a bibliography of 416 entries; *The Indonesian Town* (published under the auspices of the Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam), The Hague and Bandung, 1958.

municipal administration. Millions live in squalor and filth in 'bidonvilles', urban slums built of flimsy material. Most probably, their numbers surpass available statistical evidence, because it is virtually impossible even to count these 'houses' and their inhabitants. It must be noted that in many areas the authorities make a great effort to develop streets, build better houses, provide the inhabitants with water from a tap, with some electric light and occasionally also sewerage. But the suburban slum remains a plague spot in many countries.

In the study on rapid social change the sub-human existence of people living in this environment has drawn the attention of Christians and churches in many lands. One of the main economic reasons for the emergence of these slums is lack of opportunity on the land, absence of an adequate development of industry and job opportunities in the cities and an absolute absence of training and preparation of young people in the villages for life in town. Additional causes are found in ill designed city administrative boundaries, and lack of title.

This situation has been described in a United Nations report[1] on urban slums in Latin America:

'Lack of title causes the emergence of whole "clandestine" suburbs. There are no public, social or economic amenities; public transport to and from the place of work is practically always insufficient. In Rio de Janeiro (loc. cit., p. 183) the working masses spend six hours a day in queues, in crowded trains or standing in buses. Transportation exhausts them more than their jobs . . .'

In Japan, conditions are improving appreciably, but for old people, widows and refugees (among the latter hundreds of thousands of Koreans) conditions of housing and life in general are miserable. The millions of refugees in other Asian countries (Calcutta, Karachi, the Arab refugees in the Middle East) likewise live a sub-human existence—in their case even more miserable because they are the victims of disunity among nations and because there does not seem to be any escape for them.

It must be noted that Governments and large enterprise increasingly find it imperative to provide better housing. In Nairobi, for instance, enterprises including government agencies such as the East African Railways and Harbours are obliged to

[1] United Nations, *Report on the World Social Situation*, New York, 1957, p. 184–187.

provide sleeping-places for their labourers. Too often, however, this is confined to a 'bedstead' for four men in a two-room house. In the study made by Mrs M. Forrester in the context of the rapid social change study it was found that the majority of these labourers were married, had families and had lived in town for fifteen to nineteen years or more. In many instances the wife came up from the village, sharing one of the two rooms with her husband, and cooking for all four men. After two to three months she would return to look after her house, children and garden and another couple would take the husband-wife room. It is surprising how in these circumstances marriages are ever kept intact; it is not surprising that prostitution flourishes and adultery is common.

All psychological, educational and ethical problems in these circumstances are subordinated to sheer physical subhuman existence and lack of economic basis.

The Church can bring the Gospel to these surroundings only if it brings better housing at the same time. And this must be said in a situation, where the intention, even the legal obligation exists to provide accommodation for the labourers in industry. In many cases this obligation does not exist.

The financial resources available for the provision of adequate housing in the bursting town communities are generally woefully inadequate. As a rule no low interest credit facilities are available. The do-it-yourself system[1]—rightly advocated by the United Nations—spreads slowly for lack of funds and organization. There is as yet no international financing of housing projects in developing countries.[2]

Urban renewal

In Europe and the United States, where the industrial cities are much older, one great problem is the decay of the old core of the towns and the flight of well-to-do citizens to the suburbs. The problems of urban renewal in these areas are of great importance for town planners and administrators.

In countries of rapid social change a similar but somewhat different problem arises in the case of the large old cities.

[1] In this system the inhabitants of a community provide the necessary labour individually or co-operatively; they receive building materials or credit through public channels.

[2] One may hope that the International Development Association is helpful in this matter.

In these cases (Hongkong, Delhi, Lahore, Cairo, to mention a few) the old centres of the town have traditionally been extremely thickly populated. Conditions of hygiene and of housing in general are poor. The new influx of people has aggravated these conditions and they have proved an obstacle to the flow of traffic as well as to social improvement. Governments, in many instances, are now condemning whole areas, providing the people with new housing opportunities in other places.[1]

The social, economic and moral rehabilitation of people, coming from a slum area, is one of the most difficult tasks. The increased distance to get to work (if any regular jobs are available), the easier access of government officials, including police, the intrusion in general of foreign elements create a sense of active resistance against social change. Nowhere does the sense of belonging, of tradition, develop into such a complex of inhibiting factors as in the case of slums. This is true all over the world. Urban slums are a sin against humanity, and the victims often refuse to be saved from their evil environment. For the churches, pastoral and social work coincide in these areas. For government, whereas determined concerted action is necessary, lessons in psychology should be heeded. A certain degree of participation by the people is necessary; government should not trespass upon private rights. For instance, slum-clearance in Johannesburg and other cities in South Africa often resulted in dispossession, in injustice against individual rights. The origin of these administrative and psycho-social mistakes may well lie —as alleged—in the racial policies of the government. Slum clearance and urban renewal are imperative in most great cities. The great challenge is to make it the tool of a process of rehabilitation and progress for the people in the area, not just for the benefit of those living around it and damaged by its existence.

The churches in changing cities

Can and should the church in the big city imitate the village church with its communal ties of common interest in the daily life of its parishioners? Should it cut across the old differentia-

[1] J. Marshall Miller (ed.), *New life for Cities around the World.* Books International, New York, 1959, gives as examples Rio de Janeiro, Alexandria and Cairo. In Naples there is an appalling task to tackle.

tion—cultural, tribal or ethnic in nature? Or should it make use of the craving for the old community life as a pastoral device? Should it try to be inter-racial, inter-denominational even in countries where a variety of mission boards operate in the villages?

What specific adaptations are necessary in church life, its organization and practice, when large numbers of young people leave the rural areas and come to town?

In the rapid social change study these problems have been recognized as being of vital importance to the members of the church, indeed to the very existence and functioning of the churches. In some cases this has led to imaginative and sacrificial service and witness among the outcast and downtrodden. Here, the parochial approach seems psychologically imperative.

In other cases it has led to ecumenical study, and co-operative action among the young people, the students, the emergent leaders. Here, the only possible approach is functional, city and even nation wide.

Nowhere, however, do the institutionalized churches seem to have an answer, adequate in depth and in scope, to the spiritual and social needs of the hundreds of millions of town dwellers. Yet, in biblical terms, the old Babylon as well as the new Jerusalem are pictured as large cities, overflowing with human vitality and full of opportunity.

This is the tragic dilemma of city life—the cross roads between the hope and despair of mankind. All the prime movers in our age, technical as well as spiritual, social and political, are at present based in the capitals of the world. Here, rather than in the villages, contemporary history is written. Here also, with the human race, the churches are put to the test.

XII

NATIONHOOD AND RESPONSIBLE CITIZENSHIP

THERE are no issues in the Rapid Social Change Study of more interest than those which deal with nationhood and responsible citizenship. That is not surprising. In the new nations of Asia and Africa men and women find inspiration in the national independence which they have recently acquired or which they are still eagerly seeking. In their situation the nation-state is a symbol of freedom, human dignity and social justice rather than an abstract idea in the realm of political science, or of public administration.

It is futile to argue that the nation-state is a historic phenomenon of recent origin in western countries, that nationalism has brought havoc and disaster in Europe and, in fact, wherever a mythical or mystical, supernatural basis for the state has become an accepted philosophy.

The answer—as was shown very clearly in the Odense consultation on European responsibilities towards rapid social change—would be that these dangers might be inherent in European history, but not in the Asian situation. Nationhood —not to be confused with nationalism—is there considered a positive gift to mankind; the right to embody nationhood in a national state is a basic human right.

Problems of states, nations, peoples in Asia, the Middle East and Africa have thus become, more than any other social phenomenon, a matter of direct, personal and human interest. If there is to be any common responsibility in this vital field of relations between people, we must approach the international and inter-continental problems from this human angle.

The rise of the nation state

First, however, we must take a brief look at the nation-state as a modern development. It arose in Western Europe, perhaps

first of all in France, England and the Netherlands, at the beginning of our modern era. The French Revolution gave a strong impetus to national feeling as a force creating and sustaining the state. But even in the nineteenth century no clear-cut definition could be given of what exactly constituted the nation. Even in rationalistic France in a rational age, Renan[1] ended up with an irrational feeling of belonging, of togetherness as the basis of the nation. Language, race, history in a common struggle for freedom and unity, a common culture emanating from a dynastic centre of power, all would contribute to the welding together of smaller groups of people into a nation.

In Germany and Italy the struggle for a united nation was particularly difficult because of regional interests and diversities. In 1870, however, these two states emerged as new powers in the European scene.

Switzerland, on the other hand, remained united in spite of the fact that—apart from a common determination not to be absorbed by its larger neighbours, Austria, France, Germany or Italy—it did not fulfil the theoretical requirements for being or becoming a nation-state.

More to the East and South, the battle for nationhood was extremely severe. The Austro-Hungarian double-monarchy, in spite of all efforts, could not be kept together because of its lack of homogeneity. Poland, three times divided by her neighbours, arose each time as a phoenix because of her essential nationhood, carefully kept alight beneath the ashes. And the same process appeared in the Balkans, where nation after nation acquired its independence from the Ottoman Empire. This process was still well under way at the beginning of this century and, indeed, the clash between Bosnian national feeling and the imperial administration caused the outbreak of the first World War.

Self-determination of nations proved to be an effective point of the programme which President Wilson brought to Europe and the United States in a war 'to save democracy'. The result, after 1918, was a proliferation of new nations in central and eastern Europe. Ireland must be mentioned as an example in western Europe. It might be added that Lenin made a similar point in his propaganda, up to the moment when the Bolshevik party took power over the whole of the old Russian Empire.

[1] Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation*, C. Levy, Paris, 1882.

The twenty-two Soviet republics, mainly based upon differences in nationality, can hardly be taken as a victory of the principle of the nation-state.

Despite all the restrictions, tensions and strife following the implementation of the principle of self-determination in twentieth century Europe, it can be stated that the nation-state has become established and recognized throughout Europe.

In Asia and Africa developments were much faster and up to the present they have been much more in one single direction. The Ottoman Empire in Asia and North Africa, after World War I, was sub-divided into a number of countries and territories. This was only possible because the main force in the process, at that time, was the military power of France and the United Kingdom. And after 1920 there followed persistent and powerful movements for Arab unity in one form or another. There has been a tendency to make language, culture and common history under Turkish administration the rallying point for a united Arab nation.

Elsewhere in Asia and Africa national independence has been won from a colonial government. In this process the struggle for political freedom has been the rallying point for the new nation, coinciding wherever possible with the frontiers of the former colonial territory.

One word must be added about Latin America. The process of nation building in this continent started much earlier, immediately after the wars and revolutions which led to the breakdown of the Spanish Empire in the western hemisphere. In spite of strong affinities through a common language and religion, related history and racial background, Latin America developed as a mixture of large and small republics. The reason —which was still operative until very recently—was geographical. Each new country had its own centre of gravity in one or more towns or mining areas, and communications were extremely difficult.

There have been some devastating wars, i.e., in and around Paraguay, and there were competing claims between Chile and Peru. But on the whole, the principle of the nation-state was hardly ever a cause of war and revolution in Latin America.

This difference in historical development has had far-reaching consequences for the growth of the sense and meaning of nationhood and the national state in Asia and Africa. We shall follow

this up in a discussion of the position of Christians and churches in these new political entities.

The emergence of new nations

In the process of decolonization, under the impact of forces described in Part I, we can usually detect various phases which affect human personality and the churches in a variety of ways.

Christians have generally taken their part in the national struggle for self-determination, self-rule and political freedom and in many cases have played a leading role. To some extent this has been the result of better educational facilities in mission schools and universities. The Student Christian Movement brought together, at an impressionable age, people from different countries and continents. Usually these young people have shown a keen desire to see their fellow countrymen develop more quickly in all spheres of life. National freedom has always seemed to be one of the most desirable means to that end. Because, however, the pitfalls and temptations of nationalism and power politics never stop at geographical boundaries, the political activities of such groups became, in Professor Wendland's words[1], a 'critical participation'.

Of course the position and action of individual Christians was different from the attitudes of missionary bodies, local churches and national Christian Councils.

The attitude of missionary societies has varied, from time to time, from a critical support of government action—even of colonial administration—to a clear moral support of a national movement for freedom. More often, however, missionary bodies have kept themselves quite aloof from the field of political activity. Once independence has been achieved the new governements will, as a rule, accept missionary activity only if strict political neutrality is guaranteed. Many young churches have followed the lead of the missionary bodies and have tried to keep clear of the political field. National Christian Councils, under the influence of young, progressive Christian leaders, on the other hand have generally shown a keen interest in national affairs and have tended to become a positive force in political life.

The twentieth century colonial period is in this respect very

[1] H. D. Wendland, *Botschaft an die Soziale Welt*, Furche Verlag Hamburg, 1959, Ch. 15.

peculiar. It is the only form of government which, explicitly or implicitly, is organizing itself out of existence. Participation in a national movement, therefore, is often encouraged by the colonial authorities. But, almost without exception, friction and tragic clashes arise out of difference of opinion concerning the speed of the process and the means to be used in achieving it.

In this situation Christians often have to make painful and sacrificial decisions. They may easily be misunderstood by fellow countrymen who want to enlist their support for their political activities.

Many independent nations have come into existence since World War II. This movement was set in motion as far back as 1946/47 with the establishment of a number of new countries in Asia. From that time onwards preparations for independence were speeded up throughout Asia and Africa. On the latter continent few people foresaw, even in 1958, that the referendum in the territories of the French Union would have a shock effect on the whole of Africa south of the Sahara. By the end of 1960 some 30 to 35 new nations had been established in Asia and Africa since the end of the war.

Whereas self-determination and freedom from political control seems a generally accepted goal and policy, this is not so in the case of contiguous areas. In fact World War II also sealed the fate of a number of small countries adjacent to Soviet Russia. Likewise, in many former colonial territories, self-determination has not been granted without severe limitations. The new nations need strong centripetal forces, but areas on the fringe would rather split off and form new independent units. In a number of cases tensions and incongruities arose out of artificial boundaries between former colonial territories, which had little regard for national or linguistic frontiers. Yet, the pages of history cannot be turned back and new nations have a strong tendency to maintain and solidify their national unity.

This tendency has been apparent in the new states established in Central Europe and the Middle East, as well as in Latin America. It has appeared in Asia and can be expected to remain a powerful factor in Africa.

In the second stage of nationhood, therefore, post-independent nationalism tries to achieve full unity by resisting the forces of disintegration arising from a variety of causes (racial,

linguistic, geographical, tribal and even religious). Citizenship in these new nations meets with the particular difficulty of conflicting loyalties, not all easily subordinated to loyalty to the new political unit, the state. In Europe these conflicting loyalties have also caused tensions and even wars, but they have largely been accepted—one need only mention the Friesian, Scottish, Welsh, Breton, Basque movements. It is not to be expected that similar movements, even separations, will not occur in other continents.

For people in Asia and even more so in Africa, historical or scientific explanations are of little help in the daily struggle. The study shows that Christians share these difficulties with others. One finds them on both sides of almost every conflict. Some churches have historic ties to a limited geographical, ethnic and linguistic area. For them the appearance of a nation-state comprising a wider area is more difficult than it would be for churches themselves covering a wide area. In the National Council of Churches they find a uniting force and indeed, at this level, it becomes easier to look at the total national picture.

The new nation-state generally wants to minimize the differences arising from ethnic causes, especially when these differences are on a tribal rather than a racial basis. Churches are very often ready to respect vernacular tribal languages, but want at the same time to be multi-racial. At this point, it would seem that the Christian conscience, stirred up by the Gospel, should be intolerant of intolerance.

As far as religious differences within the boundaries of a given nation-state are concerned, tensions prevail and clashes are easily provoked on the supposition that each nation has its own religion and views any minority with suspicion. Christians in a number of countries, Jews in others and also in a few countries Moslems, suffer discrimination and sometimes outright persecution by religious majorities which then take on the appearance of political pressure groups.

In many cases it would seem as if an institution which is essentially secular—the state—has now assumed an absolute claim on man's personality, a claim which hitherto has only been exercised by religion and, in the last century, by some secular ideologies, which might be described as pseudo-religions for example rationalism, liberalism, communism. Yet, in the battle for political freedom, forces have been aroused in modern

man of such a kind as have rarely been seen before in history. In this respect there is therefore no parallel with other continents or other periods.

It is of the utmost importance to note, however, that in Asia and Africa the birth of many new nations has given rise, almost simultaneously, to a longing for wider loyalties, beyond the boundaries of the state. The most important movement in that respect is Arab nationalism, extending—at least among groups of the population—over an area much larger than any one single Arab state. There are also in Africa interesting moves towards narrow co-operation, federation, and perhaps even amalgamation, of territories.

There is no necessary coincidence between nationhood and state. In some cases the expression of nationhood in political forms is not yet fully possible because a number of territories have not yet attained full self-government. Where this is the case the struggle for nationhood and full citizenship often appears under another guise, for example in a reaction against racial discrimination. In parts of Africa—notably Africa south of the Zambesi—this has given rise to an emotional movement for African civil equality and an equally emotional counter-movement for segregation and the maintenance of the existing power structure. It is significant that all over Africa strong feelings of solidarity have developed, in a remarkably short span of time, against all inequality of status on account of race. Racial issues therefore complicate to a large extent the problems of nationhood and citizenship in Africa. This is hardly the case in Asia or in Latin America. It gives a very special character to nationalism in Africa. Here, and particularly in South Africa, the Rhodesias and in Algiers, the nationalisms, or the struggle for an expression of nationhood of different peoples (even of a different race), clash because no geographical boundaries can be drawn, however roughly, between the groups.

Nationhood and the ideal of the nation-state in our century demand much personal sacrifice. In 1923, after a bloody war between Greece and Turkey, peace was concluded on the basis of a mass migration in both directions. This has helped to reduce tensions between the two nations, but has made hundreds of thousands of people into homeless 'displaced persons'. Millions have followed them as refugees because of race, religion or political conviction. Yet, such is the impact of the political

structure on personal life that nowadays a foreigner or a deviationist is considered in many societies to be a potential enemy or traitor.

Responsible citizenship

In the studies on rapid social change it has become customary to summon Christians in the emerging and new nations to 'responsible citizenship.' The expression is clearly related to the concept of 'responsible society', the latter laying particular stress on power and responsibilities in society, including the national framework. In the various studies and conferences the formulation of the biblical basis of responsible citizenship has been eagerly sought after as well as the application of biblical teaching to the situation today. The conference at Thessalonica devoted a large part of its report to Christian responsibility in political action.[1]

In the process of finding a structure for the new nation, and even more in the struggle for the proper functioning of the new political, social and administrative organs, the emphasis will shift from a fight against old restrictions to a battle for the right use of the new freedom.

Decolonization, even in the political field, does not end on the day of the transfer of sovereignty. The fight for freedom, in the full sense of the word, really begins on that day. The removal of foreign political power may create a vacuum which has to be filled with new positive values, serving the new nation.

Concentration on removing 'colonial reminiscences', whether political, economic or cultural, intensifies the pains of the process of decolonization after independence.

The 'emotional mass movement' may be necessary to achieve profound socio-political changes. The achievement and perfection of nationhood in the context of the nation-state is often therefore fanned by politicians under an emotional slogan which may endanger the political rights of minority groups of any nature.

It should be noted that some governments and dominant political parties have conscientiously refrained from anything which would lead to intolerance against minorities. In these

[1] *Dilemmas and Opportunities*, World Council of Churches, Geneva, 1959, Part II.

countries political participation by Christians is relatively easy.[1] In others Christians are often faced by a crucial dilemma between active participation in government, withdrawal from politics, or participation in an opposition party—if the latter is allowed.

Political Institutions

It is impossible to discuss responsible citizenship without thinking in terms of political institutions. It is in the nature of a large society, embodied in a state, that these institutions either have power and authority over people, or are designed to influence those in power and authority. A democratic state has a structure which enables these two types of institutions to keep each other in some kind of balance.

Responsible citizenship must show itself in both types of institutions, although an individual need not take part directly in both. The main political institutions are the executive government or system of public administration, parliament and other representative bodies on the one hand, and political parties and groupings or pressure groups on the other hand. The judiciary has to be added as an additional institution, testing the behaviour of citizens and also, in some countries, governmental decisions.

We cannot deal here at any length with governmental organization and parliamentary systems. We must rather concentrate on the voluntary associations of a public or political nature, which require decisions from individual people.

Nevertheless, it seems important to highlight some features of the changes in the political structure under the impact of the prime movers. These are primarily of a political nature, new ideas moving people to change their old institutions and forms of government. But the other prime movers also have a deep and widespread effect on government.

Improved communications between people, the need for planned development, the development of schools and road systems enable governments to concentrate more power at the centre and, at the same time, intensify the need for more concerted action at a national level. Almost inevitably when remote groups are to be integrated in the unity of national life, frictions

[1] P. E. Devanandan and M. M. Thomas—*Christian Participation in Nation-building*, The National Christian Council of India, Bangalore, 1960.

develop. Each country has at its fringe, in places which are not easily accessible, groups of people who resist all government interference, even if this means better opportunities for them in many directions.

This resistance increases to the extent that a government has a more embracing and more directed policy of development and national unity. It is understandable that colonial administrations encounter, as a rule, little difficulty in dealing with tribal society. The recognition of an overall sovereignty fits into the tribal pattern, and in return for the payment of some tax money, tribal chiefs generally manage to keep their local society intact and their own authority unshaken. Incorporation into a new national state is very often resisted, and the history of new nations abounds with examples of trouble, even revolution and bitter struggle, between the people at the centre and those who live on the fringes of national society.

An added diffulty arises for the churches and for Christians in cases—and they are frequent—where these remote tribes or groups have kept their religion alive until the coming of Christianity. Acceptance of a world religion often appears to them a sufficient link with the world as a whole, whilst in other respects they maintain the integrity of the old society. This selective adaptation to forces from abroad—wherever the mission did not meet with one of the other world religions—is so widespread that it proves, in my view, the fallacy of Toynbee's thesis, claiming that in the partial contact with the West, people from other cultures tend to absorb the trivial and reject the higher aspects of culture.

In the history of missions and in the life of many of the younger churches many examples exist of a thorough acceptance of the Gospel not accompanied by an attempt to change social, economic and political institutions. In the new nations these churches find it difficult to maintain their attitude of aloofness from society as a whole and they see many of their younger educated members move in the opposite direction. Churches in Burma and Indonesia for instance suffer from this dilemma.

The role of democracy

Most of the leaders in government in Asia and Africa have been educated in the liberal universities of the West and have

learned to appreciate 'democracy'. Also, in contrast to the bureaucracies of colonial administration, they have promised their followers the benefits of general suffrage. But western democratic, parliamentary systems cannot easily be introduced. More often the tendency is to have a presidential cabinet as in the United States rather than one immediately responsible to Parliament. Political parties, the basic institutions of western parliaments, cannot easily be organized; or, conversely, it is too easy to organize them because they are not based upon differences in political insights, but rather centre in one man or are of a regional (tribal) character.

Nations want to move quickly. They easily get impatient and military strong men or 'a junta' of young officers may take over the affairs of the nation. What then remains of democracy?

The term 'people's democracy' extensively used in Leninist ideology adds to the confusion of what democracy really means.

At the same time, in all countries where the rapid social change study was carried out, young educated people put high hopes on the development of a 'real' democracy.

It should be recognized that democracy is not a recent invention of political scientists but the basis of many small communities—villages, clans, tribes, throughout the world. Even in these small communities one finds all gradations of autocracy and democracy. Chiefs and lords have great inherited power in some societies, or almost no power except in trust for the people, to be withdrawn if performance is below expectation.

In many areas the democratic process requires if not unanimity, then at least a consensus of opinion. This may mean costly delays and a chain of uneasy compromises. Even in countries like Japan (the decision to surrender in 1945) and Indonesia this feature of democracy, also in cabinet sessions, has been very inconvenient.

In other areas the democratic process takes for granted that the spoils go to the victor, even if he obtains only 51% of the votes. In this environment—typified by Latin society—it is considered that asking for a qualified majority in the political process is equivalent to a domineering minority. In these circumstances violent political changes may be expected, but they are often not taken tragically. If a politician gets in easily, he may get out easily as well.

In modern democracies in western Europe there is an

element of protecting the minority—as in the consensus-democracy—and an element of the formality of the rule by majority. The majority at least has a moral duty to protect the interests of the minority, if not to safeguard them by law and administration. This means freedom of expression, of religious belief, of organization.

Democracy in some newly established countries, where a violent minority threatens peace and order, has a hard time. The main question really is how far a minority is forced to resort to violence because its rights are not safe or, *vice versa*, to what extent a government is forced to suspend democratic rights, because the integrity of the nation is endangered. The temptation to interchange means and ends is great.

The role of political parties

One of the tests of democracy is the existence as well as the self-restraint of political parties. It is hard to envisage a democracy without political differences of insight and these are best institutionalized in political parties. A one-party system does not comply with this basic idea of democracy. Even where a mass movement, in the crucial years of a struggle for new or sustained independence, organizes itself into one single political party, one must expect deviations. Wherever these deviations to the 'right' or to the 'left' are not tolerated, there is no real democracy.

The one-party state may be ideological or there may be an overtone of ethnic dominance, or it may be merely a symptom of an undue centralization of executive power. All types exist in countries in rapid social change.

On the other hand the political system may break down because there are too many parties. In the Third Republic in France for instance, or in Chile, the numerous political parties were largely centred in personalities rather than in programmes. An undue proliferation of political parties may be as detrimental as a monolithic state.

In a few countries the question has arisen to what extent there should be 'Christian political parties'. On the continent of Europe the phenomenon of the 'Christian democratic party' is quite common; in the Anglo-Saxon world it would be considered a profound heresy to mix religion and politics through a Christian political party. In the Netherlands there are at least four

'Christian parties' and this has deeply influenced Indonesia. This country has established various Moslem as well as Christian political parties. In the conferences and discussions on responsible citizenship in Indonesia the grounds for 'Christian political parties' were extensively discussed.

Political parties, in the transitional period from colonial administration to national independence, are more than organizations for direct political ends. They have also a social and ideological character, as, in the struggle for national freedom, they ask for the full commitment of the whole person. In the aftermath of colonialism what is the legitimate role of ideologies in political parties? That is the more general question, put not only by 'Christian' parties but also by the Communists. This question goes deep into the roots of national life and government.

The secular state and the ideologies

In a number of Asian states, notably in India, the constitution guarantees freedom of religion and political affiliation and the state declares that it is of a secular nature. In Pakistan, an avowedly Moslem community, the state is based upon the fivefold principle of the 'Pantja-sila'. Indonesia and other Asian nations have the same basis. The question arises what is really meant by a secular state, coupled with the belief in one God and the brotherhood of man. This needs clarification especially as Communist China also expresses its belief in the five principles of peace and friendship.

To what extent can a state be theocratic or Marxist-Leninist and guarantee freedom of religion, of speech? To what extent can a secular state have a philosophical or religious basis? Christians desire to participate in and wholeheartedly support the life and aspiration of the nation to which they belong. To what extent are they welcomed or only tolerated? And what positive content does tolerance have in the case of an overwhelming majority of other religions? In some Latin American countries non-Roman Catholics suffer from discrimination and intolerance.

There are many ideologies, all demanding full commitment and these are all in conflict with the Gospel, which gives only God the right to demand full surrender and obedience.

A particular ideology, which hampers Christian participation

in political matters, is one based on one or other of the myths of racial superiority. Racial discrimination is still to be found in a variety of circumstances, either supported by written laws or court orders, or opposed to them. The second assembly of the World Council of Churches (Evanston, 1954) expressed its belief that such discrimination is incompatible with the Gospel of Jesus Christ. In situations of rapid social change racial discrimination is particularly painful where the ruling groups are members of the Christian churches.

In the study responsible citizenship was shown to be a norm or yardstick against which to measure many ethical problems, which can no longer be evaded by Christians. More people suffer from political interference and intolerance on the part of the political system than ever before. This must make Christians and churches particularly aware of their calling to righteousness and justice in this broken world.

XIII

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PLANNING, THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

Planning and Economic Policy in the West

DURING World War I Germany, inspired by the eminent Walther Rathenau, startled the world with its economic and industrial achievements. Rathenau's philosophy was directed towards a fully planned society, based upon the corporative association of producers, including labourers.[1] His most striking idea was that enormous losses and inefficiency resulted from the trial and error methods of classical capitalism, operating solely through the market forces.

In the mammoth enterprises, as they developed to no small degree to meet the demands of World War I, planning, programming and budgeting had already become highly institutionalized. It was only one further step to apply the same engineering and managerial techniques to the whole of society.

However, it was not western Europe but Soviet Russia which undertook the main experiments in planning, partly in order to overcome the destruction of a war, a revolution and a civil war, but largely as a way of organizing the means of production, centralized in the hands of the state. Thus planning seemed to take on an ideological flavour. Whatever element of truth there may have been in that assumption, modern society in the non-communist world also came under the power of managers in industry and organized labour[2] and even of the experts needed to advise government.[3]

Japan when it braced itself to organize society for a total war in the years 1934-1946, followed methods which, while somewhat similar, differed in many respects.

[1] W. Rathenau, *Die neue Gesellschaft*, 1919; *Autonome Wirtschaft*, 1919.

[2] From J. Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution; what is happening in the World*, New York, 1941, to A. A. Berle, Jr., *Power Without Property*, New York, 1959.

[3] The word 'braintrust' gained prominence in the early days of the New Deal under F. D. Roosevelt, 1933.

Planning practices and techniques had developed in the industrialized countries during periods of war or severe depression long before a theory of planning had been formulated, let alone accepted. Many western countries strongly rejected the planning philosophy of communism as a political means to control society and limit the freedom of the individual while, at the same time, carrying out measures described as incidental or temporary—which in time would make a profound impression on the structure of society.

Gradually, however, following Keynes, the rapid development of econometrics and the link established in the Beveridge Report between planning and social justice, a new concept of the welfare state emerged in the West. In a quarter of a century, between Rathenau and Beveridge, the concept of society in the West underwent profound changes. From an automatism it became an instrument; from behind the clouds of massive business upheavals rose the promising sun of progress with security.

It is against this dynamic and kaleidoscopic picture of western society and against the image which Westerners develop about their own economic and social life, that one must look at the dreams and efforts of the non-industrialized world.

Economic policy in rapid social change

A new look at world development promised a new deal for hitherto underprivileged nations. If all a country needed, in order to progress rapidly, were improved economic organization, why could this not be achieved by all or most countries, or at least the larger ones? We shall discuss the political aspects of this growing desire for progress in the next chapter, and confine ourselves here to its impact on economic policy and development.

Experience in the twentieth century has indicated that government policies with regard to trade and to financial, fiscal and investment problems could alter 'natural' trends to a considerable and even decisive extent.

In this respect it remained a political goal to imitate the West, even if the military and cultural superiority were no longer acknowledged. The North Atlantic countries and Soviet Russia remained unchallenged in the mass production of industrial goods. Why should not the capacity to produce in abundance be acquired by all nations? What would be the prerequisites for

rapid economic progress? What national and international policies and programmes are necessary and feasible to attain this goal?

Still smarting from the disastrous decline in the prices of raw materials in the 'thirties, the independent countries in Latin America, during World War II, jointly developed a post-war programme, with the hope for, and the promise of help from the United States. This plan was based upon an increasing volume of exports at reasonable prices, against the import of capital goods, also at reasonable prices. In other words, the United States would equip the primary producers to diversify their economy. The sudden de-control of prices in the USA in 1946, however, diminished the real value of the Latin American dollar reserves, and struck the first blow against the high hopes of the immediate post-war period.[1]

The British government, struggling with shortages of all kinds, forced the marketing boards of West Africa only very gradually to release funds built up as a capital reserve for the post-war period. But it tried to maintain their real value at the highest possible level by avoiding inflationary rising prices.

In both cases it was expected that the capital resources needed to develop the overseas countries could accrue from the sale of export products and that the latter, at least, would be an adequate backing for investments which the large financial centres of the world would be willing to make.[2]

Temporary 'educational' tariffs would protect infant industries in the new countries. They were allowed by the International Trade Charter of Havana as a corollary to stable and equitable prices of food and raw materials. Unfortunately, a number of assumptions underlying these war and immediate post-war efforts, proved to be illusory.

With negligible exceptions it proved impossible to attain a reasonable price stability for raw materials. The flow of private capital into the industry and agriculture of industrially underdeveloped countries remained at a low level. It took years for the International Bank to work out procedures to make loans

[1] Great Britain similarly found the purchasing power of its first huge loan for reconstruction diminished.

[2] The Bretton Wood's institutions—(International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) were designed, even during the war, for the double purpose of bridging the short and long-term needs of countries.

of significant magnitude to the low income countries. Economic nationalism and protectionism, all over the world, proved hard to overcome. Numerous, almost endless, conferences in a multiplicity of international organizations produced excellent recommendations but had little executive power.

In the meantime other forces were instilling into the 'underdeveloped' countries a national rather than an international approach to their problems. International bankers and bureaucrats, as well as national governments, required 'national plans' in order to establish priorities among the manifold requests for funds. In the beginning these were little more than a 'shopping list'.[1] Following the lead of the USSR, where the successive five-year plans were essentially long-term budgets, countries set out their national goals in five-year, six-year, eight-year or ten-year plans. International economists and national planning bureaux succeeded gradually in improving the technique for drawing up these plans and making them internally consistent.

Attractive plans in themselves, of course, offer no certainty of execution. They may have helped to speed up international private and public financing, but only slightly. They revealed the existence of numerous obstacles which threatened to impede their fulfilment. One of these was the lack of experience in applying modern technology. It was with a real feeling of expectation, therefore, that the world heard President Truman announce in January 1949 Point IV of his Presidential Programme.

The United Nations soon followed with a technical assistance programme which was widespread, multilateral and co-operative. This was joined by the British Commonwealth, Soviet Russia and, to a lesser extent, western European countries. The 'colonial' governments, spurred on by the general trend, by their obligations under the UN Charter, and by new concepts of responsibility for people in overseas territories, started impressive programmes.

Yet most tropical and sub-tropical countries felt that their progress fell far below their expectations. More social and economic physicians were called in to examine the patient. Phrases like 'social obstacles', 'deficient public administration', 'unwise financial policies leading to inflation', 'inequitable differences between high and low groups in society', 'the burden

[1] An early example is the programme of the First Colombo Plan, 1950.

of western social services', 'unbalanced economic programmes', 'lack of confidence because of political instability', 'lack of research in basic investment opportunities', 'no stability in export prices', 'insufficient economic infra-structure', 'not enough attention given to social infra-structure', 'excessive protectionism', 'excessive economic nationalism', 'nepotism and corruption' were frequently used in the diagnosis. These diagnoses were sometimes mutually incompatible and, in any case, rarely suggested any remedy.

However, as we look back upon this struggle for sound development policies, we are amazed that this whole avalanche of efforts and events occupied only about fifteen years, a very short period indeed. In a number of countries it has led to a more sober, but healthier approach to developmental policies. There should be no disappointment, let alone despondency, if not all development programmes have worked out well. Much has been achieved, and fifteen years after World War II the world picture looks infinitely better than a decade and a half after World War I.

Relative Levels of Economic Development

Reviewing pre-World War II levels of economic development, one finds western Europe still at the summit. During and immediately after this war, however, the pattern of economic growth was greatly disturbed. North America (the United States and Canada) had expanded their industrial as well as their agricultural production in a spectacular way and, for a while, the United States became a shining example to everybody in the world who hoped for rapid economic development.

Thereafter, however, Soviet Russia showed rapid growth rates and, after 1950, western Europe also recovered very rapidly from war devastation, a significant difference from the between-wars stagnation.[1] Last but not least, rapid growth of industrial and agricultural production has been announced by mainland China.

Relative levels of overall economic growth have thus become a major political issue. Which system of economic organization promises the most rapid increase in levels of production? By what means can governments promote or accelerate economic development?

1. Svennilson, *Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy, Geneva, 1957.*

It should be remembered that everywhere, under all political regimes and in every economic organization, rehabilitation after a war can proceed faster with limited means than either a process of self-sustaining growth or a process of early development with outside help would be able to show.

It is easy to establish the reasons for this phenomenon. In a war devastated country many productive assets, notably people, are not operating to full capacity because vital links in the chain of production are missing. If the attempts to weld these missing links anew are successful, production will rise substantially.

On the other hand, if a country makes an effort to increase overall production rapidly with outside experts and capital, the opportunities for overlooking certain important elements are plentiful—skilled domestic manpower is often one of the bottlenecks. There are also many institutional factors which can hardly be established with foreign aid. In these circumstances, it cannot be expected that economic life will expand rapidly, smoothly and in a balanced way.

Countries in the process of self-sustaining growth, especially when this depends to a large extent upon the initiative of the individual and the firm, are in an intermediate position.

Yet, the growth of overall national production and the increase per capita have an important bearing upon the expectations of wide groups of people who are seeking progress.

It should also be remembered that the yearly growth figures did not have quantitative meaning until the United Nations, about 1950, gave widespread support to nations wishing to establish their level of national income in a comparable way. At the moment of writing data are available for a variety of countries over the period 1951-1957. Such a short period may not show conclusive differences, but the figures are at least an indication. The following data are mainly derived from United Nations statistics.[1]

From these admittedly incomplete and rough data it would appear that both high and low income countries are represented at all levels of economic growth. It is even questionable whether

[1] *Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics*, United Nations, 1959. *Significant issues in economic and international development*, Development Centre, Stanford Research Institute, Palo Alto, California, USA, 1959.

Percentage per Capita rate of growth of Gross National Production

Low (2 %)		Medium (2–4 %)		High (4–6 %)		Very High (6 %)	
gentina	0.5*	United Kingdom	2.1	Netherlands	4.1	West Germany	6.4
livia . .	0.2*	Brazil	2.2	Italy	4.8	Red China . .	7.4
ile . .	0.3	India	2.5	Burma . . .	4.8	Venezuela . .	8.6
nited States	1.2	Puerto Rico . .	2.5	Japan . . .	5.3		
nada .	1.3	Sweden	3.1	Austria . . .	5.7		
ailand .	1.6	Switzerland . . .	3.7	Greece . . .	5.8		
rkey . .	1.8						

* per capita decrease in real terms

prima facie availability of land and energy resources or density of population has been the decisive factor.

It is often said that the highly developed countries on the whole have been making more rapid progress than the industrially less developed countries. This, however, as the table shows, is too much of a generalization.

A recent United Nations study[1] provides figures which indicate that in large parts of the continent of Africa the economies developed very rapidly. These data are not directly comparable to those quoted above as they give increase in total gross national production and have been adjusted for increase in population and in price levels. The latter is a precarious matter in countries where a large part of the goods and services never enters the monetary economy. Nevertheless, an annual rate of growth of the total economy of 13% in the Federation of Rhodesia, 11% in Kenya and 8-9% in Morocco and the Belgian Congo, Uganda and the Union of South Africa, brings this part of the world among the most rapidly growing economies.

However, not everything is said with these figures. The example of India may illustrate the peculiar difficulty of an economy in an early stage of industrialization.

Expressed in current prices, national income developed as follows[2] (in billions of rupees):

[1] *Economic Survey of Africa since 1950*, United Nations, 1959 p. 208.
[2] Data received from the Central Statistical Organization of the Government of India.

Year	48/49	49/50	50/51	51/52	52/53	53/54	54/55	55/56	56/57	57/58	58/
Agriculture	42.5	44.9	48.9	50.2	48.1	53.1	43.5	45.2	55.2	52.9	6
Non-agriculture	44.0	45.2	46.4	49.5	50.1	51.7	52.6	54.6	57.9	61.1	6
Net National Output	86.5	90.1	95.3	99.7	98.2	104.8	96.1	99.8	113.1	114.0	12

*) preliminary figures

If however these figures are expressed at constant prices (1948/49 = 100), the following picture develops:

Year	48/49	49/50	50/51	51/52	52/53	53/54	54/55	55/56	56/57	57/58	58/
Agriculture	42.5	43.6	43.4	44.4	46.0	49.8	50.3	50.2	52.5	50.1	5
Non-agriculture	44.0	44.6	45.1	46.6	48.6	50.5	52.5	54.6	57.5	58.8	6
Net National Output	86.5	88.2	88.5	91.0	94.6	100.3	102.8	104.8	110.0	108.9	11

*) preliminary figures

In the non-agricultural sectors of the economy, production rose steadily, both in money value and in constant prices. The difference between both ways of measurement, over a ten-year period is only 1.7 billion rupees or less than 3% of the value produced in 1958-59. This is a remarkable feature, showing a successful development, and the absence of inflation in prices of industrial products and services.

Over a ten-year period, the rise in production in real terms in the non-agricultural sectors has been 38%.

In the agricultural sector, it is less easy to measure progress, because of the uncertainties of the monsoon and rainfall in general.

Expressed in real terms (constant prices) one can distinguish years of rapid progress (1953/54 and 1958/59), but also of stagnation (1950/51 and 1955/56) and even of regression (1957/58). Taking the high figure after 1958/59 to be normative, we find a rise of 31% in 10 years. This is not unsatisfactory, but if one takes the average of the two early and the two late years in the range, one finds only 23% increase in 8 years.

Further analysis turns up more particulars about the precarious position of the food and agricultural sector of the economy.

The variations between both sets of figures can also be expressed as relative price levels:

ear	48/49	49/50	50/51	51/52	52/53	53/54	54/55	55/56	56/57	57/58	58/59*
griculture	100	104	113	113	104	106	86	90	105	106	111
on-griculture	100	101	103	106	103	102	100	100	101	104	103

*) preliminary figures

Agricultural prices fluctuated much more than non-agricultural prices. The pendulum swings obviously in accordance with agricultural production.

In or right after a year of a good harvest, prices drop. In years of stagnant production, prices rise. The comparison of 1950/52 and 1954/56 is particularly illustrative. In the latter period, farmers produced over 10% more, but the value of their product was 10% less. This fact was of considerable assistance to the government in its effort to keep the cost of living down, but would hardly be an incentive to the peasant to increase his production through investment and specific efforts. One can accept fluctuating prices for agricultural products sold to non-farmers, if the changes in production are purely a result of rainfall—this will spread the 'feast or famine' situation over a larger part of the population. But if the increase in food production is the result of an additional human effort, there is a need for additional purchasing power in the towns. It is impossible to envisage that either part of the economy can grow rapidly unless simultaneously. This however requires first of all improved and enlarged marketing, storage and transportation systems. The Third Five Year plan for India expresses these interrelationships in the following words: 'self-sustaining growth can only be achieved by balanced development both in agriculture and in industry. Incomes and employment cannot rise sufficiently without industrialization. On the other hand, an industrial revolution cannot be achieved without a radical improvement in agricultural production'.[1]

It is in itself difficult to achieve balanced development in industry and agriculture, but it is even more difficult to do so rapidly and without thoroughly disturbing the monetary sector.

Besides, it has now become self-evident that the real bottlenecks are in the field of management of the new productive assets of a developing country and the administration of public

[1] Government of India Planning Commission, Third Five Year Plan. A draft outline, New Delhi, June, 1960, p. 11.

institutions in a changing social structure. As a result, no sector of society can be automatically assumed to develop and be served adequately with well trained staff. 'Planning and programming for development' has become more and more necessary, intricate and precarious.

India has a remarkably stable economy and its main trouble is this stability which may also cause inertia and stagnation.

But the economies of newly developing countries with a deeply penetrating money economy and a high degree of dependency on world markets for raw materials and food, though more volatile, are at least as precarious. As examples we select some African export economies, wholly or mainly dependent on a single commodity:

Year		1950	51	52	53	54	55	56	5
Country	*Product*	*Value of production*							
Egypt	Raw Cotton	£ 150	164	126	116	113	107	99	12
Sudan	Raw Cotton	£ 23	47	29	27	22	30	42	2
Ethiopia	Coffee	$ —	57	59	83	112	85	82	11
Gambia	Groundnuts	£ 2.1	2.7	3.6	2.5	2.2	2.4	2.3	
Ghana	Cocoa	£ 55	60	53	56	85	66	51	5

The export value of these countries is derived for 60-90% from a single export commodity (Mauritius depends for 98% on sugar alone). Thus, they are highly vulnerable as, over a period of one decade, the value of cotton or coffee returns differed by 100%, and groundnuts or cocoa by 50%.

It is understandable that the representatives of raw material producing countries have since World War II asked on every possible occasion for measures on a world scale, leading to some degree of price or income stabilization for their main export crops. Among the most pressing and eloquent of the spokesmen for the raw material producing countries have been Argentine, Brazil and Cuba in the western hemisphere and Indonesia among the Asian countries. Africa, so far, has had less opportunity to make its voice heard in the United Nations or other international bodies, but it can be expected to swell the chorus very soon.

The seriousness of the problem has been clearly shown by P. Hoffman.[1] From mid 1957 to mid 1958 the changing economic

[1] Paul Hoffman: *One Hundred Countries and One and One Quarter Billion People;* Committee for International Economic Growth, Washington, 1960, p. 58.

climate in the major buying countries was such as to drive down prices and reduce the export earnings of the underdeveloped countries by 7-8%. During the same period the prices of manufactured goods continued to increase, with the result that the underdeveloped countries lost some $2 billions in import capacity. This is equivalent to the total amount of bilaterial and multilateral grants in aid in the same period.

The developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America have tried by a variety of policies to overcome the burden of violent changes in the prices of their export products. We have already mentioned efforts to reach price stabilization through agreements between producing and consuming countries. In the period 1946-1948 protracted negotiations and international conferences were held in order to establish rules for international trade. In March 1958 the Havana Charter, embodying the results of these discussions, was accepted by the delegates of 48 nations. With the exception of Liberia and Australia, however, the Charter was not ratified by any parliament. Neither did the envisaged machinery for price stabilization through commodity arrangements materialize. At the same time many newly developing countries tried to diversify their economy through industrialization. On economic as well as social and political grounds the development of industry is indispensable in the process of increasing per capita income. In some countries this effort met with considerable success. Among these stand out Mexico, Brazil, Argentine, the Union of South Africa and Australia.

Some of these countries have simultaneously been expanding agricultural production. On the medium range—we have only 15 years experience— these appear to have in the aggregate a faster growth, but this may be because they have been able to avoid undesirable social and economic tension.

In this very process some countries have been able adequately to control inflation while others have failed to do so. In the first category can be found countries with strong enough governments to resist spectacular public expenditures or wholesale wage increases. The second category of countries has generally suffered from the desire to over-invest or anticipate through issuing money on expected higher productivity, thereby defeating their own efforts towards a higher standard of living.

The Role of Government

In almost every country—even in the early, difficult years of the United States of America—people expect that the government will not only maintain peace and order, but will also actively promote economic growth and social well-being. Considerable misunderstanding has been created by an overemphasis on private initiative in economic life (particularly in industry) by economists and politicians in the West when advising or judging development programmes in the areas of rapid social change. Misunderstanding, because the changes in economic and social policies in the West, over the last two centuries, have not been straightforwardly in *one* direction. Misunderstanding also, because theory and practice in the West changed over this period as situations changed, and not only because of deeper and clearer thinking on the subject.

In practice all international institutions—even the International Bank—accept intensive governmental activity in Asia and in Latin America, and even rely on it for rapid and sound development.

There are, however, striking differences between the present-day situation in newly industrializing countries and the situation prevailing around the North Atlantic during most of the nineteenth century.

Politically, one could say, the difference is in the now widespread suffrage rights of the people. It is also caused, however, by the means of modern mass communication. Socially, it exists in the fruits of social legislation in the West, dangling over the fence and envied by the masses elsewhere. It is impossible—even if anybody wanted to do so—to ignore labour movements or to keep out the diagnoses of scrutinizing experts under the various technical assistance programmes.

Economically, it means that a high level of savings and investments must be reached, but, at the same time, budgets for social investments or expenditures must be high.

Governments have to fulfil this task under the limelight of internal and external attention. At the same time, they are expected to build up, almost overnight, a capable and incorruptible civil service. Last but not least, if they let foreign exchange reserves fall and currency circulation increase, thus causing inflation, they are in great trouble, internally and ex-

ternally. Few of the techniques of public administration and legislation, or of financial regulations are foreign to these governments. They know only too well the temptations of easy stop gap measures.

The role of government in areas of rapid social change has many technical aspects, of efficiency and impartiality. It is clear that these concepts have also an ethical content. And if choosing means an effort to reach commendable ends the instrumentalities create many human problems. We shall touch upon a few of them.

Government and industry

It has become a point of controversy, to what extent government has the duty or the right to regulate industrial life, and even more so, to what extent it would be justified in entering into industrial production.

While there is no dispute about the duty of regulation through a variety of devices in the area of labour relations, credit facilities, safety regulations, cartellization, problems do arise when a government creates monopolies or when it nationalizes existing industries. In the study on rapid social change, from the area itself, no major discussion has arisen around these questions. Usually it has been taken for granted that rapid industrialization and economic development in general require positive and forceful government action.

There is equal danger that political theories may become an ideology, which either nationalizes all industries or, on the other side, condemns all government industry. The spirit of management is more important than the legality of ownership of the plant. There is no guarantee that a nationalized industry will evoke more care and responsibility on the side of the labour force; nor is there a guarantee that privately owned industry will be more efficient. As a matter of fact, there is little reason to stir up controversy, where in practice all sorts of constructions exist side by side. But there is indeed danger in the extreme positions. In newly industrializing countries very often the minimum economic size of a plant requires an amount of capital which cannot be obtained by a group of private individuals. In such cases the government must finance or help finance the enterprise. There are also public utilities where the governments must either interfere through extensive regulations, rate-

determination, etc., or finance and operate the plant as a public utility. As far as could be ascertained the differences are much greater in theory than in practice and there is more discussion of the slogans in the West than in Asia or Africa.

At the same time, in some consultations stress was laid upon the need of norms and programmes, which would facilitate a fruitful and lasting co-operation between foreign capital and management in respect of nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

This is understandable. In the past foreign enterprise was often linked—if only by origin—with a colonial administration. Anti-colonial propaganda has often linked so-called exploitation by government and by big business. While this is an obsolete concept there remains a need for positive norms and safeguards. A full discussion of this subject brings us to the topics considered in the next chapter on 'International Co-operation'. Indeed, private investment is generally considered one of the indispensable tools of economic aid, a tool therefore of international co-operation. Generally it takes the form of participation, by a large firm, in a project which the government also considers to be of general interest. Joint financing seems to provide a basis for more confidence on both sides. Thus, foreign private investment is already deeply involved in the internal economic and social situation. A second principle, now generally accepted, is the need for the training of nationals for responsibility in the common business enterprise. The whole philosophy of big business for the venture overseas has changed and it looks as if, through human relations and attitudes on both sides, more can be done than ever would have been possible through a legal code of investment.

Government and social development

Another field of consensus of opinion in the studies and consultations has been the obligation of governments to initiate programmes of social development. In community development and a variety of public services to peasants and rural people there is no difficulty. But it is here that the limitations of governmental action become clear. In the long run no government can stimulate development without active participation by the people themselves. The whole concept of community development has been born out of this insight. But how can a civil

service create a spirit of self-help and initiative? We have already indicated that the Christian churches and congregations have a great opportunity to encourage local social action. In areas where Christians are a small minority—and this is the rule rather than the exception—this means that their main hope is for governmental programmes which they can support with conviction and dedication.

Governments at the same time should search for voluntary agencies, willing to undertake what governments cannot or should not do. Both in villages and towns, and particularly for the vulnerable groups—women, children, young mothers, blind and handicapped. Here, governments would be helpless without the sacrifices made by voluntary agencies and a large number of voluntary workers. Christians have to find their place in this field.

Similarly, Christians must help to ensure that social legislation is enacted, kept up to date and implemented. This entails both political action and social education. Governments must determine carefully what kind of social measures could and can be taken in view of overwhelming needs and limited means.

XIV

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

THE tragic events of the first half of the twentieth century showed clearly that peace could not be based upon a system of political equilibrium, free trade and the gold standard. Nationalism, in its economic as well as its political and military aspects, proved too strong. It was clear that what was needed was international co-operation.

It was precisely for this purpose that the League of Nations was created after World War I. Deserted by the United States the ideal could not survive against the onslaughts of Italian, Japanese and German aggression, coupled with scepticism and lukewarm support by western Europe and Latin America. In the Great Depression two economic world conferences failed dismally. Then came World War II, and in 1945 the United Nations Organization was established.

Experience in the period of the League of Nations had shown that co-operation in the social and economic fields was easier than finding agreement on the political level. Indeed, the International Labour Office at Geneva and the International Agricultural Institute at Rome were examples of fruitful international co-operation. The allies, therefore, were already during the war preparing the ground for world-wide economic and social co-operation. The conference at Hot Springs (1944) resulted in the establishment of the Food and Agriculture Organization, that at Bretton Woods in the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank. Lack of food on a world level, violent price fluctuations of raw materials, and lack of international investment-funds, had indeed increasingly been the problems besetting the economists in the 'thirties'. Immediately after the war the inter-governmental organizations just mentioned were set up, as well as those for promoting health (World Health Organization) and education, science, and culture (UNESCO).

In the economic field painstaking efforts were made to establish an international trade organization, but these efforts failed. Nevertheless, international trade barriers and preferential systems were attacked through international, multilateral negotiations.

Already, in the period 1945-1950 all this involved more stress on agencies to promote active and positive international co-operation in a variety of economic, social and cultural fields. The tools for international co-operation became keener and more varied. On the other hand, the task proved to be much heavier than the founders of the United Nations and its specialized agencies could have foreseen.

The main factor complicating the prospects of world-wide international co-operation was the growing tension between 'communist' and 'capitalist' countries, spearheaded by the USSR and the USA respectively. The Soviet Union did not join the IMF or the Bank or FAO, and kept aloof from the international trade and tariff discussions. At the same time the newly independent nations in Asia and Africa joined with the Latin American countries in demanding a new deal in international economic affairs. Among other things they sought active support for, and the freedom to protect, their developing industries, and at the same time a free flow of their products to industrialized countries at stable and reasonable prices. They hoped for a persistent flow of investment capital in large amounts and, at the same time, insisted that they had full rights to nationalize foreign enterprises. The 'cold war' between two groups of white man's countries did not interest them deeply, except as a danger to their development programmes.

Meanwhile the United States had, through the Marshall Plan, poured huge resources into war-damaged European countries and contributed generously to a rapid reconstruction.

A last contribution to the rapidly changing concept of international relations was the now famous announcement by President Truman in Point 4 of his inaugural address, January 1949. Convinced that low income, developing countries needed above all advice on the application of modern techniques and methods of production, he expressed willingness to make this knowledge available. This notion of 'technical assistance' was very soon developed further by the 'expanded technical assistance programmes' of the United Nations, the 'Colombo Plan Organ-

ization' (mainly inside the Commonwealth of Nations), a variety of development instrumentalities by metropolitan European countries towards their overseas territories and 'communautés' and, last but not least, extensive bilateral programmes of 'mutual co-operation' between on the one hand the USA, the USSR, the Federal Republic of Germany, among others, and, on the other, practically all countries in Asia, the Middle East and Africa. These programmes—the expanded programme of the UN is a notable exception—generally matched capital goods and technical knowledge. Never has the world seen so many efforts in the field of international technical, economic or financial assistance.

It is not within the scope of this publication to review critically the variety of means of transferring and applying these goods and services. We are interested here in the human problems created or intensified in the process and—one hopes—also brought nearer to a solution.

Governments, nations and individual people in areas of rapid social change are involved in many ways in the whole phenomenon, its structure, *modus operandi*, size, and impact on specific situations.

Among features characterizing efforts in technical and financial assistance, the following seem to be the most important from a psychological and social angle.

(a) *Broad acceptance of the idea*

Within a decade the idea of international co-operation through the transfer or interchange of methods of production and organization of public life in a wide variety of ways, has spread and been accepted throughout almost the whole world, in all countries and regardless of the political situation. The prime movers and catalysts must have been particularly operative in this specific field. There is, on the one hand, a new vision of the interdependence of all human societies brought about by technical progress; and on the other hand, there is a new desire to improve production, to change social structures and to raise standards of living.

There are already definite legal obligations, based on the United Nations Charter. There are also regional treaties of mutual assistance—such as the Organization of American States, the Colombo Plan countries, the Warsaw Pact, the

European Economic Community, the European Free Trade Association, the Arab League, to mention a few.

But the strength of the idea is not confined to its legal foundation. The need, even the necessity, is generally accepted. Even where there are no legal obligations and not even an international agreement, nations and governments feel that they have a right to expect aid.

The motives of the 'rich' or 'donor' countries vary widely. Some are, or have been, purely strategic and diplomatic. The communist and the western nations watch what each does, and use economic aid as a tool in the diplomatic or economic cold war. In some cases governments and even nations could not continue to exist without a large amount of foreign aid. There are also strong feelings of economic interdependence, of the mutual advantage of developing human and material 'resources' at a rapid rate throughout the world. There is an increasing feeling of world solidarity.

On the low income, or 'receiving' side, motives are equally varied. There is the feeling that in the past the area and the people have been 'developed' for the benefit of others. Even if there has been mutual benefit this is often seen as 'exploitation', mainly on the ground that the native leaders were not equal partners in the deal, and were objects rather than subjects of 'development'.There is also the feeling that quarrels between the powerful nations might benefit the smaller, industrially underdeveloped countries, and that in the United Nations, under the 'one-member, one-vote' system, a group of small nations can by exercising pressure obtain wider benefits from international economic relations. There is also a direct relation between the idea of national independence and the idea of material and social progress. In other words, if a 'new deal' in the economic realm does not immediately follow the new national status, people are bitterly disappointed and apt to ask why the 'politicians' magic' did not work. Combined with this there is a widespread hope for new peaceful relations between the nations of the world and the establishment of new standards of human dignity and freedom.

The variety of these motivations means that the giving and receiving of foreign aid comes to be accepted as a normal relation between the nations.

(b) '*No strings attached*'

In most societies the self-regarding *do ut des* principle in human relations is widely accepted. It is therefore somewhat surprising to find that everybody claims to be giving 'without strings attached' or is willing to accept aid only if no strings are attached.

One of the reasons for this is the fear—not without foundation—of becoming entangled in the big controversy between the USA and the USSR. On both sides, only a limited number of countries have thought it wise to join a regional defence pact— in other words, join in an alliance with a very strong partner.

Another reason, in a number of cases, is that a country may feel that it is losing face or losing status, if an arrangement is made without clear obligations from both parties. Such an arrangement is taken to mean (in the *do ut des* philosophy) that there must be unknown or secret counter-commitments of an oppressive or degrading nature. In these circumstances it is face-saving to be able to say that no hidden obligations or commitments exist. The new concept of personal human dignity and national freedom often makes a pronouncement of this sort necessary. For this reason a loan is often more acceptable than a grant and even 'a soft loan' payable in the country's own currency—equivalent in the long run to hardly paying at all—may psychologically be preferable. The USSR disguises most of its 'economic co-operation treaties' in the form of a barter contract—a form facilitated by the system of state trading largely practised by the USSR.

Undoubtedly there is also a hidden mistrust, a refusal to believe that aid between nations can be given just for the sake of helping to raise standards of living and fighting hunger, disease and illiteracy. In these cases the formula 'no strings attached' simply means that the receiving nations accept a certain amount of aid without feelings of mutuality, mainly as a reward for clever manoeuvring between the great powers. The conclusion may well be that slogan and reality have little in common, and one must consider the phrase 'no strings attached' first of all as a defence in a relationship which should respect the freedom and dignity of all parties, but fails convincingly to do so.

(c) *The rights of small nations*

In international relations, traditionally, the rights of smaller and weaker parties, even if they are partners, are not protected. There is no world authority capable of ensuring law, order and protection of rights. The League of Nations, the International Court of Justice, even the United Nations, are but weak instruments for maintaining peace unless the big powers are determined to avoid war. The newly independent countries in Asia and Africa, as well as the nations of Latin America, look with awe at the prospect of two power *blocs* clashing in the holocaust of a Third World War. Out of self-protection, they disclaim —whenever possible—any commitment to either side.

In the United Nations and its specialized agencies—with the exception of the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank and its associates—the small nations insist upon the principle of 'one member—one vote'. Generally speaking, this has been accepted as a form of democracy. It must be emphasized that this practice is a complete novelty in international affairs.

At the same time there still is a strong tendency on the part of a large country to cultivate a cluster of weak partners as a method of expanding its sphere of influence. On both sides in the cold war these smaller partners of the opposing power are called 'satellites', but this term is strongly and understandably resisted by the smaller nations—the more so, if it might be applicable in certain cases of dependence on economic and military assistance.

It became clear in the 1960 session of the United Nations Assembly that the combined votes of the smaller nations—mainly from Asia, Africa and Latin America—could overrule either power *bloc*. This very fact may in future make for considerable change in international relations. In a sense the large and powerful nations are now as much dependent upon the wisdom and self-restraint of the small nations as was the reverse in the past.

(d) *The principle of multilateralism*

It is a widespread philosophy, mainly in the smaller countries, that the dangers of political, military or ideological entanglements can best be overcome by the principle of multilateralism. For that reason the United Nations and its agencies

are thought to be the best channels for international aid. A bilateral agreement would almost inevitably lead to domination by the stronger party, whether it was the USSR, the USA or one of the west European countries.

Among the larger nations multilateralism is not so popular. The USA and the USSR spend the main part of their resources for foreign aid bilaterally. Consequently most aid is received on the basis of a bilateral agreement.

The question arises, to what extent is bilateral aid dubious ethically or dangerous. In the first place, it brings the temptation to expect political benefits from the relationship. The case of the abortive application of the 'Eisenhower doctrine' to assistance to the Lebanon in 1958 is an example. That country nearly lost its existence and independence in the riots and civil war which followed. Secondly, it makes people expect specific ties of gratitude. In the United States especially, the idea is widespread that generous aid must inevitably make the country beloved among the beneficiaries. Bad human relations can therefore upset the objectives of the aid.

On the other hand, bilateral aid may establish direct relations between groups or organizations in both countries, and these relations may be more personal, more human, more fruitful than anonymous funds from a common pool. For instance, contacts with universities enable the International Co-operation Administration to organize certain parts of its programme in a direct, coherent, consistent manner. This facilitates the development of a team spirit among the 'experts' as well as among their 'counterparts' overseas.

Bilateral aid is very unevenly divided over the receiving countries, more so than multilateral aid through UN channels. However, even with country programming for the expanded technical assistance programme, there is no provision, for instance, for loans from the International Bank, the International Finance Corporation or the International Development Association (both linked with the Bank) to fit into a pattern of technical assistance or *vice versa*. The principle of multilateralism therefore does not automatically lead to a more equitable distribution of the available resources among participating countries. It is doubtful whether the United Nations and its agencies—about a dozen altogether are operating in this field—could absorb the amount, the personnel and the relationships created during a

period of over ten years, even if all countries agreed to channel their entire aid programme through the United Nations.

It is highly desirable, however, that the amounts of available multilateral aid should be increased, that the efficiency of organizing this aid should be further improved and, most of all, that the United Nations should act as a clearing-house for information and co-ordination of all aid. Also, the United Nations should relate forms of technical assistance and financial aid to the structure of the world economy, the terms of trade between raw materials and industrial products, the total flow of private and governmental capital, etc.

It is especially important for the following two categories of people that foreign aid should be run efficiently and should be well co-ordinated: the tax payers in contributing countries and the administrative and economic elite in the receiving countries. If these groups become thoroughly discouraged or tired of giving their money, time and interest, no system of international co-operation through technical assistance and economic aid is feasible. It is once more the human element which determines the successes and failures of the various programmes.[1]

(e) *The character of the 'expert'*

Experts sent out under any of the wide variety of programmes, be they governmental or non-governmental, under a bilateral or a multilateral agreement, have much in common. They are the personal conveyers of the idea of international co-operation. There are many thousands of them at work in every conceivable social structure and in fields covering all human activity. The international technical expert is a new category of prime mover, to be added to the merchant, the missionary, the colonial administrator. In fact, the expert has some of the features of all of these. He must combine efficiency in administration and technical alertness with missionary dedication. His function is never 'technical' in the material sense, he must first of all establish good communications with

[1] It is particularly unfortunate that the US Congress and administrators have put forward the idea that economic aid could directly contribute to the security of the USA in a military sense. It may—under the Mutual Security Act—have facilitated the raising of some extra billions of dollars, but it made the generosity of the US people suspect in many countries, especially in Asia.

the people in his new environment. He brings the spirit of his own culture and must harmonize it with that of the others.

In the newly established 'foreign aid relations' the expert is therefore a key person. His attitude and behaviour, both in his assignment and in his personal life, determine to a large extent the success of his mission. Technical competence is, of course, an important factor, but it is by no means the decisive one.[1]

In his strategy he must solve complicated psychological and organizational problems. His advice may support the views of some groups, but may well be considered dangerous or prove disadvantageous to other groups. One need only to think of problems of land tenure, or control of the monetary system, improved taxation methods, or the continuance or discontinuance of protectionist measures, to envisage the difficulties of choosing the right course.

Even more difficult will often be the reconciliation of economic and technical efficiency with patterns of belief (or 'superstition') and social structures which prevail in the society in which he is asked to work. He must, therefore, vicariously consider the value of his advice for the illiterate small peasant or the overburdened high official or the hard pressed cabinet member.

In general, the expert is sent only at the specific request of the receiving government. When he arrives much is expected of his experience, technical knowledge and wisdom. His time is short, especially under the rules of the United Nations. More often than not he does not speak the language and perhaps most of the reports and data are printed in the national language. Much of his success depends upon his counterpart in the receiving country.

More difficult, however, are his social contacts. He must refrain from politics and it may be very difficult to meet members of the opposition. He runs the danger of becoming absorbed by the small foreign colony—the diplomats, his colleagues.

He is met with a warmth of anticipation. Can he live up to it? One of his main duties is to make himself unnecessary, but no task is more difficult. The more successful he is in his technical mission, the more indispensable he may consider himself.

[1] R. S. Bilheimer, *Ethical Problems of Economic Aid and Technical Assistance*, Special Issue, Project Papers for the R.S.C. study Geneva, 1957.

On the other hand, if he meets with little success, he will be reluctant to shorten his assignment. The blame may fall on him rather than on the circumstances. And although he is met with warmth, there must remain an undercurrent of doubt whether this foreign expert can indeed find a solution to problems which baffle the national administrator. The more the expert's work reflects on major issues for the nation's well-being, the stronger will be the suspicion of meddling, at least in certain circles.

The enormous importance of 'technical assistance' brings into focus the human problems which confront the foreign expert. These remarks are not made to discourage the system of sending expert-advisers. But some measures seem essential. At the centres of activity even more co-ordination in programming and timing is needed. And even taking into account the acute shortage of personnel, more should be done to prepare prospective 'experts' for their arduous and important tasks. Continuity of assignment should be encouraged, for instance, by appointing a man to successive posts in Arabic or Spanish speaking countries rather than at random throughout the world. Team work can be strengthened by a more coherent 'home base' for a group of experts.

In missionary activities all these prerequisites for facilitating the communication between 'donor' and 'receiver' through the medium of the people sent, have long been recognized. Mission experience also shows that to find people who combine personal dedication with administrative efficiency is often difficult.

(f) *The foreign student*

If there is a flow of thousands of 'experts' into areas of rapid social change, there is also, to balance it, a flood of tens of thousands of 'trainees' or 'students' from these areas into industrialized countries. According to UNESCO statistics—at any given time over 100,000 students participate in the academic life of a foreign country. The majority come from Asia, Africa and Latin America. These huge numbers create problems for the authorities in the universities and research centres. More and more, specific institutions or courses are being organized to accommodate these students, as their needs differ substantially from those of the domestic ones. On the surface these students do not encounter the difficulties of the expert. But they, too,

are affected by international co-operation in a direct personal way. Let us assume that a particular student's mission, or his field of study, is as well prepared as that of the expert. He may then be expected to discover what social organization, or technique, or basic scientific knowledge will be of use when he returns home. Or will he? If he absorbs what he sees and hears in the United States or western Europe or Soviet Russia without critical evaluation, he will return home only to find that he has lost contact with his own society. The more he succeeds in his efforts towards 'acculturation' in his temporary new environment, the greater becomes this danger. If, however, he wants to pick out the best and leave aside the less useful or the useless, his task is as difficult as that of the 'expert' and he has to meet it at an age when such insight is not expected from his colleagues, either at home or abroad.

The result is very often that the student abroad is really not at home anywhere. He is attracted and repelled at the same time by both worlds. No wonder that many a young intellectual has returned home a revolutionary, rebelling against both past and present. These students return with an urge to create their *own* new world, not just to serve in a changing world to which they belong only in part, and they have this urge largely because this world has hurt them.

Again, during the last decade numbers have increased to an extent which makes the foreign trainee or student a mass phenomenon in Moscow as much as in Cambridge (UK and Mass. alike). But it is individual human relationships which they need most and—if they are sufficiently aware of their need—cherish most. To be met as a person, a man or a woman, and not as a phenomenon or a foreigner, is their desire. It follows that it is almost impossible to institutionalize these human relations.

Being met and treated as a personality rather than a specimen of a foreign culture also means that the sacrifices—financial and other—must to some extent be accepted as normal on all sides. The student or trainee should not be cradled or neglected; it is wrong, ethically and socially, to relieve him of all his financial, social or cultural troubles.

The desire to move out in a new world is, like any human motivation, fraught with ambiguity and temptation. But studying abroad is, for hundreds of thousands in our day, the road to deep and thorough emancipation from personal adolescence

and at the same time the preparation for a lifetime of service.

(g) *The flow of capital*

Part of the change in international co-operation is reflected in the activities of inter-governmental or governmental agencies, designed to channel capital into the low income countries. Up to World War II the provision of capital was mainly in the hands of private investors or was made anonymously through the main centres of banking and finance. Governments of the less developed countries, have been seeking financial support from the main financial centres for a long time.

The political and economic disturbances of two World Wars in one generation have largely cut the 'normal', nineteenth century pattern of the flow of capital. They have greatly reduced the willingness to invest personal savings in far away countries. They have at the same time led to an image of the financial world, which identifies 'colonialism', 'capitalism' and 'imperialism' and therefore has reduced the eagerness to absorb private capital. At least, in many countries measures have been taken which are designed to discourage much needed foreign capital. We have already touched upon this problem in the previous chapter.

As was said before, we cannot here deal with the organizational aspects of the manifold channels of investment from abroad in the areas of rapid social change. But we must touch upon some of the social and political implications.

Gone are the easy ways of the nineteenth century. A government cannot just ask a bank in New York, London or Zürich to place its bonds on the market and then use the money as it wishes. Nor can a business executive from Amsterdam or Dundee—perhaps even under the protection of his own flag—establish a plantation, sink a mine or set up a factory.

Loans can generally be obtained only for specific purposes and their use is—as is the case with the International Bank—subject to some sort of supervision. The decision as to whether a country is 'credit worthy' and should or might borrow lies outside the jurisdiction of the borrowing country to a far greater degree than it did before World War II.

Investments generally can be made only after prolonged negotiations with governments. Conditions are laid down concerning participation from public or private sources in the

country of settlement. Very often there are clauses guaranteeing the training of, and responsible jobs for, local people.

In theory everybody is agreed that only a combination of public and private channels (very broadly speaking, for the social and economic infra-structure and for direct production respectively) can satisfy the urgent need for capital. In actual practice in many countries the flow of capital is seriously handicapped by political, social and psychological obstacles. It falls to us, as part of our common responsibility, to facilitate international co-operation in this vital field of human activity.

A world economy

Economic uncertainty and instability, balance of payments difficulties and inflationary pressure under conditions of under-utilization of economic resources, are perhaps a greater obstacle to sound international co-operation than anything else. Often, in a strange and complex pattern they frustrate the flow of capital and the exchange of goods and services.

Economically and financially the post-war world is divided into more small compartments than at any time since the industrial revolution in Europe began to make strong economic relations with other continents a necessity. True, for a number of agricultural products prices have been less fluctuating than before World War II and for the main minerals big business has a direct interest in price stability. But changes in the terms of trade between industrial products and raw materials remain a constant danger to the primary commodities. And in many cases the threat of over-production and huge unsold stocks cannot be met by stock piling in the United States. Coffee is an example, where production over the last seven years has expanded much more quickly than consumption.

Representatives of Latin America and Asia (until very recently Africa had less interest and no voice) have repeatedly asked the intergovernmental agencies for devices for the protection of their economies through stabilization of prices or by safeguarding their exports. So far a variety of committees has met and various proposals have been made, but no adequate solution has yet been found.

In the field of so called commodity arrangements (wheat, sugar, tin, rubber, and the like) there have, since 1946 when the matter came up in relation to the proposed International Trade

Organization, been few occasions when the interests and insights of the USA and the UK have coincided. And as was clearly shown during and after the short-lived Korea boom, producers want an agreement when prices are falling and consumers when they rise. And in a period of relative stability—the best time to have the interests and minds meet—there is little political urgency.

After World War II, for a long time, most nations wrestled with a shortage of dollars to buy in North America. Whereas this shortage in Europe was largely relieved by rapid economic development, there have recently been signs that the United States will have to increase its exports or reduce its foreign commitments. While this paradoxical phenomenon developed, the needs of the areas of rapid social change remained at a high level. One answer is that newly prosperous western Europe should take a larger share of the burden in helping the industrially underdeveloped countries.

In the framework of the United Nations various regional commissions have dealt with economic instability in their respective areas at length and in detail. They have, however, no agencies for suggesting or operating remedial measures. These must be looked for at a world level. Basically this unity of approach has not yet been found.

The Churches and international co-operation

In the ecumenical movement, since World War II, the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA) has had the task of studying and pursuing international problems. Peace is its main concern, but the commission has well understood that political tensions are closely linked with economic and social world problems. In its relations with the United Nations and its specialized agencies, CCIA has always stressed the need for generous and well-organized technical assistance, for the creation and expansion of capital funds in order to make sure of economic and social development and for stabilization of the markets for primary products.

In the studies on rapid social change there have been a variety of voices from the areas, pointing out the hazards of the international economic situation and asking for solidarity and co-operation. The main call came from the First Assembly of the

East Asia Christian Conference at Kuala Lumpur, May 14-24, 1959.[1]

Three conferences on European soil[2] (Arnoldsheim 1956, Odense 1958 and Salonica 1959) have dealt extensively with the responsibility of nations, governments, churches, enterprises and individual people of the West with regard to international co-operation.

These conferences were united in stating their conviction that the strengthening of ties with the people in areas of rapid social change is a primary responsibility of all Christians elsewhere. They base their conviction on the need to share with others any material wealth accumulating in industrial society, but also on the biblical concept of stewardship for all that modern man has received from God—a field much wider than any conceived of in the past: stewardship not only of our personal possessions but also of our social organization and the natural resources of the earth. In combination these call for partnership in the development and utilization of the world's resources.

The task before us

In spite of rapid progress in a short span of time, it is obvious to any objective observer that international co-operation is far from satisfactory. In an attempt to point to a realistic goal, I am well aware of the fact that conditions change very rapidly and this analysis may well be obsolete by the time it is published. In that there would be nothing but rejoicing.

First of all, the whole system of international technical, economic and financial co-operation is insufficiently co-ordinated. No coherent system of international flow of capital goods, raw materials and financial resources has been established. Perhaps this is the most serious handicap to rapid economic progress.

Secondly, the sources of assistance are widely spread over national and international agencies and many individual projects have little effect because they are insufficiently supported

[1] *The Witness of the Churches amidst Social Change in Asia.*

[2] *The Responsible Society in National and International Affairs*, Record of a Conference at Arnoldsheim, Germany, July 9–14, 1956, Division of Studies, WCC, Geneva. *The Specific European responsibilities in relation to Africa and Asia*, Record of a consultation at Odense, Denmark, August 8–11, 1958, Department on Church and Society, WCC, Geneva. *Dilemmas and Opportunities*, Report of the Ecumenical Study Conference, Thessalonica, Greece, July 25 - August 2nd, 1959, Part III, WCC, Geneva.

and undergirded by simultaneous complementary measures. A new approach to the flow of students, trainees, experts, and capital must be devised.

Thirdly, there is a very serious lack in well trained 'cadre' at most levels—with the exception in many countries of the highest level—necessary to bring to fruition the possibilities opened up by international co-operation and national effort.

Fourthly, the flow of capital and experience is not great enough to supplement the national effort. From the present level of about $4 billion annually, the total amount of developmental aid needs to rise to about $7-8 billion, almost double the present figure.

Fifthly, in the present organizational set-up there are insufficient safeguards to ensure active participation by recipient countries in decision making and planning for the country.

To a large extent these deficiencies are recognized by all concerned and continuous efforts are made to remedy the shortcomings. But the number of people and the importance of the groups belonging to the 'all concerned' is too small. Too many people believe this to be the territory of bureaucrats, nationally and internationally. Too few people are really concerned about the magnitude, the efficiency, the coherence and the psychological effects of the very large number of ongoing programmes.

What has been said is equally relevant to public opinion in receiving and donor countries. And it should not be forgotten that in specific instances, countries in Asia, the Middle East and Latin America have as much to give as they have to receive. International co-operation rather than giving by a few rich nations is the essence of the matter.

PART III

THE COMMON RESPONSIBILITY

INTRODUCTION—ATTITUDES AND ACTION

THE rapid social change study of the World Council of Churches was launched in 1955 as an enquiry into a common responsibility of all men and women. It would be based upon the Christian faith and would put specific responsibilities upon churches and Christians all over the world, but it would include non-Christians as well, governments and private business alike.

Are people ready to accept a common responsibility? The answers differ greatly and it seems worthwhile to give careful attention to the meaning of this responsibility.

First of all, to what extent can we be responsible for the action or inaction of earlier generations? This question is not to be taken too lightly, especially if this action had international repercussions. Here, especially in so-called colonial or pseudo-colonial relations, there appears to be a rather general dodging of responsibilities. It is quite permissible to soften judgments of the past in the light of a generally prevailing ethical or social climate, or the level of knowledge and technology. It is not permissible to sentimentalize history in order to establish a clearcut picture in black and white.

In our analysis we saw how the same historical events can be described by one side as a holy mission, by the other as a brutal attack. It is very easy to establish the collective guilt, neglect or backwardness of other nations. It is most difficult to acknowledge the shortcomings of one's own nation. And if the facts speak too loudly, there is still an excuse by heaping the burden upon a minority in one's own society (the capitalists, eager for profit, old feudal bureaucracies, feuds between ancient rulers).

It is not very helpful, however, to accuse past generations in one's own or in foreign countries. Responsibility for the present does not rise out of 'the sins of the fathers', although it becomes

heavier when we consider our heritage from the past, good, bad and indifferent. It arises rather out of the call of the present, and looks ahead to future action.

There is, however, very often among church members a reluctance to accept this responsibility. This aloofness is born out of a sense of futility concerning the efforts of individuals, small groups, or weaker nations in world affairs. This feeling resembles, to a certain degree, the views of pagans and animists, looking upon the fierce fights of the gods, fights which may very well mean life or death for thousands of mortals.[1] There is often an overwhelming sense of the inadequacy of all human action in view of the misery, hunger and suffering of untold millions. Responsibility, in order to be meaningful, must stand in some proportion to the possibilities of effective action.

[1] In this respect it would be interesting and instructive also to compare the changing religious motivations for action in society in Islam.

XV

TOWARDS NEW LOYALTIES AND SOLIDARITIES

In the process of social change we should give careful attention to changing fields and forms of solidarity and loyalty. In traditional society commonly the highest virtue of the individual person is group solidarity and loyalty towards the ideas and common convictions of the group. We have already encountered this as a powerful force holding the old society together and putting a brake on any attempts to change.

During the processes of social change the loyalty towards the old norms is weakened or shattered and group solidarity changes in nature. As set out by sociologists, in traditional society men and women live their whole lives in the group into which they were born. Most groups are based upon birth rather than choice, upon biological rather than social or ethical origin. They were called by Tönnies, community ('Gemeinschaft') rather than society ('Gesellschaft').

At times it has appeared as if group solidarity would move only in one direction, away from 'community' into 'society', from ancestral and traditional ties to choice. This trend was strongest during rationalist periods in Europe, especially when religious wars were found to be senseless. The twentieth century, if not showing a reversal of that trend, at least shows an unexpected come-back of certain forms of 'community'. In Europe and, to a lesser degree, also in the USA, the twentieth century has shown an intensification of both solidarities. On the one hand, communist ideology asks for full commitment of the total man to a choice-bound association of people. To a lesser degree labour unions and political parties require solidarity, once the choice has been made. But, on the other hand, the replacement, by the nation state, of earlier forms of political organization, mostly dynastic states of various structures, requiring general education into patriotism, led to an outburst of community

discipline and loyalty, unknown in earlier times in the political field, except in an emergency.

Where the two meet, and the state itself becomes ideological, as for example in Nazi, Fascist and Communist regimes, it is shown clearly that the two types of loyalty do not necessarily clash. On the contrary, if cleverly manipulated, the two streams of feeling of solidarity can be made to reinforce one another.

In the West few societies have entirely escaped this new demand for conformity to the ideals and goals of society, embodied in the modern state. At the same time the possibilities for starting and joining functional groups have increased in a spectacular way, mainly because of improved means of communication.

In the countries of rapid social change, old and new have equally made their claim on man's solidarity and loyalty. Undoubtedly nationhood, in the form of the nation state, makes the most universal and most pressing demand. As in the West, this is most clamant in times of emergency and the status of 'non-selfgoverning territory', as well as the early years of national independence, are felt keenly as a national emergency.

With the notable exception of China and adjoining communist republics, there is no general tendency to link national solidarity to monopolistic ideological or religious claims.

We have already dealt extensively with the call for responsible citizenship within the national framework and at this point we only wish to emphasize the legitimacy of loyalty to the nation within the framework of responsible society. But some of the problems of nationhood itself are involved.

In a number of cases it is a difficult task to unite the people living within given political or administrative boundaries into the common feeling of nationhood. To some extent the difficulty arises out of a strong 'sense of belonging' to a smaller unit ('ethnic group') within the new nation.

Many western countries have, or have had, similar problems of friction, tension and even clashes because of regional loyalties. Where language and/or religion differ sharply, these tensions are felt more acutely. Few European countries are so homogeneous that local loyalties play no role of importance in national life. The same exists, as one would expect, in the new nation states in Asia, the Middle East and Africa. It appears more

below the surface in a number of countries in the western hemisphere.

Not much, however, is gained by a pure statement of fact or a perhaps more subtle historical comparison. In some of the new states of Asia and Africa, the problems are overwhelming because of the sudden enlargement of the old 'ultimate societies' through schools (especially higher education), economic relations (labourers in mines and factories) and, above all, the creation of the new independent state. Some churches have narrow linguistic or territorial boundaries. To them it may be most difficult to see the larger whole. Where does the Christian stand in the turmoil between the old tribal and the new national claims for loyalty? To what extent can and must he apply rules of parliamentary democracy, including the protection of linguistic minorities or the maintenance of local culture?

There are also loyalties over-arching nation states. One of the most important of these is in the realm of racial relations. In present day situations racial tension and strife are most vociferous where a 'white' minority possesses the dominant position, politically, economically and socially. But racial tensions are not always distinguishable from ethnic tensions, where smaller anthropological and cultural differences may well lead to estrangement.

A very special case, where race or ethnic group and religion play a vital, or rather a deadly role in human relations is in anti-semitism, long the curse of Christianity. Since the establishment of the state of Israel, Arab solidarity (again a combination of ethnic group, religion and historic interest) has sprung up against this new state. Although one could not call this anti-semitism in the European sense, it has all the significant marks of unyielding loyalty to one's own community.

All of these loyalties are of the 'community' type. Class solidarity and other loyalties based upon the 'society' type of organization have less rapidly, and generally less drastically developed in the areas of rapid social change. It is not certain, however, that this will remain the case.

If Westerners express the desire to spare the newly developing nations the misery, tensions and strife of the first century of industrial development, they hope that the functional solidarities and loyalties in the new nations will remain subordinated to 'national interests' or to 'the common good'. To some extent this

may happen, but it is almost inevitable that social and political differences, and even cleavages will develop once the new nation is firmly established and economic development is well under way.

In some countries, notably in Africa, there is a tendency to play down the danger of economic and social differentiation by avoiding the term 'class' for certain social groups. But differentiation on a functional basis in society is unavoidable. In many Latin American countries the social dichotomy between poor, illiterate masses on the land (and in the slums of sprawling cities) and a small group of highly educated business-men and political leaders is very marked and is becoming a major factor in socio-political life. Yet it has not (yet?) given rise to class hatreds in the way in which these developed in Europe in the nineteenth century and were brought to a climax in the Russian and Chinese communist revolutions.

It remains to be seen to what extent the internationalizing of the basic conflicts of loyalty in the 1960's, will bring about social developments different from those which arose from the industrial revolution in Europe.

In the international field solidarities have developed among the Afro-Asian nations, among the Latin American, and also among west European and among east European countries. These political associations are generally based upon choice rather than on 'natural' or 'historical' community. It is important that our irrational age should see in each of these political associations or international groupings, the desire to strengthen the measurable advantages of such a getting together by the myth of a belonging together.

It may well be that one or more of these associations, based upon mutual advantage, will grow into a stronger but less tangible unity based upon common heritage or ideals. In history one outstanding example of a 'brotherhood of nations' existed in the idea of Christendom. Here—most explicitly, perhaps, in the Congress of Vienna, 1815—the Christian Church, or at least a code of ethics derived from Christianity, was considered to be the underlying ethos of a political association of conservative European powers. The broadening of the political scene to a world-wide panorama of 'non-Christian', 'Christian' and 'post-Christian' nations destroyed the 'Christendom' idea. But it did so only after the disastrous consequences of linking the Gospel with a political system had become clear and in

many places had resulted in resistance to Christianity as a western phenomenon or—even worse—as a tool in the hands of imperialist governments.

It can be assumed that any such mythical basis for a 'Eurafrika' will prove to be too weak for any political structure, even a temporary one. However, in the countries of the Warsaw Pact, as well as in the NATO grouping, continuous efforts are made to undergird the political structure with the myth not only of an historic mission, but of a spiritual basis. There is slightly more but, in my opinion, still insufficient basic unity to weld the eighteen or twenty western European countries together into a united Europe.

Nevertheless, these attempts at developing inter- and supranational solidarities are not lost on the new nations of Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America. It appears that rational, economic, technical, even strategic considerations, are insufficient to hold the attention and devotion of the masses in furthering specific political aims. Therefore emotional, irrational ingredients are mixed with rational main motives. Unfortunately, these emotional appeals generally have as their main common element the conditioning of people into fear, contempt and hate towards real or imaginary enemies. This formula has been repeated, and often very successfully, in all parts of the world. 'The Jews' filled that role both for Hitler and for the Arab nations, the 'American Warmongers' for the communist countries, 'the Dutch' for Indonesia, the 'Kremlin rulers' for a large part of the North Atlantic powers. It is of great importance that the landslide of social change since the First World War should occur in a world situation when there is a return to irrational, 'community-type' associations between nations and groups. This in many cases has facilitated the transfer of political power, but at the same time it has dealt a mortal blow to efforts along rational democratic lines aimed to make this world a more peaceful place.

If reason has failed to put order into the conflicting claims of loyalty, what has been and could be the effect of religion on human loyalties?

In many cases, of course, religion was solely a part of national culture and wars between people were wars between gods. But allegiance could change and philosophical tolerance prevailed. Only in the case of religions of revelation, and a belief in one universal God, could there be an absolute call to loyalty on the

basis of an absolute claim to truth. But even here the belief in a universal God may not be strong enough to prevent earthly loyalties from gaining the upper hand.

There have been, and still exist, various attempts to make 'Christianity', 'the Church', 'religion', 'Christian principles', or 'Christian civilization', an object of loyalty for Christians and a rallying point for group solidarity. So it comes about that the eternal truth of the Gospel, the command to love God above all, and the promises of the Holy Spirit for the renewal of human and social life, are embedded in human theories and institutions.

A 'Christian community', however, or any other solidarity based upon religion, may have much in common with the worldly 'community' into which one is born, in which one lives and dies. The continued existence, over many centuries, of a variety of religious groups in Asia and the Middle East is based upon these premises. Sociologically, western missions made a breach in an unwritten but understood covenant when they not only recognized fellow Christians in the Near East or South India, but started to incorporate non-Christians or, even worse, Christians, into their new churches. Hence the resistance against 'proselytism'. As long as one is born a Christian or a Jew, but not made into one, even Islam is tolerant.

As we have seen in our analysis of social change, individual choice is made difficult by traditional society and a personal conversion is more of a miracle than a religious mass movement.

In the realm of changing loyalties today, race, nation and class make extravagant claims for loyalty on the individual's mind, soul and body. To the Church, in so far as these take the place of God in their demand for obedience, they are idols. But in the world of today it is not enough to point out the danger of enslavement to ideologies. We must recognize that loyalties to human social institutions, whether these are of the 'community' or the 'society' type, are part of man's life in this world. They are only to be limited by other loyalties and most of all by loyalty to the rule of God.

It must be part of our common Christian responsibility to study very carefully, in the light of the Gospel, the various conflicting, but all highly demanding claims for loyalty. This indeed is not only a problem for Churches and Christians in areas of rapid social change; it is one of the most pressing ones in every dynamic society.

XVI

ETHICAL DECISIONS IN RAPID SOCIAL CHANGE

In a process of rapid social change people are inevitably and frequently confronted with decisions of a crucial nature. The Thessalonica Conference called them 'dilemmas and opportunities'.[1]

Many of these choices are of an economic nature and might be considered ethically neutral. However, economic choices often have an element of stewardship over nature and, more important still, over people, including oneself. These choices are therefore made under God's command to love him above all and one's neighbour as oneself. As a rule the choice of the most economic solution—aiming at maximum result from minimum effort—is not contrary to, but rather in line with good stewardship. But it takes a very keen sense of values in adding and comparing costs and benefits, if one is to make the right judgement. Economists know that the calculation from the point of view of society as a whole differs substantially from reasoning on an individual basis.

Choices in the realm of organization, involving the transfer of duties, responsibilities and privileges or rewards to other people, are more obviously a matter of stewardship and ethical decision. Management in business and government cannot afford to leave out of account the circumstances of other people. Questions of the freedom and restriction of freedom of people are directly connected with the choices made in business, government and organized mass society. Here again it can be argued that right insight and value judgment will inevitably lead to the

[1] *Dilemmas and Opportunities*, Christian action in rapid social change, Report of the International Ecumenical Study Conference, Thessalonica, Greece, issued by the World Council of Churches, Department on Church and Society, Geneva, 1959.

best solution from an ethical, as well as from an efficiency point of view. But even if this were true, it would still be necessary to compare the results from the point of view of both types of insight.

Other choices are in the realm of personal taste and inclination and benefits obtained from the right choice may be thankfully accepted as part of God's grace. Again, in a society complicated by innumerable interrelations and secondary effects, or agitated by the impact of a complex of 'prime movers', the chances are that a new freedom of choice for one group may limit the freedom of choice for others.

In these three fields of human action and behaviour ethical decisions are often disguised or hidden beneath more obvious motivations such as result, reward, profit, efficiency, pleasure or satisfaction.

It is one of the main concerns of the churches to reveal the ethical responsibilities involved in technical choices. But how can they fulfil this essential task? On theological grounds alone one could say that there are no absolute laws to be laid down in the field of ethical decisions and even the cleverest casuist cannot overcome this hurdle. In the social sphere it is even easier to see the immense difficulties in the way of any effort by non-technicians to unravel the complexities of economic, social or political patterns of behaviour.

Here is a field where ecumenical study and action can help. In many cases the study on rapid social change and related activities undertaken by the World Council of Churches and other ecumenical bodies has brought together people of various walks of life. In these discussions the main result was often the shock of seeing the effect of one's own hitherto unchallenged attitudes on the well-being of others.

With all due respect to the theologians for their contribution to the study and to the awakening of the conscience of the layman, the ecumenical movement is full of examples where the layman, through his analysis and criticism of the social situation, has awakened the theologian.

Of course this need for close co-operation between Christians from a wide variety of ways of life, nationalities and churches is not confined to the process of rapid social change. But these processes have a profound influence on the intensity and scope of new choices, new attitudes, new conscientious behaviour.

Choice depends upon opportunity

The area of 'choice' suddenly widens as new opportunities open up. It is in the interplay of forces leading to and emanating from rapid social change that these new opportunities become realities in the life of people. A few illustrations, already mentioned in this volume, may suffice.

Trade, industry, mining, urbanization processes create new labour opportunities. This may happen close to or far away from the homes of the people. The first and crucial choice is whether a man or a family should join the army of wage earners. This decision may be forced upon a man by low income or even starvation in the village, or by the obligation to earn money in order to pay taxes. But once the first big step is taken, a host of new ethical decisions have to be made by the husband and wife. How can family life be maintained or safeguarded? What is in the best interest of the children? Can a man, alone or rather as one of a crowd in town life, refrain from adultery or from falling prey to prostitutes or indulging in drinking bouts? The statement in a United Nations Report[1] that labourers in the new African towns often look for a 'substitute wife', 'second wife' or 'temporary wife', in its attempt to state the facts in ethically neutral terms, reveals something of the tragic ethical dilemma.

The introduction of western style schools and training facilities open up opportunities for fresh kinds of jobs for those who manage to fit in with the new economic and social conditions. The choice of a job often confronts a man with a straightforward ethical decision. The whole system of marks and grades is geared to economic reward from individual effort. Naturally university students tend to concentrate on jobs in towns, for these, if not economically more rewarding, are at least socially and culturally more attractive. Is there any call for service in the rural areas, emanating from the schools and training institutes?

In Japan, as early as the beginning of the Meiji period around 1875, a non-Christian government made rules obliging beneficiaries of free education to work and serve in the rural areas. In other countries a measure of this nature is frowned upon as a

[1] *Social implications of industrialization and urbanization in Africa south of the Sahara*, International African Institute (under the auspices of UNESCO), London, 1956.

restriction on individual freedom in choosing a job.

Ethical decisions appear to be involved at at least two levels. The first is in the realm of individual personal dedication. To what extent can the churches and the ecumenical movement challenge people to serve? When I visited Japan in 1957, in the context of the rapid social change study, I found a couple from Tokyo dedicating years of their life to rural development in the mountains of northern Japan. Here, there was no government compulsion and the spiritual and social effects of their action accordingly exceeded the normal impact of a dedicated government official.

At face value the work of missionaries coming from overseas should have a similar effect. But, in general, institutionalized missions and government services are more or less equivalent, in the eyes of the people in the village, and the giving, the care, the dedication, cannot easily be demonstrated. The ethical decision behind making oneself available for service overseas, as a missionary or as an expert in the service of a government or the United Nations, is often overshadowed by the institution one serves.

This points to the level of decision-making on an ethical basis in an organizational framework. What measures can a government take to ensure an equitable distribution of economic, social, educational and medical services for all the inhabitants of the country, in town and village alike? Must it rely on economic incentives? Could it allow a degree of compulsion? And in what manner must other institutions—among which the mission boards are prominent, followed by the technical assistance agencies—develop their pattern of activities? At this level the problem of spiritual and social communication with the common people is of paramount importance. Even if the spirit of service and dedication is beyond question, there may be a rift between officials or foreign experts and the people.

Thus, the choice of a job and the service to one's fellow man in and through daily work is of utmost importance and should be a matter of direct, ethical decision.

In the chapter on family life we found that the structure and the function of the family is very resilient and not easily affected by social changes. Yet the freedom of choice of a partner in marriage is often dramatically widened in and through rapid social change. It may change from a head-of-family decision to a choice by the young people themselves. Rules of exogamy

(the tradition forcing a young man to find a bride outside a defined group of relatives) or endogamy (reversely, the rule that a bride can only be found within a close circle of relatives) are often broken with impunity and cease to operate. Again, the scope for freedom of choice widens substantially.

At the same time young people, before and after marriage, miss the sheltering environment which their parents knew. More and more the decisions in their relations with one another become a matter of ethical choice.

Each novelty asks for acceptance or rejection, in the social as well as in the technical field. The introduction of money—to a wage earner as well as to a peasant producing for the world market—makes expenditure patterns more flexible. What uses of money will be selected?

Some criticism of people's behaviour in a low income situation is their high propensity to consume, in other words—the low level of saving and investment. Yet, when many essential needs are still unfulfilled, no other attitude could be expected. In her very detailed study of spending habits among Africans in Nairobi (Kenya) Mrs Forrester enquired how people would spend their 'additional income' if suddenly they earned more. She also studied how people actually spent their money when they had a little more than necessary for their basic needs. Priorities in both cases were rather similar—better education for the children, improvement of the house in the village. Also in the dreams of such people investment in the savings bank loomed large, but in actual reality there was a more direct and tangible use of the money. Mrs Forrester, on the whole, found little evidence of extravagance or waste.

It cannot be denied that spending for spurious ends or for status improvement is often met with in situations of rapid social change. Imitation of western standards of consumption or ways of life is most frequently the cause of this very common human behaviour. It is just as common in modern western society.

Economists have often explained the basic difference between modern society and traditional tribal or village life as a transition from limited to unlimited needs.[1] And others have indicated

[1] J. H. Boeke, *Economics and economic policy of dual societies, as exemplified by Indonesia*, Haarlem 1953. J. S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, Cambridge, 1948.

that the demonstration effect of higher standards of living is a necessary prerequisite for the operation of economic motivations in the transitional period.[1]

Obviously, for the nations and the churches in areas of rapid social change, ethical decisions in personal and social life are at the root of this complex problem.

The first generation of capitalist business executives in western Europe, in puritan North America, and also in Japan and India, lived a frugal life. The larger part of their earnings was reinvested in their enterprise. Conspicuous personal spending would only become more prevalent in the third generation —with many counterbalancing social and spiritual forces operating towards responsible stewardship over acquired wealth.

The newly developing business executive class, in many countries in an early stage of industrial development, finds itself in a world where only through conspicuous spending can they join the privileged groups (landowning gentry, merchants, their colleagues in the West).

Similarly, the type and level of spending on a governmental level must often be called 'conspicuous consumption'. The new nations enter an expensive international world, with representatives of ambassadorial rank in all the main cities, with an excessive number of international meetings and conferences. Here again, a small nation often feels obliged to spend more than it can reasonably afford, and much more than western countries at a comparable level of economic development, say a century ago, would have had to spend.

The 'demonstration effect' of spending by others has, since World War II, also entered the enormously expanded field of technical assistance. At this point the United Nations were forced to set levels of income and status comparable to those necessary to attract Americans for service in the USA governmental programmes. And the latter level was extremely high —far beyond, for example, the level of civil servants in colonial administration. It is hard to see how this could have been altogether avoided, but the foreign expert brought, in his own pattern of consumption, the highest and the lowest levels of material living into direct contact.

This is a facet in the process of rapid social change, a powerful

[1] R. Nurkse, *Problems of capital formation in underdeveloped countries*, Oxford, 1953/55.

'prime mover' in changing the attitudes of people, but it poses ethical problems of a vital and urgent nature[1], far beyond their political or social implications.[2]

Ethical decisions obviously have to be taken on all sides. How can nations and inter-governmental organizations proceed with their deeply penetrating 'technical assistance' without upsetting valuable social traditions? How can churches and ecumenical action programmes resist the temptation of assuming the trappings of over-organization in joining 'extravagant' worldly institutions, or the perils of isolation from them?

How can people from the 'West', especially when it concerns families with educational needs for their children, live responsibly in a low income environment? How can they maintain personal and social communication with such widely different worlds as South-East Asia or Africa south of the Sahara on the one hand and North America on the other hand?

How can the people of the low income countries, in government, in church and mission, in industry, build up a meaningful personal and socio-cultural relationship with the high income parts of the world, the latter even penetrating into their own economic and social life? This problem could indeed be solved by the natural leaders of the old communities, who had acquired status and dignity in their own world, more easily than by students, young diplomats or political leaders.

In respect of 'standards of living', limited or unlimited needs, Christians all over the world are confronted with ethical decisions of a far-reaching nature. Professor Wendland, a member of the working committee on church and society of the World Council of Churches, in his recent book[3] calls the uncertainty in understanding the meaning of 'following Christ' one of the greatest difficulties in our life today. He makes this statement in relation to asceticism and frugality in an age of affluence. The idea of 'plain living' as an accompaniment to 'high thinking' fits more easily into early Hindu or Buddhist philosophy than into the Christian Gospel. We are free to enjoy the results of

[1] R. Bilheimer, *Ethical Problems of Economic Aid and Technical Assistance*, Special Issue, Project Paper for the RSC Study, Geneva, 1957.

[2] One does not have to accept the situations described in '*The Ugly American*', (by J. Lederer and E. Burdick, New York, October 1958) as reality, to see how important the latter are.

[3] H. D. Wendland, *Botschaft an die soziale Welt*, Hamburg, 1959, Chapter VII, 'Evangelium und Askese'.

science and technology as coming to us through the grace of God. But are we free to enjoy them in the face of the misery, hunger, illness and illiteracy suffered by hundreds of millions of our fellow citizens, in the growing awareness that these discrepancies are of human making and are not inevitable?

A paradoxical situation is developing. Fifty years ago, by and large, people in Asia and Africa accepted their low economic and social status—even in a caste system, or in servitude on the land—as inevitable, part of the overarching destiny of man as a child of nature. First thousands, now millions of them, soon hundreds of millions of these people are waking up to the idea that they have a right to share with other people wealth and the fruits of power over nature.

On the other hand, fifty years ago in western countries, by and large, people were convinced that science and technology would, through a rational behaviour of people in society, stamp out misery, backwardness and oppression. At present, after two world wars, there is more scepticism about the structure of world society, there is more inclination to find the more developed parts of the world threatened by the under-privileged parts, and less sense of a mission in the technical and organizational field.

Indeed, the impact of rapid social change is perhaps at no point more powerful than in the growing discrepancy between the exuberant growth of expectations, desires and claims from the under-privileged countries and groups and the means to fulfil these expectations. Yet a rapidly growing world society, if it is to maintain even a precarious but precious peace, must provide a balance between justifiable requirements and available means.

It would be contrary to the Gospel as well as to the western spirit, if this problem were left to blind economic and political forces, and kept outside the realm of world-wide social ethics.

Our age of interdependence involves the need to develop a common Christian understanding of rights and wrongs in the structure of the world economy.

Christians have no easy answers to these involved problems. Yet they have two essential contributions to make. First of all, the Gospel pronounces a very stern judgement on man's inner selfish motivations and leaves no one complacent about his

daily pattern of behaviour and living. Each day the Word of God lives among men, revealing and cleansing.

But secondly it does provide the basis for mutual trust and confidence in the intentions of the fellow man, in the exchange of information, insights and motivations. How rare is this privilege in human relationships! Here again, the study gave an unexpected opportunity, often in a situation which seemed hopelessly confused. Many people have given testimony to this fact as a ray of hope in a dark world.

XVII

THE COMMON CHALLENGE

We have been discussing the choices and dilemmas, the opportunities and dangers inherent in rapid social change. We should not forget that the ethical challenge, the call for decision to be made by men and women, by young and old, experienced leaders and striving youth is common to *all* humanity. In our age identical prime movers operate in all societies and cause social changes everywhere. The same catalyzing forces cause ferment in the heart of people, in family life and in the wider circles of society and of the nations all over the world. The same inhibiting factors cause friction, the same symptoms of change occur in the so-called West as occur in the so-called East.

There are differences. As we have seen, the shorter space of time given to people in Asia and Africa causes the speed of change to become almost qualitatively different from the changes in western Europe and North America. It has therefore a special meaning in our dynamic age to talk about areas of rapid social change.

But there is at the same time ample reason to devote the final chapter of this book to the common challenge to people, and particularly Christians, all over the world and in every type of society. Some of these common challenges are the same though under a different disguise. A comparison of the so-called highly developed countries with societies in transition will reveal the common need for responsible emancipation, for human dignity, for social justice, for freedom, for responsible citizenship, for solidarity. In the study projects and discussions on the common responsibilities towards (or in) areas of rapid social change, these same needs were to be found again and again in a wide variety of circumstances. These factors are all attributes of responsible society; they are a visible sign of the needs of a worldwide humanity under the rule of God.

Through the yearnings of a suffering humanity and the strivings of a hopeful humanity it is possible to detect today, throughout the world, the birth pangs of a new society. The witness and life of Christians and churches must help to make and keep this world a habitable place, even under the stresses and strains of rapid technological and social change.

Responsible emancipation

The first documents of the study in areas of rapid social change had as their sub-title—responsible emancipation. Soon word reached Geneva that groups of women in Asia, Africa and Latin America were taking a keen and lively interest, because their role in the society in which they lived was to seek emancipation, and particularly responsible emancipation. At the same time they were looking for the emancipation of their country or nation in the context of the family of nations.

The need for emancipation presupposes discrimination against certain groups in society or strongly one-sided pressure in group relationships. Once discrimination is felt to exist, there arises an irresistible urge to remedy the humiliating situation. The question of women's position in society shows that the social status of women changes from 'time-honoured different' to 'low' and 'unbearable' largely as a psychological process both in men and women. It does not follow that equality must be a complete equality, or rather, the content of complete equality may have a different meaning in different societies and different periods. But, wherever these differences rankle, they are regarded as inequality and discrimination.

Responsible emancipation is the active response of the person or group working for emancipation. Too often we find pseudo-emancipation in the form of an educational process or a gradual granting of rights by the ruling groups. Wherever there is a genuine urge towards emancipation from below the substitute of emancipation from above is not sufficient or is felt to be inadequate. Here are examples of this point: In a number of countries the abolition of slavery was an act of emancipation by the ruling classes of the government. In some cases the freed slaves were not prepared to make full use of their new status and legal emancipation did not make for genuine change. Real emancipation had to come later, through movements designed to raise the self-respect of the people concerned. And it is not

astonishing that in the southern states of the USA the process of emancipation among negroes is still going on.

Similarly, it is clear that the legal act of the transfer of sovereignty, even if this is the final phase of a national struggle for independence, is not the end of the story as far as the process of emancipation among other nations is concerned. Emancipation needs to be acquired, not given; it is not a mechanical or legal change in position, but a deeply emotional process.

In social life and in international relations as much as in the individual life of young men and women, discrepancies between the form and content of emancipation usually have far-reaching consequences in the creation of feelings of inadequacy, guilt or mistrust. These may spoil the relations from both points of view.

Responsible emancipation calls for great self restraint in the process of acquiring rights and position, both in the timing and the methods used. The Gandhian principle of *satiya graha* is a very profound example of the possibility of stressing the claims of the oppressed, whilst creating in their souls a sense of responsibility through willingness to suffer.

Responsible emancipation is also an ethical problem for those people and groups who have enjoyed hitherto special rights and have now to lose their ruling or leading position. There is much blindness and self-deception due to having had and perhaps having conscientiously carried out special duties of leadership. There is a need to re-evaluate one's own position and to view the claims of the other (people, group, nation) through their eyes.

Finally, on their path to emancipation people may find unselfish assistance from their fellow men, even where they themselves are affected by the change. In North America the North struggled for and with the negro. Liberal opinion in Great Britain spoke out in support of the Congress Party in India. There can and should be increasing solidarity between those who are discriminated against and those who are not. Only if this basic human solidarity is recognized by all can responsible emancipation gain its true goal.

Human dignity

In many countries from time to time, but in India specifically, one of the main goals of social change is the dignity of all men. Christians in India call for love towards 'the brother for whom Christ died', who is thus a real brother. Protests against in-

fringements upon human dignity are, however, not confined to Christians, nor are all Christians or churches vocal in this respect. Millions all over the world live in squalor, hungry and a prey to disease, poor and illiterate. Where then is the dignity of man, created in God's image? But this question can also be asked in the slums of many western cities and—at least until very recently—in connection with the unemployed and large numbers of old people.

In many of the processes of rapid social change human dignity is in danger. The Indian of the high Andes, the Zulu shepherd or the peasant in any Asian village differs greatly from the worker in the mines of Bolivia, Johannesburg or the unskilled worker in those oceans of nameless humanity in the big cities of Asia. It is more a problem of purpose in life and a certain freedom of decision than a matter of standard of living. Human dignity is often crushed by the big wheels of industry or extinguished in the glare of city lights.

At the same time, social change is the only real hope of restoring human dignity to those who have lost this precious value in an earlier phase of their history. People can feel no sense of responsibility for the realization of the fundamental human rights, if they are not aware of their unique value and dignity as members of society. There can be no striving after improvement if people do not see a glimmer of hope that soon —quite soon—conditions will change for them and their children.

The example of communist China, at least in the view of a great many visitors to that immense country, shows to what extent people are willing to suffer and labour, if they are convinced that their struggle is for the self-realization of their country and for the benefit of the younger generation.

One of the major challenges to the rich countries of the West is how to be a prime mover and to create in people living in countries with a low average income the feeling of dignity and willingness to co-operate 'on equal terms'. Too often the comparison merely serves to create envy or complacency. Too often the Westerner hurts the feelings of dignity in low income countries by conscious or unconscious bragging about the achievements of his own country.

Social justice

In Europe it has become customary to think of 'social justice'

either as something created by social change or as a value defended against the assaults of social change. It is the creation, growth, or protection of the rights of the individual or the endangered group in social institutions. Social justice can only be envisaged in an institutionalized form; yet it is more than the maintenance of basic law and justice in a legal sense.

The emancipation of low-status-groups and the dignity of the individual, in this connection, are never safe, unless society finds ways and means of translating basic human rights into specific social institutions.

Paternalism is pseudo-social justice and even the best personal relations, generosity and good-will cannot give adequate security and stability to relations between social groups. Emancipated people, or those striving for emancipation, want social justice, not charity.

In relations between nations and peoples of the West and those of the East there is a specific shortage of institutions aiming at social justice. Equal rights for small and powerful nations in the United Nations are only a legal formality if they are restricted to voting rights.

Do the low income nations have a right to share more equally in the riches of the more privileged nations? To what extent is there injustice if the majority of children in Asia and Africa have little opportunity to go to school? Are the violent price fluctuations of raw materials, especially those of agrarian origin, proof of injustice?

Great differences in economic or social positions become an injustice if the means of improving the situation are known. In international, as much as in national affairs, the realization of social justice requires, first of all, knowledge.

But it is also necessary that concerted action should be taken by all concerned. The less privileged must be drawn into the discussions which give rise to decision-making. And this requires institutionalization both in national and in international affairs. In international affairs in particular the machinery needed to establish institutions aiming at social justice is rare and, indeed, difficult to operate.

I am well aware of the fact that in thinking of man's relation to society the North American is less concerned with the idea of social justice than he is with the need for individual initiative and effort. Nevertheless, as the low income groups and countries

grow more and more conscious that united action can lead to decisive change, it is difficult to avoid some consideration of the meaning of social justice.

Even in the World Council of Churches, and throughout the ecumenical movement, there is great need to establish a framework of social justice on a world-wide scale. In missionary work and in inter-church aid it is almost as difficult as it is in the United Nations to develop a programme of co-operation and mutual aid, of mutual moral obligation. Charity (in the secular sense) is hard to accept and even harder to organize. Charity (in the biblical sense) is badly needed to turn aid into brotherly service.

Freedom

The feeling of freedom is essential to all human endeavour and the promise of freedom one of the most powerful agents in social change. Indeed, if 'reward awareness' is a catalyzer, freedom is a highly coveted reward.

In rapid social change the call for freedom has been insistent and more compelling than any other. Freedom is sought in a twofold sense—as a liberation from the chains which prevent or seem to prevent change and progress, and also as freedom to choose and decide on action to change the future.

Modern ideology and technology promise freedom from want, from hunger and from fear, and likewise from oppression. This is a freedom, based upon profound changes in human society, assuming that the human personality will be moulded according to the structure and needs of society.

The Gospel also promises freedom. But the teachings of Jesus are based upon the proclamation that liberation from the power of sin and death will change the human personality and that the whole of human life will be renewed and changed accordingly. Jesus' miracles in freeing people from disease and evil cannot be separated from his preaching on faith and obedience. Other proclaimers of freedom also see the need to demonstrate their power or at least to show ways which must lead to freedom. Whereas religions offer or promise freedom based upon profound changes in human personality, secular forces generally believe in conditioning people for new forms of behaviour and organization which very often turn out to be another form of slavery. Very often, therefore, Christians have been the moving

and catalyzing forces in processes of change only to find themselves in the position of uttering warnings against the abuse of newly acquired freedoms. By political or secular standards they are reckoned to have been inconsistent or wavering, and as a result they often have to suffer.

For churches to give testimony and for Christians to witness and serve in the midst of rapid social change, this perhaps is the most crucial task—to share critically and sacrificially in the processes of change in society, inspired by the freedom which is the privilege of God's children in this world.

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